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The history of modern science and technology is a story that cannot be told 
without attending to the military, destructive, and violent purposes motivating 
the search for new knowledge and devices.1 At certain times, the pace or novelty 
of developments have been seen as demanding social debate. The construction 
of atomic and nuclear weapons is perhaps the exemplary case where pause and 
concern has been evident about what the capabilities of some mean for the many.
At the start of the twenty-first century, warnings have been raised in some 
quarters about how — by intent or by mishap — advances in biotechnology 
and related fields could aid the spread of disease. Science academies, medical 
organisations, government commissions and security analysts, as well as 
individual researchers, are among those that have sought to engender pause and 
concern.2 While varied in the terms and tones of their messages, each has raised 
a weighty question: Might the life sciences be the death of us?
The forewarning by Serguei Popov provides an illustrative example. As a 
leading scientist in the extensive Soviet biological-weapons programme until 
the early 1990s, he contributed to attempts to genetically enhance classic 
biowarfare agents as well as devise novel ones. Looking into the future on the 
basis of this past, in an article for Technology Review titled ‘The Knowledge’,3 
1 For instance, see Rappert, B., Balmer, B. and Stone, J. 2008, ‘Science, technology and the military: 
Priorities, preoccupations and possibilities’, in The handbook of science and technology studies, London: MIT 
Press; James, A. 2007, ‘Science & technology policy and international security’, in Rappert B. (ed.), Technology 
& security: Governing threats in the new millennium, London: Palgrave.
2 For instance, see Lentzos, F. 2008, ‘Countering misuse of life sciences through regulatory multiplicity’, 
Science and Public Policy, vol. 35(1), pp. 55–64; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005, Report of commission on the intelligence capabilities of the United 
States regarding weapons of mass destruction, Washington, DC, available: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/
report/wmd_report.pdf [viewed 1 November 2009]; Fidler, D. and Gostin, L. 2008, Biosecurity in a global age, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 2006, Globalization, 
biosecurity and the future of the life sciences, Washington, DC: NRC; InterAcademy Panel 2005, IAP statement 
on biosecurity, 7 November, Trieste: IAP, available: http://www.nationalacademies.org/morenews/includes/
IAP_Biosecurity.pdf [viewed 1 November 2009]; National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in 
an age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National Academies Press; NSABB 2007, Proposed framework for the 
oversight of dual-use life sciences research, Bethesda, MD: NSABB; World Health Organization 2006, Biorisk 
management: Laboratory biosecurity guidance, September, Geneva: WHO.
3 Williams, M. 2006, ‘The Knowledge’, Technology Review, March/April.
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Popov outlined a number of accomplishments and possibilities in the Soviet 
programme that were becoming within reach of far-less-well resourced efforts. 
This was due to the growth in understanding of basic life processes and the 
accessibility of sophisticated technologies. Among the many prospects outlined 
included increasing the virulence of pathogens, synthesising viruses from 
common laboratory materials, modifying bacteria to induce debilitating diseases 
(including multiple sclerosis), as well as using pathogens to interfere with 
specific cellular targets in order to alter cognition, behaviour, and perception.
In the article, as typically happens elsewhere, such dire claims were accompanied 
by questions of a sceptical bent: would novel bioagents make for effective 
weapons in practice? Are sub-state groups or deranged individuals really in 
a position to produce them? Could the claims of former weapon developer 
be taken at face value? If it is relatively easy to deliberately spread disease, 
why have there not been more instances of bioattacks? Would controls on the 
conduct of research and the spread of technology make us safer or place us in 
greater danger?
‘The Knowledge’ concluded with a bleak assessment that: ‘I don’t know what 
kind of or scientific or political measures would guarantee that the new biology 
won’t hurt us.’ But the vital first step, Popov said, was for scientists to overcome 
their reluctance to discuss biological weapons. ‘Public awareness is very 
important. I can’t say it’s a solution to this problem. Frankly, I don’t see any 
solution right now. Yet first we have to be aware.’
Awareness and Education: Disagreement in 
Unanimity
Arguably these sentiments do not just represent the thinking of one man, but 
rather characterise the state of international thinking today regarding ‘what 
must be done and by whom?’4 As examined in the next section, a diverse array 
of assessments have been put forward about what dangers are associated with the 
life sciences and what should happen as a result. Calls for increased education 
of some kind have figured in recommendations across a range of concerns — 
from ensuring the physical safety of labs, to vetting experiment proposals, to 
tackling diseases that undermine economic development and thereby collective 




well-being.5 Education is envisioned as necessary in both those responses that 
call for informal self-governance by science communities as well as those that 
demand formal regulations.
However, as I have argued elsewhere, once one moves from such general calls 
to specific actions, a number of difficult choices must be addressed.6 Initial 
indications of these are given in Box 1. It lists some basic questions that arise in 
considering what should be done.
Claims of what is appropriate biosecurity education are potentially contentious 
because they are bound up with the exercise of authority and expertise. For 
instance, with regard to concerns about purpose mentioned in Box 1, some types 
of education focus on transmitting authoritative knowledge or values. However, 
particularly in relation to matters of ethics, resistance can be intense when some 
try to tell others what they should think. Alternative types of education instead 
stress the need to nurture individuals’ own reasoning so as to enable them to 
think through ethical problems on their own. Still other types are not focused 
on individuals, but seek to further the ability of people to work together in 
joint deliberations.7 Not only are these different approaches associated with 
alternative learning techniques and opportunities for questioning, they also 
suggest various ways of resolving what should be done.
5 As a sample of such calls, see Report of Royal Society and Wellcome Trust Meeting 2004, ‘Do no harm — 
Reducing the potential for the misuse of life-science research’, 7 October; World Medical Association 2002, 
Declaration of Washington on biological weapons, Washington, DC: WMA; National Research Council 2003, 
Biotechnology research in and age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National Academies Press; British Medical 
Association 1999, Biotechnology, weapons and humanity, London: Harwood Academic Publishers; United 
Nations 2005, Report of the meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/
MSP/2005/3 14, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org [viewed 1 November 2009]; National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity 2008, Strategic plan for outreach and education on dual use research, 10 December, 
available: http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/PDF/FinalNSABBReportonOutreachandEducationDec102008.pdf 
[viewed 1 November 2009].
6 Rappert, B. 2007a, ‘Education for the life sciences’ in Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds) A Web of 
prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the future governance of research, London: Earthscan, 
pp. 51–65. Available: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/br201/Research/Publications/Chapter%203.pdf [viewed 1 
November 2009].
7 See Päsänen, R. 2007, ‘International education as an ethical issue’ in Hayden, M., Levy, J. and Thompson, 
J. (eds) Research in international education, London: Sage, pp. 57–78.
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Box 1: The Who, What, and How of Education
What.should.education.entail.by.way.of.subject.matter?
Should it include the characteristics of diseases from expected 
dangerous agents, the physical and biological security otf laboratories, 
the history of offensive programmes by states, or the potential of 
civilian research to further the spread of disease?
Who.needs.to.be.educated?
Should they be pathogen investigators, bioscientists as a whole, those 
associated with life sciences in general, or the public?
What.is.the.purpose.of.education?
Should it seek to ‘implant’ knowledge or ‘elicit’ understanding?
Who.is.the.educator?
In other words, who is expert?
How.can.audiences.of.practising.scientists.or.other.practitioners.
be.reached?
How can their attention and active engagement be secured?
This volume examines a variety of attempts to bring greater awareness to 
security concerns associated with the life sciences. It identifies lessons from 
practical initiatives across a wide range of national contexts as well as more 
generic reflections about education and ethics. In offering their assessment about 
what must be done and by whom, each of the contributors addresses a host of 
challenging practical and conceptual questions. As a result, the volume will be 
of interest to those planning and undertaking activities elsewhere. In asking 
how education and ethics matter in an emerging area of unease, it will also be 
of interest to those with more general concerns about professional conduct and 
social problems.
Security and Biology: Dilemmas at Intersection
Before exploring the issues associated with education in more detail and 
introducing the chapters, this section continues focusing on the security 
implications of the life sciences. As will be argued, determining what to do by 
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way of education is not only challenging because of the choices available in how 
to foster learning, but also because of the stubborn dilemmas, ambiguities and 
uncertainties associated with understanding the issues at stake. While it might 
seem plausible that growing knowledge and capabilities equate with growing 
agency for hostile actions, much scope for contest is also evident in conception 
of the issues at stake. The manner in which this is done has implications for 
what kind of education should be pursued, with whom, and how.
Consider, then, a number of contentious areas:
Running.Faster
While in recent years some commentators have forwarded concerns about how 
developments in science and technology might aid the deliberate spread of 
disease, in practical terms, overwhelmingly research has been looked at as a 
way of countering identified threats. This is most marked in the US. Here a 
substantial expansion has taken place in biodefence and biodefence research. 
While in the financial year 2001 the US civilian biodefence funding totalled 
$569 million, in 2008 it was more than $5.3 billion.8 Research has been a core 
component of this expansion, with funding in excess of $3 billion per year 
since 2004, much of it led by the National Institutes of Health.9 In other words, 
the technologically sophisticated nightmares often envisioned have justified a 
similarly sophisticated response.
With the emphasis placed on staying ahead of threats through more research, 
worries have been expressed whether the shift in funding has established 
inappropriate priorities, blurred the boundary between internationally 
permissible defensive work, or created dangers regarding the accidental or 
intentional release of pathogens.10 With regard to the latter, the substantial 
expansion of biodefence funding has resulted in a corresponding increase in 
the number of individuals and facilities working with pathogenic agents. Given 
the conclusion of the FBI that the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks in 2001 
was an American working within the US Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases,11 the question has been posed more than once as to whether 
the multi-billion-dollar increase in biodefence has resulted in a proliferation 
of dangerous knowledge, skills and materials. At the time of writing, intense 
8 Franco, C. 2009, ‘Billions for biodefence’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 7(3): pp. 291–309.
9 See Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation 2008, Federal funding for biological weapons prevention 
and defense, Fiscal years 2001 to 2008, Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation.
10 See Enserink, M. and Kaiser, J. 2005, ‘Has biodefense gone overboard?’, Science, vol. 307(5714), pp. 
1396–98; Leitenberg, M., Leonard, J. and Spertzel, R. 2004, ‘Biodefense crossing the line’, Politics and the 
Life Sciences, vol. 22(2), pp. 1–2; Klotz, L. and Sylvester, E. 2009, Breeding bioinsecurity, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.
11 Bhattacharjee, Y. 2009, ‘The danger within’, Science, 6 March, pp. 1282–83.
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political debate is taking place in the US and elsewhere regarding what sort of 
screening and oversight of individuals should occur and who should control 
it. The underlying question of how much and what kind of defensive work is 
prudent remain topics on which governments and commentators have offered 
wildly opposing views.
In part, the question of what is appropriate defensive research is disputable 
because the ultimate ends served by that work are debatable. Much of the 
original increased funding in the US was designated for traditional ‘Category A’ 
agents (for example, anthrax, smallpox, plague). To some extent, in response to 
criticism about how this was establishing inappropriate research priorities, many 
of the funding programmes broadened their mission over time beyond a narrow 
conception of biodefence.12 However, owing to the multiple dimensions in which 
goals can be mutually co-opted in the researcher–funder relation, determining 
the significance of official priorities has meant agendas and outcomes require a 
fine-grained analysis.
Everywhere.and.Nowhere
One aspect of increased research scrutiny that has animated much debate is 
the suggestion that work carried out in universities or other traditionally 
open organisations might be inappropriate to conduct or communicate. Unlike 
questions about the safety or physical security of labs, this does not so much relate 
to how research is conducted, but rather to its so-called dual-use dimensions. 
This usage of the term refers to the potential use of knowledge and techniques 
for beneficial and hostile purposes. Therefore, since 2003 a number of funders, 
publishers and organisations (in the West) have introduced oversight processes 
to assess the risks and benefits of individual instances of research to determine 
whether they need to be modified or withdrawn.13
It is notable that such procedures rarely conclude that manuscripts, grant 
applications or experiment proposals should not be undertaken or restricted. 
For instance, in 2003 a group of 32 science journals agreed general guidelines 
for modifying, and perhaps rejecting, manuscripts where ‘the potential harm 
of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits’.14 However, it would 
seem no manuscript has ever been rejected on security grounds.15 As far as is 
known to the author, the same could be said of the funders that have established 
12 See Franco 2009, op cit.
13 Rappert, B. 2008a, ‘The benefits, risks, and threats of biotechnology’, Science & Public Policy, vol. 35(1), 
pp. 37–44.
14 Journal Editors and Authors Group 2003, PNAS, vol. 100(4), p. 1464.
15 Van Aken, J. and Hunger, I. 2009, ‘Biosecurity policies at international life-science journals’, Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism, vol. 7(1), pp. 61–72.
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submission-oversight systems.16 Perhaps even more notable with these review 
processes is the infrequency with which they have identified items ‘of concern’ 
in the first place.17
While data on research controls within government departments (especially 
defence-related ones) is not readily available, in relation to universities and 
other publicly funded agencies it seems justifiable to conclude that — barring 
dramatic changes — oversight processes will identify little research as posing 
security concerns and will stop next to nothing. This situation raises questions 
about the ultimate purposes and prospects of formal oversight procedures as 
well as who is conducting assessments and how (see below).
Formal.Policies.and.Informal.Practices
While many recently introduced formal dual-use procedures intended to weigh 
the perceived societal benefits and security risks of civilian research have not 
ruled any work should be halted, evidence suggests individual scientists might 
be acting otherwise. In 2007 the National Research Council and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conducted a survey of 
10,000 AAAS members. The 2009 report of that survey indicated that one in 
six respondents had made some changes in what research they did, how it was 
communicated, or who it was done with.18
The small response size (16 per cent for completed surveys and 20 per cent 
for partially completed ones) means it is not possible to treat the findings as 
representative of any grouping. However, even without making generalised 
claims, disparities between the reported practices and the outcomes of recently 
introduced review processes are notable.19
While some have taken the survey findings to indicate scientists are already 
acting responsibly to reduce risks,20 it seems more justified to ask further 
questions. One obvious question would be: why is there such inconsistency 
between the willingness of researchers to report forgoing aspects of their work 
with dual-use potential and the inability of formal process to do the same (or 
16 These include the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council, the UK Medical Research 
Council, the Wellcome Trust, the Center for Disease Control, and the Southeast Center of Regional Excellence 
for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefence.
17 So across all the journals in the Nature Publishing Group, roughly 15 papers were subjected to a special 
security review in 2005 and 2006. For further figures, see Rappert 2008a, op cit.
18 National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science 2009, A survey 
of attitudes and actions on dual-use research in the life sciences, Washington, DC: NRC and AAAS.
19 Though in this regard, 25 per cent of respondents to the survey indicated they had worked with ‘select 
agents’ in the past, therefore suggesting a possible reason for both the changes made to research practices and 
the awareness of dual-use concerns.
20 National Academies 2009, Survey samples life scientists’ views on ‘dual use’ research and bioterrorism, 
Press Release 9 February.
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even find any aspects of concern)? Within organisational sociology, the disparity 
between formal procedures and informal practices is a long-standing topic of 
commentary. Such a situation is not necessarily an occasion for arguing who has 
made the right decisions, but rather one for asking how alternative assumptions 
about proper working practices are informing conduct.
In relation to the themes of education central to this book, the disparity also 
raises the issue of how practitioners communicate concerns. Particularly in 
light of the lack of dual-use educational provisions as part of university degree 
programmes and the absence of professional attention to this topic in recent 
decades, how the scientists surveyed became concerned by hostile applications 
is an important matter that could signal pathways for educational interventions, 
such as seeking to make explicit practices that were previously implicit.21
Individual.versus.Cumulative.Developments
It seems reasonable to argue that one reason why dual-use risk-benefit review 
processes have not halted grant applications, manuscripts, and experiment 
applications is the difficulty of establishing the possible hazards associated 
with single-research inputs against the backdrop of pre-existing knowledge 
and capabilities. Despite ongoing attempts,22 making risk determinations is 
highly problematic. Even if reasonably robust assessment procedures could be 
devised, it is not clear that threats derive from discrete projects, so much as how 
cumulative developments in knowledge, know-how, and technologies enable 
additional possibilities for action. Just how that is happening is essential to 
understanding what is possible (see below).
Therefore, rather than focusing on whether particular experiments should 
go ahead, it seems more fruitful to ask what directions should be funded in 
the first place.23 Some of the lines of biodefence undertaken in the US and 
elsewhere (particularly those associated with characterising threats) might be 
questionable in terms of their necessity. Positively, directions of work that might 
enhance security by fostering international collaboration and development, as 
suggested in the DNA for Peace initiative, could be supported.24 This ‘macro’ 
attention towards research directions is not without problems too, such as how 
21 For a discussion of this as a prevalent form of ethical training, see Halpren, S. 2004, Lesser harms, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
22 Royal Society 2009, New approaches to biological risk assessment,29 July, London: Royal Society.
23 Johnson, D. 1999, ‘Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science’, Science and 
Engineering Ethics, vol. 5(4), pp. 445–61.
24 DNA for peace: Reconciling biodevelopment and biosecurity,available: http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/home/
documents/DNA_Peace.pdf [viewed 1 November 2009].
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to anticipate research results. However, what is clear is that attention to date 
on dual-use issues has been directed at individual elements of research at the 
expense of other approaches.
‘Dual.Use’.is….‘X’.is…
In the paragraphs above, ‘dual use’ refers to the potential for knowledge and 
techniques to serve beneficial and hostile purposes. In doing so, it is roughly 
in line with the highly influential report by the US National Academies, 
Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism.25 However, like other terms with a 
rising currency of late — such as ‘biosecurity’26 or ‘codes of conduct’27 — ‘dual 
use’ has its own history. It is often taken to mean different things by different 
people. That ambiguity has no doubt been part of its attraction.
This indistinctness brings certain hazards too. One is a lack of clarity and 
corresponding misunderstanding in what is being argued about the relation 
between science and security. For instance, Atlas and Dando have offered a 
distinction between three dual-use aspects of the life sciences to avoid conflations. 
They distinguish between: 1) how notionally civilian facilities can be used to 
develop biological weapons; 2) how agents and equipment intended for peaceful 
purposes can be used in the production of bioweapons; and 3) how knowledge 
generated through science can aid those seeking to produce weapons.28 They 
argue each is associated with its own conundrums and require specific types 
of responses — mandatory international inspections and transparency in the 
case of facilities; balanced export controls and domestic oversight in the case of 
agents and equipment; and a culture of responsibility in relation to knowledge.
Other matters are at stake in our use of terminology and concepts than possible 
misunderstanding. As McLeish argues, questionable assumptions can often 
underlie reference to the dual-use presumptions that rarely get scrutinised 
because of the ready labelling of science and technology as such. As she argues, 
much of the security analysis relies on an outdated linear model of innovation 
wherein science is applied to produce new technologies. In addition, the locus 
of concern with dual-use issues in many commentaries often shifts in an uneasy 
and unacknowledged manner between the transfer of materials, the intention 
of users of knowledge and technology, and the physical characteristics of 
technology itself.
25 National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press.
26 See Rappert and Gould (eds) 2009, op. cit.
27 Rappert, B. 2007b, ‘Codes of conduct and biological weapons’, Biosecurity & Bioterrorism, vol. 5(2), pp. 
145–54.
28 Atlas, R. and Dando, M. 2006, ‘The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: Perspectives, conundrums, 
and global solutions’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 4(3), pp. 1–11.
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For such reasons, the language adopted to characterise the security dimensions 
of science and technology can also cloud understanding.29
What.are.Biological.Weapons?
Greatly aiding efforts to prevent the deliberate spread of disease is the widespread 
denunciation of any such act. As opposed to other fields, such as nuclear science, 
weaponising the latest research findings is generally seen as inappropriate in the 
life sciences. Within customary and international law, as well as the rhetoric of 
states, ‘biological weapons’ are set apart from other weapons in that they are 
treated as a distinct category.30
In some ways this has only displaced controversy to the question of what counts 
as a biological weapon in the first place.31 This is most evident in debates about 
the appropriateness of biochemical compounds as instruments of force.32 The 
use by Russian security forces of a fentenyl gas (an opium-based narcotic) 
during the Moscow theatre siege in 2002 provides one example of the types of 
options being pursued by states for law enforcement and military operations 
that might be designated ‘biological’. Additionally, governments such as the US 
have examined more sophisticated biochemical choices to alter consciousness, 
behaviour and emotions.33  The acceptability and permissibility of such 
biochemical agents is fought out, in part, through terminology. Proponents make 
use of labels such as ‘calmatives’, ‘incapacitants’ and (misleadingly) ‘non-lethal 
weapons’.34 Should such developments lead to a legitimate role for bioagents 
as a means of force, the implications for the current stigmatisation of biological 
weapons would likely be substantial.
What.are.‘Effective’.Biological.Weapons?
As a final area of contention, much disagreement is evident today regarding the 
extent of biothreats. Some of this stems from underlining presumptions about 
29 It should be kept in mind though that ambiguity in meaning is often highly valuable in building shared 
agendas.
30 This in contrast to the suggestion by many of those involved in offensive programmes that biological 
weapons are not different from others. See Domaradskil, I. and Orent, W. 2003, Biowarrior: Inside the Soviet/
Russian biological war machine, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, p. 150; Balmer, B. 2002, ‘Killing “without” the 
distressing preliminaries’, Minerva, vol. 40(1), pp. 57–75.
31 See Rappert, B. 2006, Controlling the weapons of war: Politics, persuasion and the prohibition of inhumanity, 
London: Routledge, Chapter 6.
32 For an overview, see Pearson, A., Chevrier, M. and Wheelis, M. (eds) 2007, Incapacitating biochemical 
weapons: Promise or peril?, Lanham, MA: Lexington Books.
33 Dando, M. 2009, ‘Biologists napping while work militarized’, Nature, vol. 460, p. 950; British Medical 
Association 2007, Drugs as weapons, London: BMA House.
34 See Rappert, B. 2003, Non-lethal weapons as legitimizing forces?: Technology, politics and the management 
of conflict, London: Frank Cass.
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what counts as a concern. Certainly within the West, much emphasis is with 
sub-state groups. The limited number of bioterror attacks in the past and the 
difficulties experienced by even well-funded groups using classic pathogens 
(for instance, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult35) suggest a low likelihood of 
mass casualties by terrorist groups acting alone.36 Therefore, the possibility that 
such groups could or would want to make use of today’s cutting-edge science is 
even more remote, at least anytime ‘soon’.
However, the situation is more complex than this. Even if it is accepted that 
inflicting mass casualties requires a well-resourced state programme, concerns 
can derive from the fear and disruption caused by deliberate spread of disease. 
As illustrated in the case of the 2001 anthrax letters, attacks need not inflict 
mass casualties to be highly consequential. ‘Weapons of mass disruption’ rather 
than ‘weapons of mass destruction’ sums up a contrast.
Concern can intensify when the basis for disruption is analysed. Fundamental 
to the international prohibition of bioweapons today is the view that these 
weapons are especially abhorrent. That orientation is expressed in international 
accords such as the Biological Weapons Convention. The continuing promotion 
of such agreements and related rules, in turn, reinforces this negative standing. 
Indeed, it is the manner in which biological weapons are treated as distinctly 
repugnant that would likely contribute to significant fear and disruption in the 
case of an attack.
Education as…
The previous section posed some major weaknesses in thinking about the life 
sciences–security relation. When this is understood to involve uncertainties 
and unknowns where much scope exists for disagreement, the question of what 
should happen by way of education becomes less straightforward than it might 
initially appear.
This section adds further density to the picture. While some of the who’s, what’s, 
and how’s of education were noted above, this section examines the multiple 
roles, functions, and standing sought for education. The goal is not to consider 
the details of what teaching efforts should include, but how education in general 
35 See Furukawa, K. 2009, ‘Dealing with the dual-use aspects of life science activities in Japan’, in Rappert 
and Gould (eds), op. cit.
36 As argued in Ouagrham-Gormley, S and Vogel, K. 2010, ‘The social context shaping bioweapons (non)
proliferation’, Biosecurity & Bioterrorism, Volume 8(1) and Leitenberg, M. 2001, Biological weapons in the 
twentieth century: A review and analysis, Washington, DC: FAS, available: http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/
bw20th.htm [viewed 1 November 2009]. For a critical response to the claims in this chapter by Popov, see 
Macfarlane, A. 2006, ‘Assessing the threat’, Technology Review, March/April.
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is positioned within debates about the science–security relation. By considering 
the many things education can be understood as, this section will help position 
the practical initiatives and proposals summarised in the next section. As will 
be apparent, the issues at stake extend well beyond what individuals sitting at 
benches know or think.
…Prerequisite
Education can be treated as necessary for other security-related activities to 
be undertaken. For instance, much store has been placed in professional codes 
of conduct since 2001.37 Such options have been said by many to be a way of 
promoting self-governance. The circulation of codes would foster a culture of 
responsibility by making scientists more aware and providing ethical guidance. 
However, efforts to devise meaningful codes have largely floundered. In no 
small part, this has been due to the lack of prior awareness and attention by 
researchers as well as science organisations to the destructive applications of the 
life sciences.38 Before codes can help teach, education is needed.
Also, consider the dual-use reviews noted in the previous section. The Wellcome 
Trust, the British Biological Sciences Research Council and the British Medical 
Research Council are among those funders that have established grant-review 
procedures. Each relies on applicants to self-identify cases where work could 
generate outcomes open to misuse for harmful purposes. In light of the limited 
professional attention to this possibility in recent decades, it seems quite likely 
that a lower identification rate is taking place than would be the case with a 
highly dual-use-aware community of applicants.
The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was established 
to advise the federal government how to respond to the dual-use potential of the 
life sciences. It similarly advocates a system for the oversight of experiments 
that relies on lead investigators to undertake the initial determination of 
whether their work is ‘of concern’.39 In recognition of the need for those making 
such assessments to be cognisant of security threats though, as well as other 
provisions it recommends that: ‘All federal agencies involved in the conduct 
and support of life sciences research […] should require that their employees, 
contractors, and institutional grantees train all research staff in the identification 
and management of dual-use research of concern.’40
37 Rappert, B. 2009, Experimental secrets: International security, codes, and the future of research, New York: 
University Press of America.
38 Rappert 2007b, op. cit.
39 NSABB 2007, Proposed framework for the oversight of dual-use life sciences research: Strategies for 
minimizing the potential misuse of research information, Bethesda, MD: NSABB.
40 NSABB 2008, Strategic plan for outreach and education on dual-use research issues, Bethesda, MD: NSABB.
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Some have argued this goes far enough. An alternative model for oversight 
proposed by a group at the University of Maryland advocates independent peer 
reviewers should carry out the identification of what is of concern. In part, this 
was justified by citing the likely limits on the security expertise of researchers, 
even if they had undergone some formal training.41
…Deficiency.Correcting
Much of the current analysis of what practising researchers know — be that 
regarding laboratory physical security42 or wider ethical/arms-control issues — 
posits a deficiency model.43 That is to say, they note a lack of knowledge held 
by certain groups. Education is advocated as a way to correct that ignorance. 
Knowledge is taken to be good: more knowledge leads to better decisions. 
Depending on the size of the hole perceived and the value attached to additional 
knowledge, a call is made for voluntary or mandatory measures, often through 
formal teaching.44
The particulars of how deficiency is portrayed are highly consequential in 
framing what kinds of problems exist and how they can be addressed. Take 
the case of the NSABB Working Group on Communication.45 In line with the 
review processes adopted by certain journals, the NSABB Charter required it 
to ‘advise on national policies governing publication, public communication, 
and dissemination of dual-use research methodologies and results’. At the first 
public meeting of the NSABB in late 2005, the Communication Working Group 
stated it would:
• Identify concerns and examine options and strategies for addressing 
issues related to the communication of dual-use research information.
• Develop draft recommendations for the NSABB that will facilitate 
the consistent application of well-considered principles to decisions 
about communication of information with biosecurity implications.46
41 Harris, E. 2007, ‘Dual-use biotechnology research: The case for protective oversight’, in Rappert and 
McLeish (eds) op. cit.
42 For a range of analyses of what is known by researchers around the world on this matter, see the 
publications of the International Biological Threat Reduction Group and Sandia National Laboratories at 
http://www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/main.html?subpages/documents.html.
43 For a further discussion of this model within discussions about science, see Bush, J., Moffatt, S. and 
Dunn, C. 2001, ‘Keeping the public informed?’, Public Understanding of Science, vol. 10, pp. 213–29.
44 For an instance of the latter, see Rappert, B. and Davidson, M. 2008, ‘Improving oversight: development 
of an educational module on dual-use research in the West’, Conference Proceeding for Promoting Biosafety 
and Biosecurity within the Life Sciences: An International Workshop in East Africa, 11 March, Kampala: 
Ugandan Academy of Sciences.
45 For a further analysis of this example, see Rappert, B. 2008b, ‘Defining the emerging concern with 
biosecurity’, Japan Journal for Science, Technology and Society, vol. 17, pp. 95–116.
46 Kiem, P. 2005, ‘Working group on communication of dual-use research results, methods, and technologies’, 
Meeting of National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 21 November, Bethesda, MD.
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As such, ‘the problem’ was to reduce the prospect that otherwise benignly 
intended findings might aid development of bioweapons. This framing 
shifted quite quickly. By July 2006 ‘the public’ assumed a prominent position 
within deliberations of the working group. Because of an acknowledged lack 
of understanding of science, the fear repeatedly expressed was that future 
media reports could spur the public to demand (inappropriate) dissemination 
restrictions. In response, the Communication Working Group’s main charges 
deriving from the NSABB Charter were modified to:
• Facilitate consistent and well-considered decisions about communication of 
information with biosecurity implications.
• Demonstrate to the public that scientists recognise, and are being responsive 
to, concerns about the security implications of their work.47
With the latter requiring the public to be properly informed about the dangers 
posed from open publishing (manageable, relatively limited, etc.). This re-
specification was in line with a wider movement within the NSABB deliberations 
to focus on the ‘threats from science’ (and thus the need for new polices and 
oversight measures) while also considering the ‘threats to science’ (from new 
polices and oversight measures). In this way, alternative notions of who is 
deficient suggest other problems and solutions.
Following on from this, more knowledge is not always seen as good, at least 
not entirely. While it might regularly be advocated that researchers should be 
more cognisant of the dual-use potential of science and technology, the same 
cannot be said of ‘the public’. Much debate is evident about just how loudly 
security concerns should be made known to the population at large.48 Scant 
efforts made prior to 2001 (and even since) by scientists to popularise how their 
work might aid the production of bioweapons indicate the historical pattern of 
not seeking to foster wider debate and awareness. So while many have dismissed 
the security concerns associated with the publication of certain experiments — 
such as the IL-4 mousepox and the synthetic creation of poliovirus — because 
their findings were already well known among specialists,49 the question can be 
asked why such possibilities were not more widely mooted before.
This last point also raises the prospect that without more engagement 
from practising researchers, policy and security analysts might be forming 
inappropriate threat assessments because of the haphazard way certain concerns 
have received a wide airing.
47 Kiem, P. 2006, ‘Working group on communication of dual-use research results, methods, and technologies’, 
Meeting of National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 13 July, Bethesda, MD.
48 For a discussion of this, see Rappert, B. 2007c, Biotechnology, security and the search for limits: An inquiry 
into research and methods, London: Palgrave, Chapter 5.




Another way to question the treatment of education is simply to question 
its utility. A fundamental tenet in social research is that behaviour is more 
influenced by situational conditions than personal dispositions. In other words, 
what people do is highly dependent on the situations in which they find 
themselves and the pressures they experience. As such, it is little wonder so 
many doctors, biologists, engineers and others in the Soviet Union were willing 
to take part in its offensive programme. While it is unclear how many involved 
knew about the international prohibition enshrined in the Biological Weapons 
Convention, it does seem clear that familiarity with the text would have done 
little to alter their participation.
Besides such coercive environments, it can be said that standards of ethics and 
practice are intertwined with the imperatives under which individuals operate. 
For instance, how those in hospitals deal with the confounding choices about life 
and death experienced on a daily basis must be understood as being indebted to 
the social organisation of the hospital itself.50 In these settings, mundane issues 
such as the relative power of nurses, doctors and administrators are highly 
pertinent in what decisions are made. Therefore, it would not be enough for 
nurses to receive instruction about ethical principles for them to act in a way 
they would regard as right. Similarly, in the case of laboratory researchers, the 
cultures and reward structures of labs (for example, ‘publish or perish’) can 
reduce the prospects of individuals acting in a way they judge as proper, or can 
work against the recognition of ethical problem in the first place.51 This can take 
place whatever individuals believe should be the case.
Thus in any discussion about education, it is necessary to ask where it can be 
made to matter and what weight it can be expected to bear.
…a.Social.Problem
While the extensive participation of experts in offensive bioweapons 
programmes during the twentieth century suggests limitations to education, 
this history also indicates the potential for it to contribute to hostile activities. 
When ethics instruction is conceived as the dissemination of values, just what 
those values are is central in evaluating the benefits of what is learnt. If duty to 
50 Chambliss, D. 1996, Beyond caring: Hospitals, nurses and the social organization of ethics, London: 
University of Chicago Press.
51 National Research Council 2009, Ethics education and scientific and engineering research: What’s been 
learned? What should be done?, Washington, DC: NRC, Chapter 6. For a wider examination of this, see Vaughan, 
D. 1996, The Challenger launch decision, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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one’s country52 is taught to be the paramount concern, then it easy to envision 
how education might not always be a ‘force for good’.53 The method of education 
can foster relations of subordination too that are contrary to maintaining peace.
More widely, efforts to instruct always come with commitments and assumptions. 
These can mean that education functions to maintain existing inequalities.54 So 
while the unacceptability of biological weapons is generally unquestioned within 
diplomatic circles today, that does not necessarily make for a non-problematic 
common pedagogical message. As Richard Falk suggested, the recent regime 
restricting bioweapons must be seen in its political context. Writing in 2001, 
he suggested this context was one in which the US was trying to divert public 
attention away from existing US nuclear capabilities. It was against this selective 
prioritisation that he asked whether:
The ongoing process that supports CW [chemical warfare] and BW 
[biological warfare] regimes, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty regimes, [should] be re-evaluated and possibly rejected? From the 
perspective of the equality of states, a fundamental norm in international 
law, are these regimes embodiments of the hegemonic structure of world 
politics that controls and deforms diplomatic practice?55
Herein, what is good and why must always be understood ‘in context’, though 
what counts as the right context is the stuff of political debate. Any education 
message is going to contest competing notions about what is right. When 
approached in this way, it is not hard to see how others could interpret efforts 
taken in one country to promote security mindedness as imperialistic.
Somewhat less critical, certain types of education can be thought to take time 
and energy away from dealing with causes of problems. For instance, abstract 
and hypothetical instruction about ethical problem-solving that is removed 
from the real experiences of individuals can do more harm than good. To the 
extent that ethics is taught without reference to power relations that give rise 
to practical conflicts and dilemmas, it can mask the sources of tension and 
perpetuate inaction.56
52 Or group difference, see Nelles, W. (ed.) 2004, Comparative education, terrorism and human security, 
London: Palgrave.
53 Moving outside a consideration of biological weapons, it can be noted that the education system in a 
wide range of countries does little to dissuade individuals from using their knowledge and skills to perfect 
forms of killing.
54 Saltman, K. and Gabbard, D. (eds) 2003, Education as enforcement: the militarization and corporatization 
of schools, London: Routledge; Apple, M. 2000, Official knowledge: democratic knowledge in a conservative age, 
London: Routledge; and Harber, C. 2004, Schooling as violence: how schools harm pupils and societies, London: 
Routledge.
55 Falk, R. 2001, ‘The challenges of biological weaponry’, in Wright, S. (ed.), Biological warfare and 
disarmament, London: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 29.




Consider another concern, that of treating education as distraction. This does not 
pertain to those being educated, but to those talking about the need to educate 
others. For instance, in recent years the awareness and training of scientists has 
been a topic of international consideration within the States Parties meetings 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Since the failure in 
2001–02 to agree a legally binding verification measure for the convention, 
yearly meetings have been structured through an intersessional process. In 
this, governments engage in non-binding discussions about selected topics. The 
education of scientists figured as a significant theme within the 2003, 2005 and 
2008 meetings.
However, from its inception, questions have been raised about the value of the 
intersessional process. At least one reason is that it distracts delegates from 
attempts to agree verification instruments or other compulsory measures.57 
Worse still, over time it might establish low expectations. Even if one concludes 
the BTWC intersessional process has been useful, how long ‘mere’ discussion 
should go on is open to debate. Comparing biosecurity education against other 
possibilities for action (or even more generic education possibilities) shows how 
the worth of any activity can be queried.
…Guardianship
Alternatively, and more positively, the education of scientists could be seen as 
a way of ensuring conventions and agreements — such as the BTWC — remain 
meaningful. This is because further awareness of the security implications of 
science and of the international instruments for the prohibition of bioweapons 
leads to more engaged scientific communities. By taking greater notice of 
and participation in the relevant activities, practitioners could help ensure 
governments are aware of their own commitments and labour to undertake 
effectual actions. By extending the range of those working to eliminate 
bioweapons, this could also reinforce the stigma against the deliberate spread 
of disease.58
57 See Chevrier, M. 2002/03, ‘Waiting for Godot or saving the show? The BWC Review Conference reaches 
modest agreement’, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 68, available: http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/68bwc.
htm [viewed 1 November 2009].
58 For a further argument of these points, see Revill, J. and Dando, M. 2008, ‘Life scientists and the need for 




Additionally, the widespread concord regarding the value of awareness and 
education could be utilised as a stepping-stone for moving ahead on other 
matters. Within the recent meetings of the BTWC a number of issues, such as 
promoting international co-operation and verification measures, have proven 
highly contentious. Likewise, proposals for oversight and dual-use reviews 
of research can generate heated debate. However, awareness and education 
are matters on which those from security, scientific, diplomatic, and other 
backgrounds can reach general consensus. Therefore, achieving understanding 
and progress here could help secure advancement in relation to more overtly 
problematic areas. It might also help indicate how to establish progress. In 
relation to the BTWC, the discussion-only terms set for the intersessional process 
since 2003 have led to an absence of the international targets and metrics. As a 
comparatively approachable topic, setting international standards for education 
could be agreed as a way of opening peoples’ imaginations to the possibility of 
setting other measurable goals.59
…Enrolment
The last two sub-sections, in particular, questioned whether education is 
orientated towards being an end itself or a preliminary step towards another, 
secondary, end. As has happened in relation to codes of conduct, contrasting 
assumptions can underlie similar calls for action. In the case of codes, those 
(often implicit) assumptions related to whether their adoption would placate the 
need for additional oversight measures or whether they were part of a stepwise 
movement towards comprehensive systems of control (for instance, the licensing 
of scientists).60
This suggests the need to interpret calls for education as part of enrolment 
processes. Through setting agendas, framing problems, and establishing 
interested networks, what is being done today is helping to form possibilities 
for future action. Whether through purposeful direction or unintended 
preoccupation, the choices made about what kind of education should be 
pursued or how it is being discussed are shaping directions for the future. 
Just how much this is taking place and in which directions are important 
considerations.
59 For a discussion of possible international goals, see Dando, M. 2008, ‘Acting to educate life scientists’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 31 October, available: http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/
malcolm-dando/acting-to-educate-life-scientists [viewed 1 November 2009].




The previous section suggested the range of possibilities that can be sought from 
education as well as talk of education. The remaining chapters demonstrate that 
variety by describing diverse efforts to educate scientists and others about the 
life science–security relation.
The chapters in Part One begin by extending the analysis of education presented 
in this introduction to questions of ethics. Selgelid examines the intersection 
of ethics and dual-use concerns. His goal is not only to outline the ethical 
dimensions of the multiple uses of research, but also to ask why bioethics has 
had so little to say until recently about this topic. In Chapter 2, Sture analyses 
what lessons past developments in medical and business ethics hold.
Part Two recounts national experiences to promote awareness and institute 
educational measures. In doing so, the chapters detail the current attention paid 
to biosecurity and dual-use issues in the countries under consideration. As will 
be evident, different countries are in very varied situations with regards to 
their past engagement and to their basis for moving forward. In describing their 
experiences, Garraux, Friedman, Minehata and Shinomiya, Barr and Zhang, 
Connell and McCluskey, as well as Enemark, provide many entry points and 
models for promoting education.
Part Three moves on from national activities to reflect on international 
possibilities. Mancini and Revill review their efforts to establish a collaborative 
Biosecurity Education Network. Part of that entailed the presentation of tailored 
educational material to life-science students. In Chapter 10, Whitby and Dando 
consider the rationale for the Biosecurity Education Module Resource noted 
by Mancini and Revill, including how it could figure within the work of civil 
organisations as well as the BTWC. Johnson then asks how ethics training about 
security issues could be made professionally relevant for scientists, in particular, 
by advocating the potential of role-playing exercises.61 In the Conclusion, 
Bezuidenhout and I draw together strains from these chapters in an effort to 
point the way for future action and research.
61 For a further consideration of role-playing exercises for biological weapons, see Rappert, B., Chevrier, M. 
and Dando, M. 2006, In-Depth Implementation Publications of the BTWC: Education and Outreach Bradford 
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During the past decade, the problem of dual-use research, science, and 
technology has been one of the most debated issues in discourse surrounding 
biological weapons and the bioterrorist threat, and a particularly controversial 
topic regarding science policy. The expression ‘dual use’ was historically used 
to refer to technology, equipment, and facilities that could be used for both 
civilian and military purposes. Conceived this way, dual-use technology is not 
necessarily something to worry about. To the contrary, this kind of technology 
was sometimes considered desirable from the standpoint of policymakers — 
a way of killing two birds with one stone. Policymakers were nonetheless 
concerned about exporting such technologies to adversary countries.
In contemporary discourse the expression ‘dual use’ is usually used to refer 
to research, science and technology that can be used for both good and bad 
purposes. While almost anything can have multiple functions, current debates 
have been primarily concerned with bad purposes involving weapons — and, 
most commonly, weapons of mass destruction in particular (that is, where the 
consequences of malevolent use would be most severe). Of specific concern 
is the possibility that recent developments in the life sciences may enable 
development of a new generation of especially dangerous bioweapons.1
Such concerns are illustrated by a number of controversial experiments 
published during the past decade, such as the genetic engineering of a 
superstrain of vaccine-resistant mousepox,2 the artificial synthesis of a live polio 
1 National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press.
2 Jackson, R. J., Ramsay, A. J., Christensen, C. D., Beaton, S., Hull, D. F. and Ramshaw, I. A. 2001, ‘Expression 
of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and 
overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’, Journal of Virology, vol. 75, pp. 1205–10.
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virus from scratch,3 and the reconstruction of the 1918 Spanish Flu virus;4 and 
the general phenomenon of converging technologies, such as synthetic biology 
and bionanotechnology.5 Given these and other developments, life scientists are 
currently in a situation very similar to that faced by atomic physicists early 
in the twentieth century, when key discoveries that enabled production (and 
use) of the first atomic bombs were made. Like nuclear technology, powerful 
technologies made possible by the rapid progress of the life sciences may have 
great benefits for humankind, but they could also have disastrous consequences 
if employed by those bent on causing destruction.
The dual-use phenomenon raises important questions about the responsibilities 
of scientists, research institutions, the scientific community, publishers, and 
policymakers. Responsible actors at each of these levels should aim to promote 
the progress of science insofar as such progress will benefit humanity; but 
they should aim to avoid outcomes where developments ultimately result in 
more harm than good. One popular idea in recent debates about the dual-use 
problem is that we should aim for policy that strikes a balance between the goal 
to promote scientific progress (and the good things thereby enabled) and the 
goal to protect security.6
While that sounds plausible, open questions remain: What, for example, would 
be an appropriate balance between scientific progress and security; and how 
could such a balance be attained in practice? Should we rely on voluntary 
self-governance, or is more governmental oversight called for? Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the scientific community is strongly in favour of ‘bottom-up’ 
solutions to dual-use research governance (that is, voluntary self-governance). 
It is commonly held that new codes of conduct addressing responsibilities 
related to dual-use research should be adopted, and that scientists should be 
further educated about the potential dual-use implications of their work; but 
scientists generally resist the idea that solutions to problems raised by the dual-
use phenomenon should involve increased governmental control over scientific 
enterprise. Among other things, they argue that autonomy is essential to science 
progress and that governmental interference would be both counterproductive 
(unnecessarily stifling important and beneficial research) and violate the right 
to freedom of inquiry (academic freedom) and (in the case of governmental 
censorship of dangerous discoveries) freedom of speech.
3 Cello, J., Paul, A. V. and Wimmer, E. 2002, ‘Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of an 
infectious virus in the absence of natural template’, Science, vol. 9, pp. 1016–18.
4 Tumpey, T. M., Basler, C. F., Aguilar, P. V., Zeng, H., Solórzano, A., Swayne, D. E., Cox, N. J., Katz, J. M., 
Taubenberger, J. K., Palese, P. and García-Sastre, A. 2005, ‘Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish 
influenza pandemic virus’, Science, vol. 310, pp. 77–80.
5 Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 2006, Globalization, biosecurity and the future of the 
life sciences, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
6 National Research Council 2004, op cit.
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Bioethics’ Neglect of Dual-Use Discourse
The main parties to debates about the responsibilities of scientists and other 
actors — and relevant debates about the governance of dual-use research — 
have, to date, mainly been scientists and security experts. With the exception 
of a small and recently emerging literature, notably absent from such debates 
has been the voice of (bio)ethicists in particular. This is unfortunate partly 
because the dual-use dilemma is, by its very nature, an ethical one. Talk about 
‘beneficial and malevolent’ or ‘good and bad’ uses of science and technology, 
the ‘promotion of benefits and the avoidance of harms’, and the ‘responsibilities’ 
of actors all fall squarely within the realm of ethics: the discipline explicitly 
concerned with issues of good and bad, right and wrong, and the duties and 
responsibilities of human beings.
Above, I indicated that a plausible and popular notion is that we should aim for 
policy that strikes a balance between the goal to promote security and the goal 
to promote scientific progress; the idea being that heavy regulation of science 
might promote security at too high a price with regard to scientific progress and 
that too little oversight might facilitate science progress at too high a price with 
regard to security. This raises questions about the (nature of the) value of security 
and the (nature of the) value of scientific progress — and questions about how 
such values should be balanced against one another in cases of conflict. For 
example, should security be considered to be merely of instrumental value — 
something that should be valued only insofar as it promotes (other) things that 
are considered to be intrinsically valuable (that is, valued for their own sake)? 
Or is security itself intrinsically valuable? These are all ethical questions.
Questions about norms, values and what social policy should be are precisely 
the kinds of things that ethics is concerned with. While science is concerned 
with what is the case; ethics, by definition, is concerned with what should or 
ought to be the case. Although their contribution to debates about dual use is 
(for obvious reasons) absolutely essential, scientists and security experts have 
no special expertise for analysis of normative questions such as these, and so 
more input from ethicists is crucial. A broader, more interdisciplinary discussion 
about the dual-use problem is wanted.
Given that bioethicists have had so much to say about research ethics in general 
and the social implications of genetic research and science in particular, it 
is surprising that they have not been more actively engaged in discussions 
about dual-use life-science research. Discourse surrounding research ethics 
has traditionally focused on the protection of human and animal subjects 
rather than dangers associated with the potential malevolent use of research 
findings. Recent decades have witnessed enormous attention from bioethicists 
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to ‘ethical, legal, and social implications’ (ELSI) of the genetics revolution. In 
the early days of DNA recombinant technology, environmental safety was a 
focus of bioethics discussion regarding genetics research. More recently ELSI 
discourse surrounding genetics has focused on the (clinical) safety of genetic 
therapy (or research pertaining thereto), genetic determinism, genetic testing, 
genetic discrimination, genetic enhancement, selective reproduction (that is, 
eugenics), cloning, stem-cell research, DNA fingerprinting, and the patenting 
of genetic sequences. That these have, to date, undeniably been the standard 
topics of ELSI discourse is quickly revealed by examination of titles, abstracts, 
tables of contents, and indexes of texts concerned with ELSI issues surrounding 
genetics. Though concern regarding dual-use life-science research largely relates 
to genetics in particular, and although the weapons implications of genetics 
may turn out to be the most serious (ethical and social) consequence of the 
genetics revolution, those concerned with the ethical implications of genetics 
have traditionally (and until only very recently, and in exceptional cases) been 
almost entirely silent about the potential weapons implications of genetics.
The lack of bioethics’ attention to this topic is partly revealed by Robert 
Cooke-Deegan’s canonical history of the Human Genome Project, The Gene 
Wars.7 Cooke-Deegan’s volume explicitly includes coverage of the politics and 
ethical debate surrounding the new genetics, and it even includes a chapter 
entitled ‘Genes and the Bomb’. Despite the links it draws between genetics 
and atomic weapons, however, the volume never mentions the biological-
weapons implications of genetics. This is odd partly because (as Cooke-Deegan 
demonstrates) important origins of the Human Genome Project are found in 
the US Department of Energy and the Los Alamos laboratories where the first 
atomic bombs were made. Such organisations were interested in genetics partly 
because they wanted to learn about radiation’s effects on genetic material. Given 
these organisations’ explicit concern with (albeit nuclear) weapons of mass 
destruction, not to mention their governmental and military affiliations, one 
expects that those involved would have recognised and considered the weapons 
potential of the genetics revolution very early on. Therefore, it is surprising 
that discussion of such issues is not included in Cooke-Deegan’s commentary on 
debates surrounding socially controversial aspects of genetics.
It is commonly said in ELSI discourse that the power of genetics is comparable to 
the power of atomic physics, and that we thus need more ethical discussion and 
reflection about the former than the latter received when the first atomic bombs 
were made and used — so that more socially responsible decisions about science 
can be made in genetics than were made regarding nuclear energy. However, 
the usual topics of ELSI discourse reveal that weapons development is not what 
7  Cooke-Deegan, R. 1994, The gene wars: Science, politics, and the human genome, New York:  Norton. The 
discussion that follows is not meant to be a critique of Cooke-Deegan.
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those concerned with the ethics of genetics have had in mind. At the time of 
writing (in early 2010), an enormous number of journal articles and books on 
ethics and genetics have been written; but, aside from a few recent exceptions, 
explicitly ethical literature (authored by ethicists and in books and journals 
primarily concerned with ethics) includes little if any discussion of genetics’ 
potential role in weapons making.
This raises interesting historical and sociological questions about the discipline 
of bioethics. How, for example, should bioethics’ long-term failure to address 
the weapons implications of genetics be explained? One possibility is that 
bioethicists were, for a long time anyway, simply unaware of the weapons 
potential of genetics. However, if this is correct, why didn’t scientists and 
policymakers bring such issues to the attention of bioethicists working on ELSI 
issues? If bioethicists (who are not usually scientists) were not aware of the 
reality and seriousness of the weapons potential of genetics, this is presumably 
at least partly because no one made them aware. Part of the explanation why 
such dangers were not highlighted earlier may be that the spectre of biological 
weapons was largely overshadowed (in the minds of scientists, other academics, 
and policymakers) by the nuclear threat during the Cold War.8 Be that as it 
may, this would not imply that the biological weapons threat should have been 
considered less far-fetched and worthy of discussion than many of the (often 
largely science-fiction) issues that bioethicists have focused on9 and which 
one might also have expected to be overshadowed by more pressing concerns. 
Another reason may be that most scientists have themselves been largely unaware 
of the dual-use phenomenon.  Such lack of awareness has been demonstrated by 
empirical research.10 (One would have thought, however, that enough scientists 
would have been conscious of the weapons potential of genetics to alert 
bioethicists to potential dangers. As indicated above, at least those involved in 
the Department of Energy and Los Alamos laboratories should have been aware 
of the possibility, so why would they not have brought the issue to the attention 
of those concerned with ethical issues associated with genetics?)
A disturbing possibility is that a conscious decision was made by leading 
scientists not to raise the issue of biological weapons at the Asilomar conference 
during the 1970s11 and that a conspiratorial silence on the part of scientists 
remained long afterwards. If this really is an important part of the explanation 
8 Malcolm Dando, personal communication.
9 Such as much of the recent literature regarding human enhancement (for example, radical life extension).
10 Dando, M. R. and Rappert, B. 2005, ‘Codes of conduct for the life sciences: Some insights from UK 
academia’, Briefing Paper No. 16, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, available: http://www.
brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/BP_16_2ndseries.pdf [viewed 18 October 2009].
11 Rogers, M. 1975, ‘The Pandora’s box congress’, Rolling Stone (19 June), p. 37, cited in Garfinkel, M. 
S., Endy, D. and Epstein, G. L. 2007, Synthetic genomics: Options for governance, available:  http://www.jcvi.




of bioethics’ neglect of dual-use issues, we should perhaps be wary about calls 
for voluntary self-governance by scientists. That is, we might be reluctant to 
trust scientists if they previously failed to disclose potential dangers of their 
work and, as a result, an important public debate about a crucial ELSI genetics 
topic was delayed by a decade or more.
Public debate about ELSI implications of genetics was in full force during 
the 1990s largely as a result of attention raised by bioethicists. However, 
public debate regarding dual-use implications of the life sciences did not gain 
prominence until early in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, this was 
arguably primarily due to the events of 11 September 2001 and the anthrax 
attacks that followed. For the most part, bioethicists neither played a major 
role in bringing to prominence, nor contributing to, the debates that have since 
ensued.
Thus, a remaining puzzle about bioethicists’ lack of attention to the dual-
use dilemma is why they have not further engaged in discussion of weapons 
implications of science since the time they most probably became aware of them. 
For example, the controversial experiments mentioned at the start of this chapter 
received a great deal of media attention, so bioethicists presumably would have 
heard about them. An important part of the explanation of neglect may thus 
be bioethicists’ lack of familiarity and engagement with security issues — as 
opposed to clinical or medical matters — in general. The significance of the dual-
use problem provides one reason why bioethicists should, in the future, become 
more engaged with issues pertaining to security. The security implications of 
infectious diseases in general provide another. Those concerned about dual-use 
research often advocate increased education of scientists regarding the dual-use 
potential of their work. However, in the aim to achieve a more informed ethical 
debate about research we should perhaps also advocate increased education 
of bioethicists regarding security. Security raises crucial bioethical issues, but 
bioethicists have devoted alarmingly little attention to such matters.
Ethics Discourse to Date
Despite the long lamentation above, the good news is that there have recently 
been at least a few exceptions to the rule that ethics literature has neglected 
the problem of dual-use research. There is now an emerging, growing body of 
explicitly ethical literature on this topic, and this is hopefully in the process 
of reaching a critical mass.12 Much of the relevant literature has focused on 
12 See Resnik, D. and Shamoo, A. E. 2005, ‘Bioterrorism and the responsible conduct of biomedical research’, 
Drug Development Research, vol. 63, pp.121–33; Green, S. K. et al. 2006, ‘Guidelines to prevent malevolent 
use of biomedical research’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 15, pp. 432–47; Selgelid, M. J. 
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questions about the ethical responsibilities of scientists in particular. For 
example, to what extent would scientists be responsible for adverse outcomes 
that might result from the malevolent use of their research by other actors and 
to what degree are they obligated to prevent misuse — perhaps by refraining 
from engaging in potentially dangerous research or publication when potentially 
dangerous discoveries are made?
Such discussion of social responsibility is important, especially given the 
history of scientific culture.13 At various times in history, to a greater or lesser 
degree, science has been characterised as neutral, apolitical, and/or values-free. 
Common ideas among scientists (and others) have been that science involves an 
impartial pursuit of knowledge and/or that scientific knowledge is inherently 
good.14 Another frequently heard idea, especially in debates about the social 
responsibility of scientists in the context of nuclear weapons, is that knowledge, 
technology and other fruits of science are neither good nor bad — but, to the 
contrary, it is the uses to which they are applied that are good or bad. Last 
but not least, it was argued that although the prevention of harmful uses of 
knowledge and technology may be important, scientists themselves do not 
have the responsibility, expertise or power to prevent malevolent applications 
of their work from occurring.15 Rather than an obligation of scientists, the 
argument goes, the obligation to prevent harmful applications of knowledge 
falls on policymakers (who have — or, at least, should have — the requisite 
responsibility, expertise and power). If scientists do not produce anything 
that is inherently bad, and these other ideas are correct, one might think that 
scientists engaged in legitimate research are not responsible for harmful outcomes 
resulting from their morally neutral pursuits and products. Those who employ 
knowledge in a malign manner, and policymakers who fail to prevent them from 
doing so, would be responsible for bad outcomes; and scientists would remain 
innocent.
2007, ‘A tale of two studies: Ethics, bioterrorism, and the censorship of science’, HastingsCenter Report, 
vol. 37(3), pp. 35–43; Jones, N. 2007, ‘A code of ethics for the life sciences’, Science and Engineering Ethics, 
vol. 4, pp. 25–43; Miller, S. and Selgelid, M. J. 2008, Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-
use dilemma in the biological sciences, Dordrecht, NE: Springer; Ehni, H. J. 2008, ‘Dual use and the ethical 
responsibility of scientists’, Archivum Immunologiae et Therapiae Experimentalis, vol. 56, pp.147–52; Kuhlau, 
F., Eriksson, S., Evers, K. and Hoglund, A. T. 2008, ‘Taking due care: Moral obligations in dual-use research’, 
Bioethics, vol. 22(9),  pp. 477–87; Dando, M. 2009, ‘Bioethicists enter the dual-use debate’, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 26 April, available:  http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-dando/
bioethicists-enter-the-dual-use-debate [viewed 20 January 2010]; Kuhlau, F., Hoglund, A. T., Evers, K. and 
Eriksson, S. 2009, ‘A precautionary principle for dual-use research in the life sciences’, Bioethics (online prior 
to printing: doi:10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01740.x); Special Issue Section on The Advancement of Science and 
the Dilemma of Dual Use (2010), Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 16(1).
13 Jones 2007, op. cit.
14 Kitcher, P. 2001, Science, truth, and democracy, New York: Oxford University Press.




However, the idea that scientists should be fully divorced from responsibility 
for consequences of their well-intentioned research is not that tenable. If one 
foresees that his work is likely to be used in ways that cause more harm than 
good and proceeds regardless (without doing anything to forestall the harm 
in question), then he will be implicated in the bad consequences that ensue. 
If I knowingly enable a malevolent actor to cause harm, I am at least partly 
responsible for harm that results. We should go farther by saying that scientists 
have a duty to consider the uses to which their work will be applied, and that 
they bear significant responsibility for harmful outcomes that are foreseeable 
whether or not they are foreseen by the scientists in question. The point here 
is that scientists have a responsibility to be aware and reflect on the ways in 
which their work will be used. The failure to reflect or foresee the foreseeable 
should be considered negligence. In the context of weapons of mass destruction, 
such negligence could cause grave harm. If a scientist carelessly conducts and 
publishes dangerous research in an environment where adequate policies to 
prevent misuse are not in place, and a malevolent actor uses this research to 
cause great harm, it would be reasonable to conclude that the scientist, relevant 
policymakers, and (of course) the malevolent actor, are all partly responsible for 
damage done.
A virtue of much of the emerging dual-use ethics literature is that it takes seriously 
the idea that individual scientists have significant responsibilities regarding the 
prevention of harm resulting from malevolent use of their research. However, 
it might be argued that at least some authors have not taken a sufficiently clear 
and/or strong stand on such issues. For example, while questioning the specific 
obligations of scientists in the context of dual-use research, Kuhlau et al. (in the 
first paper on dual use in the journal Bioethics, published in 2008) argue that 
scientists have a duty to ‘consider negative implications of research’ and ‘to 
consider whether to refrain from publishing or sharing sensitive information 
when the information is of such a character that it could invite misuse’.16 
They do not, however, go further by saying how one should act on his or her 
deliberations. The mere duty to consider the consequences of one’s actions is 
presumably too weak if one is not further obligated to refrain from the actions 
in question if certain expectations result from the consideration in question. Not 
only do they fail to say how a scientist is obligated to act based on consideration 
of the results of a potential research project or publication, they do not clearly 
hold that scientists have any obligation beyond the act of consideration itself. 
One might have expected, for example, that scientists have obligations to 
consider the implications of their research and publications and obligations to 
refrain from the research or publication when harms are (reasonably) expected 
16 Kuhlau et al. 2008, op. cit., pp. 484–5.
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to outweigh benefits, or something like that. In the context of research, at least, 
perhaps this is what these authors have in mind, but it is odd they do not say 
so more explicitly.
In the context of publication, in any case, Kuhlau et al. offer resistance to the 
idea that scientists clearly have a strong obligation to refrain from publishing 
dual-use discoveries with dangerous implications, but their analysis here 
conflates separate issues:
[W]e need to recognise such values as publishers’ freedom of press 
and scientists’ legal right to publish. It is therefore controversial to 
propose an obligation inflicting too many restrictions. Restrictions on 
publications have several implications, for example, for scientists’ need 
to be able to replicate results in order to conduct further research, build 
upon the results of others, and develop and maintain a scientific record 
and reputation.17
The problem is that this kind of concern confuses the question of what a 
researcher has a moral obligation to refrain from doing with the question of what 
a researcher should be legally prevented from doing. Whether or not censorship 
by government of dual-use research would ever be called for is an important 
question. However, one could consistently believe there are cases where 
scientists would have a moral obligation to refrain from publication without 
thinking the obligation should be enforced by law or governmental censorship. 
The legal right to freedom to publish is not incompatible with a moral obligation 
not to publish because not all obligations are (or should be) enforced by law. 
What one is morally required to do and what one is legally required to do are 
distinct but related questions that should be treated separately. I might think I 
clearly have a strong moral obligation to walk my dog twice a day and say my 
prayers before I go to bed at night, but this would not imply that I think the law 
should require me or anyone else to do such things. Proposing that scientists 
have obligations to refrain from publication in problematic cases simply does 
not entail support of censorship, as is suggested by Kuhlau et al.18
17 Ibid.
18 Kuhlau et al. conclude (p. 485) that ‘the duty not to publish or share sensitive information’ is ‘potentially 
reasonable, although phrased too much in the negative’. Given this, and their final suggestion that censorship 
by government might on occasion be called for after all, it is not entirely clear what specific duty beyond 
the ‘duty to consider whether to refrain from publication’ they are arguing for. Rather than defending or 
establishing a stronger specific duty of scientists in the context of publication, their argument appears to be 




Two things remain to be said about the apparent focus of much of the emerging 
ethical literature on the duties and responsibilities of individual scientists. 
First, although the dual-use phenomenon undoubtedly raises crucial ethical 
questions about the duties and responsibilities of individual scientists, it is 
by no means an ethical issue for scientists alone. The phenomenon of dual-
use research, science, and technology also calls for important ethical decision-
making by actors (with duties and responsibilities) at other levels. Research 
institutions (insofar as they are at liberty) must decide how to oversee activities 
within their confines and whether or not to provide (and perhaps require) 
relevant education. Scientific associations need to decide whether or not and/
or how to address dual-use research in codes of conduct; and they must decide 
whether or not and/or how to enforce such codes on members. Publishers need 
to decide what to publish and/or what screening mechanisms to put into place. 
And governments must decide whether or not and/or how to impose restrictions 
on dual-use research and technology. Governmental regulations could, among 
other things, potentially call for mandatory reporting of dual-use research to 
committees for clearance before experiments are conducted or published and/
or compulsory education of researchers about the dual-use phenomenon and/or 
ethics. Finally, funders of scientific research must decide what research to fund; 
and they must decide whether or not relevant education, adherence to codes of 
conduct and/or reporting of dual-use research to committees before experiments 
are conducted or published should be conditions of individual researchers’ or 
research institutions’ eligibility for funding. The dual-use phenomenon raises 
ethical issues for decision-makers at each of these levels, because they all face the 
ethical question about how to strike a balance between the protection of security 
and the promotion of academic freedom and/or scientific progress (assuming 
these things will sometimes come into conflict19). More detailed ethical analysis 
of the responsibilities of these other actors is therefore important.
Although governmental regulation of research is controversial for reasons 
considered at the beginning of this paper, it may be imprudent to rely too 
heavily on voluntary governance of scientists or the scientific community — 
even if we gain more clarity about the social responsibilities of scientists. One 
reason that mandatory measures might be called for is that scientists may not 
always have sufficient expertise for judging the security dangers that might 
result from their research and/or publications. Responsible decision-making 
requires assessment of the security risks and social benefits likely to arise from 
any given experiment or publication. Scientists, however, usually lack training 
in security studies and thus have no special expertise for assessing security risks 
19 Some might argue that free or open science would provide the best means to maximisation of security.
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in particular. In some cases they are systematically denied access to information 
crucial to risk assessment. For example, in the case of the mousepox study a 
primary concern was the possibility of proliferation of smallpox from former 
Soviet weapons stockpiles of the virus — that is, because bioweaponeers would 
need access to the virus in order to apply the mousepox genetic engineering 
technique to it in the hope of producing a vaccine-resistant strain of smallpox. 
However, any detailed information about smallpox proliferation is classified 
information to which the vast majority of scientists would not have access. 
Thus, in this important case, which has been a paradigm example of dual-use 
research of concern, ordinary scientists would be unable to make an informed 
assessment of the risks of publication.
An additional reason not to rely too heavily on voluntary self-governance is 
that conflicts of interest may often come into play. For example, given that 
career advancement in science is largely determined by publication record, a 
researcher may often have self-interested reasons for publishing potentially 
dangerous findings even when this might not be in society’s best interests, all 
things considered.20
A second reason why ethical analysis of dual-use research should not focus 
too heavily on social responsibilities of scientists is that their duties (regarding 
whether or not to pursue a particular path of research or publication) cannot be 
determined in a vacuum. What exactly an individual should or should not do 
partly depends on actions taken by other actors at other levels in the science 
governance hierarchy.
Given the ultimate aim to avoid the malevolent use of dual-use technologies, 
it is important to recognise various stages in the ‘dual-use pipeline’ where 
preventative activities might take place, or regulations might operate. First, 
there is the conduct of research that leads to dual-use discoveries. One way to 
prevent malevolent use is thus to prevent the most worrisome experiments from 
taking place to begin with. A second way to prevent malevolent use would be 
to prevent dissemination of dangerous discoveries after they are made — that 
is, by not publishing them oneself (self-censorship), or by stopping others from 
publishing them (censorship). A third way would be to prevent malevolent use 
by limiting who has access to dual-use technologies and materials such as ‘select 
agents’ or potentially dangerous DNA sequences, requiring licensing of those 
using such technologies and materials, registration of relevant equipment, and 
so forth. A fourth way would be to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
20 Selgelid, M. J. 2007, ‘A tale of two studies: Ethics, bioterrorism, and the censorship of science’, 
HastingsCenter Report, vol. 37(3), pp. 35–43.
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Convention via the addition of verification measures. This would at least help 
prevent state actors from using legitimate science for the promotion of offensive 
biological-weapons programmes.
The point here is that the question of whether or not a researcher has a duty 
to refrain from pursuing a particular project or publishing a particular study 
partly depends on what preventative mechanisms are in place further down 
the ‘dual-use pipeline’. For example, if one discovers how to synthesise a 
particularly contagious and/or virulent pathogen, the propriety of publishing 
this partly depends on whether regulatory measures that would prevent this 
finding from being employed by malevolent actors have been implemented. For 
instance, if there were stronger controls over access to the technologies and 
materials (for example, DNA sequences) required by others to reproduce such a 
pathogen and/or if the BTWC was strengthened by the addition of verification 
measures, the dangers of malevolent use arising from such a publication would 
be lower than otherwise. Thus, whether or not a researcher would have a duty 
not to publish in such a scenario, assuming they were at liberty to do so, at least 
partly depends on whether or not policymakers have fulfilled their duties to put 
adequate preventative measures in place.
In addition to further expanding discussion beyond the responsibilities of 
individual scientists, there are additional fruits to hope for when ethicists 
more actively engage with the dual-use problem. There are obvious ways in 
which it raises issues similar to (or overlapping with) those discussed in ethical 
debates about the doctrine of double effect and the precautionary principle. 
Whether or not either of these is plausible or correct, the well-developed 
discourse surrounding them would presumably shed light on the ethics of dual-
use research. Rational decision theory and discourse about ‘acts and omissions’ 
likewise address relevant issues. The point is that a long, rich history of ethical 
debate in these and other areas might fruitfully be brought to bear on the 
dual-use problem if those with expertise in these and other areas of ethics only 
applied their minds to it. To date, it is safe to say, rigorous ethical analysis of the 
dual-use dilemma has only scratched the surface.
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Chapter 2: Educating Scientists about 
Biosecurity: Lessons from Medicine 
and Business
.JUDI.STURE
When looking at the intersection of ethics and biosecurity, we are generally 
concerned about how we may highlight ethical issues and solutions as a means 
of mitigating the risks of biotechnology being used for malign purposes. This 
chapter sets out to discover what we may learn for this endeavour from attempts 
to teach and develop ethical practice and awareness in the fields of medicine and 
business.
These two areas have paid considerable attention to the teaching and 
development of ethics in practice while also addressing social, professional and 
national cultures, which is a key factor in the recognition and interpretation of 
ethical issues. Because these sectors are engaged on a daily basis with two of 
the most accountable areas of human experience — health and money — they 
are probably the focus of the highest degree of ethically related litigation and 
risk of incurred costs around the world. No doubt this is at least part of the 
reason behind their increased attention to ethics in recent times. However, some 
situations go far beyond the issue of economics and law, at least in theory and 
aspiration, and grow out of global concerns that focus on a common, shared 
humanity and the goal of human safety and security. By reviewing work from 
these areas, the aim is to present several recommendations as to how bioethics 
education around issues of biosecurity in the life sciences may be most effectively 





It is important to recognise that life scientists already work in an atmosphere 
of ethical awareness and accountability. However, recent research1 in Europe 
shows that while ethics and biosecurity are a part of some university-based 
education and training in the life sciences, they are typically only a very small 
part, often viewed as a ‘bolt-on’ concept rather than an integral part of the 
professional identity of the individual scientist. It is against this background 
that we can make the claim that there is currently insufficient recognition among 
scientists of the potential risks of the destructive use of life-science research and 
we should recognise that this may be a significant barrier to addressing this 
problem.
From my own communications with colleagues teaching ethics and working 
on the development of ethics approval and monitoring processes in the UK, 
it appears to be commonly believed among scientists and others working in 
academia that society’s ever-increasing concerns about ethics and responsible 
research have been adequately, if not too heavily, addressed by the rise in the 
prevalence of instruments of control or guidance in these areas. Antagonism 
among researchers in the UK to a perceived increase in ethical-approval processes 
appears widespread in my experience. Typically, however, this antipathy is 
generally hidden from public expression. Yet, it is my estimation that there 
remains substantial resistance to the requirements of ethics accommodation and 
approval at the grassroots level, and this is probably due, amongst other things, 
to a failure of those driving the policies to adequately engage with professionals 
in the various disciplines to explain and situate the issues effectively. In the 
past two decades codes of practice, ethical policies and standards of ethics have 
proliferated in professional associations, universities, research laboratories, 
and in the public and private commercial sectors. But I would argue that these 
instruments are insufficient to address the growing risks of dual use in the global 
security arena. The existence of codes of ethics does not preclude the need for 
effective enhanced education in ethics on dual use and other biosecurity risks, 
as evidence shows that their existence does not equate to full or even partial 
compliance with them.2
1 Mancini, G. and Revill, J. 2008, Fostering the biosecurity norm: Biosecurity education for the next generation 
of life scientists, report by the Landau Network-Centro Volta and Bradford Disarmament Research Centre; 
Dando, M. and Revill, J. 2010, ‘Building international educational resources’, this volume.
2 Kaptein, M. and Wempe, J. 1998, ‘Twelve gordian knots when developing an organizational code of 
ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 17(8), pp. 853–869; Schwartz, M. 2001, ‘The nature of the relationship 
between corporate codes of ethics and behaviour’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 32(3), pp. 247–62; Schwartz, 
M. 2002. ‘A code of ethics for corporate code of ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 41(1–2), pp. 27-43; 
Schwartz, M. 2004. ‘Effective Corporate codes of ethics: Perceptions of code users’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
vol. 55(4), pp. 321–41.
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Most educated people with whom I work and interact in the UK and beyond 
(including researchers, tutors and students from around the world) operate 
on the assumption that they already ‘know what ethics are’ and know how 
to  ‘act ethically’ in their work. However, when asked to name a few ethical 
principles, to describe and locate themselves within the framework of any 
theory of ethics in research, most fall silent. What people really mean is that 
they know they already have a value-set. The confusion arises because they 
are typically referring to their private value-set rather than their professional 
ethical standards. Unsurprisingly, people become defensive when they feel 
challenged about their ethical principles, but they mistake the challenge for 
an assault on, or a questioning of, their private values. Resentment against the 
teaching of ethics to students and professionals is largely a result of the failure 
of ethicists to explain clearly what it is they are really referring to. Ethics seems 
to be one of those unusual subject areas in which most people believe they do 
not need to be educated because they already understand ‘it’. Clearly, this is 
not always the case. I would argue that the current burgeoning of codes and 
guidelines can actually blind people into thinking that ethical awareness can 
be reduced to a tick-box activity rather than being an element of professional 
identity, character and responsibility. It is too often viewed as an added extra, 
or something to consider in case of audit.
I would make a case that as well as limited engagement with professional 
ethics in the context of biosecurity within the life sciences, there is insufficient 
recognition among scientists in general of the role of private ethical values in the 
personal uptake (the ‘buy-in’) of professional ethical ideals and views.3 We are 
all shaped by the culturally derived and expressed standards that governed our 
upbringing but we seem to forget that these varying value-sets may not always 
align with professionally required or assumed principles. Einstein apparently 
said that common sense is the collection of prejudices we have acquired by the 
age of 18, but this tends to be overlooked as we pat ourselves on the back for 
our educated and objective outlook as scientists. There is arguably too much 
emphasis and reliance on the notion that scientists are a breed apart from all 
cultures, shaped by and sharing in a set of values that are neutral, truth-pursuing 
and non-judgemental, as if being a scientist somehow confers on a consenting 
individual a new set of cultural values that supersede all those previously held. 
This is patently nonsensical, and cannot possibly be true unless the education of 
scientists somehow produces humans who have never been, and are no longer, 
subject to the forces of human nature, along with prevailing and past cultural 
pressures.
3 Sture, J. 2010, ‘Private morals and public ethics: cultural aspects of ethical development and ethical 
learning in the scientific context’, Paper presented at the ‘Promoting Dual-Use Ethics’ Workshop, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 28–29 January 2010.
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Nevertheless, it is surprising how such a view persists and appears to be held 
dear by scientists themselves around the world in relation to their day-to-day 
work. In practice, this view is often a confusion between impartiality and 
neutrality4 or, at the very least, an attempt to secure value-free ‘safe’ knowledge 
that does not ‘tread upon the sensitive ground of politics or ethics’.5 To question 
this sacred truth is seen to challenge the very nature of the scientific endeavour, 
rather akin to any attempt to question the right to free speech or academic 
freedom. However, concerns about the destructive use of the life sciences 
need to be addressed. If this involves challenging some long-held but perhaps 
mistaken notions, then so be it.
The emergent appreciation of the risks of biosecurity and biotechnology 
research was highlighted by the United Nations in December 2008 when the 
Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC) called for investigation into and development of the education of life 
scientists and relevant stakeholders.6 If concern is being raised at this level, and 
is supported by a growing body of evidence suggesting that life sciences and 
the recognition of dual-use risks is not sufficient among practicing scientists, 
it seems reasonable to consider how we may go about responding. While the 
antagonism among many professionals to further development of codes of ethics 
and approval processes remains, I would suggest that we go beyond the route of 
codes of ethics and practice (which appear to be the commonly followed path of 
ethics education and monitoring) and further develop existing ethics education 
frameworks as a means to communicate the potential for ethical approaches to 
assist professionals in addressing a range of biosecurity challenges. The next 
section reviews how this might be done by considering lessons from arenas that 
have studied matters of ethics for some time.
Ethics Education in Medicine and Business
The most commonly recognised areas in which ethics play a huge part in 
regulating the behaviour of practitioners are those of medicine and business. 
My review here of a range of papers from the journal Academic Medicine focuses 
on ethics education of students in US medical schools in the 1990s and early 
2000s. My appraisal of work in the business and management literature focuses 
on the Journal of Business Ethics. In contrast to the vast amount of literature 
4 Lacey, H. 2004, Is science value-free? Values and scientific understanding, London: Routledge.
5 Proctor, R. 1991, Value-free science? Purity and power in modern knowledge, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
6 United Nations 2008, Report of the meeting of states parties, December 2008, Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, Geneva: UN Publications.
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on medical ethics and the training of doctors as distinct subject areas, ethics 
in the business world tends to be addressed under umbrella concepts such as 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), although it is commonly recognised as a 
discrete issue in companies seeking to synchronise ethical standards in widely 
differing cultural settings. Crucially, the business concept of CSR often transfers 
ethical responsibility onto the company rather than the individual, providing a 
contrast with the medical approach that focuses on the individual practitioner. 
This is useful when considering the possible destructive uses of life-science 
research as we need to consider not only the role of the individual but also the 
community or group, whether it be a professional association, some cultural 
entity or a nation state.
By looking at the education and development of professionals in these contexts, 
it is possible to find some useful themes that may help us as we move towards 
enhancing life scientists’ ethics skills in settings where otherwise beneficial 
research may be subverted for malign purposes, by equipping them to build 
a sustainable capacity in understanding and pass on the baton to subsequent 
generations. In the following sections I highlight points drawn from these areas 
that may be of use in supporting the development of ethics education among life 
scientists as a means to enhance our security.
Theme.One:.The.Hidden.and.Informal.Curriculum
Ethics education — at least at some level — is already part of many science 
education programmes, even if it largely fails to address the risks of malign 
use of research. It is expected that students and professionals hold ethically 
appropriate and responsible views, but work has shown that competing value-
sets and pressures to which they are exposed during education can undermine 
individuals’ ethical standards. What is explicitly taught is not always what is 
learned.
A key finding among studies in US medical schools was the existence of a  ‘hidden 
curriculum’ that pervaded education, often to the detriment of ethical behaviour 
among students and junior doctors. A number of researchers7 found that despite 
the stated commitments of the medical education system to patient well-being, 
altruism, empathy and caring, another value-set was being promoted tacitly. This 
promoted detachment, self-interest, objectivity and a business outlook among 
the students and newly qualified doctors. The two value-sets were in conflict. 
7 Hafferty, F. W. and Franks, R. F. 1994, ‘The hidden curriculum, ethics teaching, and the structure of medical 
education’, Academic Medicine, vol. 69(11), pp. 861–71; Hundert, E. M., Hafferty, F. W. and Christakis, D. 
1996, ‘Characteristics of the informal curriculum and trainees’ Ethical choices’, Academic Medicine, vol. 71(6), 
pp. 624–33; Hafferty, F. W. 1998, ‘Beyond curriculum reform: confronting medicine’s hidden curriculum’, 
Academic Medicine, vol. 73(4), pp. 403–7; Coulehan, J. and Williams, P. C. 2001, ‘Vanquishing virtue: The 
impact of medical education’, Academic Medicine, vol. 76(6), pp. 598–604.
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Hafferty8 concluded that by looking at the ‘products’ of the medical education 
system — be they courses, buildings, appointments of faculty, and so on — it 
was possible to see evidence of the implicit, business-led culture dominating the 
medical education system through financial values rather than patient-oriented 
focus. This even extended onto wards, with senior doctors and medical teams 
requiring students to behave in certain ways in order to ‘get on’ professionally, 
concentrating on the needs of the student doctor instead of the patient. Not 
only did students absorb these implicit values from faculty and senior doctors, 
but also they passed them on between themselves. Resultant changes in student 
behaviour comprised an erosion of the ethical ‘being a doctor’ standards that 
they had held when they entered medical school. Students reported having to 
move away from the traditional empathetic and patient-oriented perspective 
towards a career-building, self-advancing, financially motivated strategy.
In relation to the overall concerns of this volume, this may lead us to consider 
what messages about ethics in research are being sent out and heard by life-
science students in the laboratory and classroom. When we teach ethics in life 
sciences we need to beware of tacitly compromising this with career-driving 
values. It is understandable that financial pressures affect aspects of education 
but, while recognising this happens, we need to balance the effects by addressing 
the resulting ethical implications. We also need to consider how we prioritise 
values in practice as well as in theory, honestly admitting the pressures we are 
requiring students to respond to in order to progress their careers. The findings 
of Hafferty9 about ‘products’ of the educational system are applicable to the 
science education system also. It is not just in the classroom that values are 
learned, and the ‘wrong’ standards may be passed on unwittingly.
While US medical schools focused on teaching and developing ethical awareness 
in a monocultural way (to ‘fit’ western standards and values), in 1997 Vega10 
questioned the tendency of US business schools to teach a universal set of ethical 
standards, claiming that to do so could have a negative effect on the practices 
of graduates. Her interest was in promoting intercultural business outcomes 
and she believed that a focus on westernised approaches was self-defeating in 
the international business world. She suggested that a combination of relevant 
stakeholder input, deontology, and utilitarianism could be combined with 
pertinent community norms, and that when applied in practice, the amount 
of relativism involved in making decisions could be reduced. In the ethical 
context, this would mean that decisions made would be situationally, culturally 
and ethically contingent. She proposed an approach of ‘common-norming’, in 
8 Hafferty 1998, op cit.
9 Ibid.
10 Vega, G. 1997, ‘Caveat emptor: Ethical chauvinism in the global economy’, Journal of Business Ethics, 
vol. 16, pp. 1353–63.
Chapter.2:.Educating.Scientists.about.Biosecurity
41
which intercultural co-operation, shared designing of programmes, co-working 
in difficult teams, and a rising above ‘parochialism’ would allow different value 
systems to ‘provide the continuum for bridging cultural and ethical differences 
and birthing mutually acceptable hypernorms’.11 Hypernorms were defined as 
‘fundamental principles of ethical behaviour that guide religious, philosophical 
and cultural beliefs’.12 Common-norming was defined as the moderating of 
one set of ethical and cultural values to meet another value-set at a mutually 
acceptable midpoint.
Weaver also critiqued US corporate ethical practices.13 He emphasised the need 
for recognition of cultural and organisational values and traditions in ‘other’ 
cultural settings, and showed how ethical processes can be compromised and 
de-legitimised by culturally careless practices. This would, of course, be a 
potentially disastrous situation if it were reproduced in current attempts to 
address dual-use and biosecurity issues. Weaver’s work highlights the need not 
only to recognise intercultural issues but also the practical and hidden ‘workings’ 
of organisations themselves in order to achieve shared understanding.
Work by Muijen14 and Wines15 showed that two commonly taught strategies for 
business-ethics training — those of compliance and a cultural change — required 
top-down transformation to assure their uptake by academics and students. 
Muijen proposed a ‘third route’ towards sharing cultural narratives through 
dialogue, focusing on empowerment and the integration (not management) of 
diversity of values and perspectives. She challenged the notion of CSR and 
questioned its meaning to differing cultures. Wines concluded that teaching 
students utilitarian (outcome-based) approaches is insufficient to prepare them 
for the complex choices that will face them in the real world. He proposed an 
integration of ethics with other concepts and theories to enhance students’ 
understanding of the social and cultural place of business and ethics. These 
include ethical psychology, organisational design and behaviour, motivational 
theory, and courses on how business, society and the law interact, plus socio-
political theory and the construction of regulatory frameworks. In rapidly 
advancing settings such as biotechnology, with its potential for harm as well 
as good, these are important points. What seems obvious to western eyes in 
concepts such as CSR is not always so clear to other cultures that may take a 
11 Ibid, p.1361.
12 Ibid, p.1353.
13 Weaver, G. 2001, ‘Ethics programs in global businesses: Culture’s role in managing ethics’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, vol. 30, pp. 3–16.
14 Muijen, H. 2004, ‘Corporate social responsibility starts at university’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 53, 
pp. 235–46.
15 Wines, W. 2008, ‘Seven pillars of business ethics: Toward a comprehensive framework’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, vol. 79, pp. 483–99.
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different approach to business ethics with cultural responsibility. The notion of 
integrating ethics education with a range of associated subjects echoes the calls 
made for the promotion of socially holistic ethics in medical schools.
Theme.Two:.Personal.Morals,.Professional.Ethical.
Standards.and.Power.Relationships
Scientists come to their professional education and practice with a fully formed 
value-set derived from their own cultural background. There is evidence that 
this pre-existing set of ethical standards may conflict with the professional 
principles to which they are expected to adhere. The personal moral value-set 
includes drivers such as social and religious attitudes and beliefs, and these 
may not accord with the ‘value-free’ drivers of scientific activities. On the other 
hand, certain private moral perspectives may enhance the uptake of professional 
ethical standards.
An example of this is found in work by Vitell and colleagues.16 These authors 
looked at the relationship between religiosity and ethical identity in the 
individual (they define religiosity as ‘the degree to which an individual is a 
religious person apart from his/her particular religious beliefs and the way 
that those beliefs are manifested’).17 They suggested these factors may impact 
on ethical decision-making in business and act as antecedents to the process. 
Whether or not we accept that religions are the source of morality, we can 
recognise that they prescribe principles and moral codes that can be fundamental 
in guiding the life of the individual. Those who hold the view that religious 
belief should have no role in the activities of the scientist will critique much of 
this. However, one does not need to be religious to recognise the power of shame 
and guilt as conformity-drivers. This can work to the good and the not so good. 
The ethics of compliance depend very much on what is being followed. Perhaps 
the most useful finding from this work is the recognition that religiosity can 
be a useful tool in understanding the motivations of an individual or group 
as an antecedent to ethical decision-making. One need not share the religious 
beliefs of people to appreciate how their views shape their perspective and may 
influence their behaviour.
In addition to the potential conflicts between personal morals and professional 
ethics, there is often confusion among professionals as to the nature of ‘ethics’ 
in practice. Is it a toolkit with which to tackle difficult challenges in the real 
world, or something more — perhaps a part of the professional character, or an 
essential part of professional identity?
16 Vitell, S., Bing, M., Davison, H. K., Ammeter, A., Garner, B. and Novicevic, M. 2009, ‘Religiosity and 
ethical identity: The mediating role of self-control’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 88, pp. 601–13.
17 Ibid, p. 602.
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Many professionals arguably never face the potential inconsistencies between 
their personal ethical values and the professional standards they tacitly 
uphold because they either do not recognise the conflict or such a variance 
never arises in their work. I would suggest that ‘ethical awareness and practice 
should be developed as an embedded part of being a [scientist]’ (adapted from 
Hafferty and Franks18). Evidence from the medical-school context showed that 
students were unable to operate according to the ethical standards to which 
they aspired because of the pressures put on them by the system.19 It was 
suggested this resulted from the relatively powerless position of students in 
the system hierarchy. Feudtner, Christakis and Christakis proposed that more 
effort should be directed at maintaining ethical standards rather than trying 
to alter behaviour, and this could be helped by timely, practical guidance from 
seniors in dealing with difficult cases as they arise. This placed responsibility on 
students to raise issues, and seniors to respond effectively to them — meaning 
that seniors needed to be ethically aware and competent too, often learning from 
juniors.
In the framework of the concerns of this volume, this leads us to consider how 
experienced tutors, researchers and practising scientists embody their ethical 
standards in relation to their private views on a daily basis. Are we practising 
what we preach? Do we facilitate the provision of adequate and appropriate 
safe space and time in which students, tutors and working scientists can raise, 
discuss and question ethical situations and dilemmas without sanctions?
The business literature examined for this chapter also reflected on the potential 
conflict in power relationships when it considered the ethical expectations of 
parent companies and subsidiaries operating in different cultures. This work 
focused on the workplace rather than the educational establishment. Thorne and 
Bartholomew Saunders20 showed how cultural values affected ethical reasoning 
in multinational companies. They concluded that businesses must not ignore 
cultural variations in ethical perceptions. They suggested that companies should 
integrate working systems in such a way as to underpin their global corporate 
goals while still responding to local organisational norms and routines. They 
proposed that ethics policy-making teams should comprise people reflecting the 
full cultural diversity of companies’ business operations.
18 Hafferty and Franks 1994, op cit.
19 Feudtner, C., Christakis, D. A. and Christakis, N. A. 1994, ‘Do clinical clerks suffer ethical erosion? 
Students’ perceptions of their ethical environment and personal development’, Academic Medicine, vol. 69(8), 
pp. 670–9.
20 Thorne, L. and Bartholomew Saunders, S. 2002, ‘The socio-cultural embeddedness of individuals’ ethical 
reasoning in organizations (cross-cultural ethics)’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 35, pp. 1–14.
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Work by Robertson and Fadil21 and Kim and Kim22 illustrated how cultural 
aspects of belief and behaviour in the business world can influence the 
formation of ethical standards. Both ethical intensity and an alignment of 
cultural with ethical values were instrumental in mediating the decision-
making of individuals in the professional context. Moral intensity23 is defined 
as the variance in peoples’ response depending on the intensity of an ethical 
dilemma, meaning that more effort is usually put into the hard decisions than 
easier ones. This of course presupposes that the difficulty or seriousness of a 
situation is recognised effectively in the first instance. Kim and Kim, in their 
work on Korean public-relations professionals, found that Korean values of social 
traditionalism were significantly involved in explaining professionals’ attitudes 
to CSR. Because traditional Korean values harmonised with much of the overall 
CSR conceptual framework, it was much easier to achieve a good uptake of 
those values in that culture. Therefore, arguably this alignment factor should be 
incorporated into any attempt to construct a cross-cultural professional-ethics 
system, particularly in a potential dual-use context. By taking advantage of 
cultural and professional ethical alignments in particular frameworks, it may be 
easier to gain a widespread common agreement about a specific ethical situation.
As with work in US medical schools that commented on the lowly status of 
medical students, research by Secchi24 recognised that individuals in companies 
are typically identified by their status within the hierarchy and the tasks 
they have to undertake. Secchi also considered other personal characteristics 
including culture, gender, age and attitudes towards politics, the environment, 
religion, and so on. His study resulted in the identification of four implications 
for business ethics and social responsibility in practice that may be translated 
into other arenas.
He found that everyone is ‘ethically aware’ as a means to self-advancement 
and this is enhanced when people regularly engage in the same social channels 
(workplace). Individuals best develop a sense of the repercussions of their 
actions when they interact frequently in situations that enable them to build 
a cognitive picture of the positive outcomes that can benefit them. In relation 
to the concerns of this volume, this might involve scientists in two scenarios. 
Firstly, the social channels of the classroom, laboratory, the grant-writing desk 
and human-resources department, all of which largely dictate the scientist’s 
current and future prospects, status and financial security. Secondly, the social 
21 Robertson, C. and Fadil, P. 1999, ‘Ethical decision making in multinational organizations: A culture-based 
model’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 19, pp. 385–92.
22 Kim, Y. and Kim, S.-Y. 2010, ‘The Influence of cultural values of perceptions of corporate social 
responsibility: application of Hofstede’s dimensions to Korean public relations practitioners’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, vol. 91, pp. 485–500.
23 Robertson and Fadil 1999, op. cit.




channel of the communal environment as a safe forum in which to discuss 
potential or real dilemmas and articulate and respond to these with the input 
and support of peers, instead of feeling isolated, unsure or afraid of the best way 
to respond in challenging situations. This latter point is visibly lacking in the 
day-to-day science context.
Further, Secchi found that social responsibility (behaving ethically) serves as a 
reinforcing mechanism. It works as a shared ‘tie’ between the giver and receiver 
(colleagues, end-users, employers, stakeholders) and it is up to the individual to 
be socially responsible or not. However, as he pointed out, there are difficulties 
in this scenario. The freedom to choose how to act can be impacted by a range 
of forces. At the bottom of this is motivation, and it is obvious that individuals 
can appear to act ethically when in fact they are only doing so for self-serving 
purposes. The apparently ethical action may not be driven by altruism, 
philanthropy or some other beneficent force but purely or principally by self-
interest. This makes it impossible to truly interpret the action of the individual, 
and in this we confront the personnel reliability dilemma. However, unless we 
allow each scientist the freedom to choose how to act, we are exposing ourselves 
to the prospect of totalitarian control of the scientific process, which cannot 
be a viable or desirable way forward. The final finding of interest made by 
Secchi is the effect of the long-term exploitation of social channels experienced 
by individuals in groups. This presupposes the availability of shared social 
channels in which each person can formulate, test and enhance their sense of 
social responsibility or ethical perspectives in a safe and supportive space.
The life sciences are an area of research that could potentially produce significant 
malign outcomes for the world’s population. This should lead us to consider 
the need for bodies such as universities and research-science organisations to 
explicitly recognise the existence of culturally diverse values and norms by 
enabling and requiring discussion and active focus on them in relation to ethics 
in science. However, while aiming to encompass a range of cultural perspectives, 
we should clarify that recognition need not, and should not, necessarily mean 
validation or result in practical implementation.
While this should not be difficult in view of the present-day emphasis on 
diversity, in practice, it will probably be challenging because such a process 
may appear judgmental. In particular, this could be the case when we 
consider religious pressures and norms, and characteristics such as religiosity. 
However, I would suggest this is a nettle that needs to be grasped. If a greater 
understanding of religious ideals and norms as opinion-formers and behaviour-
drivers will enhance our understanding of how we make ethical decisions, 
let’s pursue that understanding. There is a need to integrate systems in our 
universities and scientific organisations to reflect our global ethical goals while 
still responding to ‘local’ norms; that is, culturally variant norms. We should 
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involve representatives of all cultural stakeholders in decision-making when 
developing policies as well as deciding what sanctions would result if policy is 
not put into practice. Social channels can be any concept from the family to the 
state level, each applying its own pressures to behave in certain ways in order 
to ‘get on’. Crucially, we need to introduce, or develop and support, where 
existing opportunities are offered, a safe time and space to engage in ethical 
debate within scientific communities and provide spaces where individuals 
can formulate, test and enhance their sense of social responsibility or ethical 
perspectives.
Theme.Three:.Ethics.Training.at.the.Right.Time
Medical-school research shows that it is important to focus ethics education 
effectively in terms of timing and content. Instead of delivering ‘classes on 
ethics’ and testing students on their theory knowledge, it is seemingly more 
beneficial to stage the delivery and development of ethical awareness throughout 
the course of a programme.
Work by Christakis and Feudtner25 found that traditional medical-school ethics 
teaching was limited in its effects because it did not focus sufficiently on the needs 
of students in ways that reflected their stage of training: students were being 
taught about their ethical responsibilities as doctors but they were still students. 
They concluded that ethics education for students should be ‘resituated within 
a framework of the student’s ethical development’26 and recognition must be 
made of the stages of intellectual and emotional development that students pass 
through during their training and professional life. They also recognised that 
there should be a place for such changing judgements to be aired and allowed 
within the hierarchy of the medical team without negative repercussions. It was 
apparent from their work that the ethical theory or ethical principles approach 
needed to be augmented with daily decision-making processes and practice, to 
allow the theoretical to become something like a professional code of conduct. 
They suggested that a process-oriented model of ethics teaching would allow 
students to develop their ethical reasoning capabilities both individually and as 
part of a team.
This study was supported in 199427 in an examination of the effects of a single 
ethics class on a group of first-year medical students. It was concluded that 
a short course in ethics was unlikely to change students’ values or opinions, 
25 Christakis, D. A. and Feudtner, C. 1993, ‘Ethics in a short white coat: the ethical dilemmas that medical 
students confront’, Academic Medicine , vol. 4, pp. 249–54.
26 Ibid, p. 253.
27 Shorr, A. F., Hayes, R. P. and Finnerty, J. F. 1994, ‘The effect of a class in medical ethics on first-year 
medical students’, Academic Medicine, vol. 69(12), pp. 998–1000.
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citing the varied backgrounds, religious affiliations and personal experiences of 
classes. This was echoed in the business literature by Wines,28 who suggested 
that there should be a progression of ethics sessions or courses throughout an 
educational programme, tailored to match the level of ethical decisions that 
were being faced by students at each time, and topped off with a ‘capstone’ 
ethics course to complete the circle.
When considering biosecurity and the protection of life-science research from 
harmful uses, this may lead us to consider the timing of ethics classes as well 
as the content. Asking too much too soon of students may be inappropriate. By 
tailoring ethics teaching to a stage-appropriate set of questions and challenges, 
students may engage more effectively with both practical and theoretical issues. 
It seems that it is also as important to provide students with opportunities to 
develop associated interpersonal skills, as it is to provide them with ethics 
as a set of knowledge. By providing a longitudinal, stage-specific, culturally 
and philosophically holistic set of ethics courses and associated sessions and 
discussion opportunities, we may be able to develop in individuals and groups 
a greater sense of becoming a ethical practitioner and promoter of social benefit. 
In addition, it is important to pass on the notion that ethics is not just a set 
of facts, rules and principles, but a way of being and a part of identity as a 
professional.
Theme.Four:.Culturally.Holistic.Training
It is has been recognised in both the medical and business literature that it is not 
only desirable but necessary to incorporate an increased social awareness into 
educational programmes and professional practice. This is an issue that goes 
right to the heart of the risks of biotechnology being used for malign purposes. 
It can be argued that scientists working in research laboratories are to some 
extent cushioned from exposure to the outside world and the effects of their 
work. Today, while this may be acceptable as long as effects of the work are 
beneficial, it is clear that we should highlight to professionals working in life 
sciences the need to review their work and its potential outcomes in a wider, 
culturally holistic sense. It is probable that we can no longer simply carry out 
research for its own sake and publish freely, as has been largely the case to date. 
We must consider far more carefully how we work and communicate in the 
future. This entails consideration of how we view and approach scientific work 
from the beginning of any project to beyond its laboratory end.
In seeking to minimise risks of dual use this may lead us to consider the bigger 
picture — a holistic view of where our science sits in the world. Just as medicine 
28 Wines 2008, op. cit.
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lies in a range of cultural frameworks, so do the life sciences. It is important to 
challenge students, tutors and working scientists with an outsider’s view of 
their work. Why are they doing what they do? Who will it help? Who will 
it hinder? Is it right to pursue what they are doing? Clearly this is already 
happening in some fields, for example in relation to human reproduction 
and stem-cell research, but we need to widen this approach to include all life 
sciences. We should view ethics education as enculturation into professionalism 
— we need to begin to develop new norms and challenge old ones that hold 
we may do science because we can do science. Hafferty and Franks29 suggested 
that teaching and learning should operate in a reflective and responsive way as 
students confront ethical issues, but that ethical issues should be considered 
in the wider cultural environment in which the medical tradition exists. Their 
view was that rather than a need for more classes, ethics would be better taught 
by starting training in it early and continuing throughout the learning process. 
An ‘ethical’ (that is,  professionally ‘moral’) view of life science may need to be 
reinstated — and we need to negotiate the pressures that define those private-
into-professional morals as ethical identity.
From the business side, Wines’ ideas30 about integrating ethics teaching with that 
of other concepts are also important. Unless we introduce a range of culturally 
meaningful theories and ideas to scientists and associated professionals, the 
notion of ethics will continue to be viewed as a ‘bolt-on’ to everyday practice. By 
incorporating a range of subjects into the delivery of ethics education, a holistic 
perspective will be provided and fostered in those engaged in learning. Wines’ 
focus on the need to enhance ethics teaching as a means to counterbalance the 
financial drivers promoted and prioritised in education and the idea of ethics 
‘capstone courses’  is one that we ought to seriously consider in the biosecurity 
and dual-use context.
Theme.Five:.Ethics.as.Part.of.Professional.Identity
The process of enculturation into a concept of professional identity is mentioned 
in one way or another by a range of authors already cited. This process was 
described by Swick31 in a paper that identified nine characteristics of a doctor 
that equate to a state of medical professionalism and it would be possible to 
relate this easily to the life-science scenario. He highlighted the subordination 
of the physician’s (scientist’s) own interests to those of others, adherence 
to high ethical standards, response to societal needs in a social contract, the 
evincing of core humanistic values (empathy, caring, and so on), self- and 
29 Hafferty and Franks 1994, ‘op cit.
30 Wines 2008, op. cit.




group-accountability as doctors (scientists), and reflective practice. These traits 
could be fostered in existing educational contexts by expanding the scope of 
ethics to make students aware of their individual role in the ethical behaviour 
of the wider scientific community. Kenny, Mann and MacLeod,32 who developed 
further the notion of professional character by looking at the use of role models 
as an educational tool, also supported this. They suggested that attempts to 
teach students ethics in the tool-kit format led to the ethics of character being 
lost. In their view, the ethical nature of the agent is central to solving ethical 
dilemmas, rather than the simple application of a set of principles. They suggest 
a return to the virtue-ethics nature of medicine as ‘virtuous physicians both 
model good behaviour and comprehend the reasons for their choices’33 and the 
apprenticeship model reflects centuries of professional education.
Hafferty34 identified themes through which ethics education and awareness 
could be addressed and easily incorporated into the life sciences: organisational 
policy development, a re-evaluation of all processes from teaching, learning 
and assessment through academic appointments and organisational practices, 
resource allocation and prioritisation, and what he referred to as institutional 
slang (changes in the use of everyday language that reflected the dominant 
mode of thinking in the medical education system, giving examples of business-
speak, illustrating the changing socio-cultural influences acting on the system). 
These areas of concern reflected crucial earlier work by Miles et al.35 which 
focused on the need to address four institutional areas in order to successfully 
embed ethics education in medical schools —support from the dean, support 
from administrative centres, the development of faculty approaches to ethics, 
and collegial support of an ethical culture. This top-down approach has been 
mentioned earlier, and is absolutely pivotal in achieving wide uptake of ethical 
processes and attitudes.
All of this leads us to consider issues around how scientists view themselves as 
professionals and as ethical practitioners. We need to enhance awareness of the 
place of science and scientists in society, encouraging them to look at themselves 
as engaged actors in a moving social, economic and technological drama. Society 
arguably demands more accountability today than in previous decades. Given 
that scientists hold such a key role in the balance between beneficent and 
maleficent outcomes for the human race, we need to broaden the way we look at 
our scientific work to encompass a truly holistic social perspective. Just as ethics 
ought to be a fundamental consideration in all research, so should awareness 
32 Kenny, N. P., Mann, K. V. and MacLeod, H. 2003, ‘Role modelling in Physicians’ Professional Formation: 
Reconsidering an Essential but Untapped Educational Strategy’, Academic Medicine, vol. 78(12), pp. 1203–09.
33 Ibid, p. 1207.
34 Hafferty 1998, op. cit.
35 Miles, S. H., Weiss Lane, L., Bickel, J., Walker, R. M. and Cassel, C. K. 1989, ‘Medical ethics education: 
Coming of age’, Academic Medicine, vol. 64(12), pp. 705–14.
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of biosecurity risk be clarified in scientific endeavour at all stages of research. 
There is also an argument for a return to an individually mediated virtue ethics 
to counterbalance the purely deontological or teleological approaches. Miles’ 
work36 looking at the need for top-down support also balances a virtue-ethics 
approach; that is, meeting the individual scientist halfway. I would suggest that 
without high-level engagement with top-down management of ethics — be it 
at the level of laboratory director, course leader or politician or civil servant 
operating at state level — any efforts to institute and influence ‘coal-face’ ethical 
identity and individuals’ values and norms will be diluted or simply not taken 
up in many areas.
Summary of Good Practice from Medicine and 
Business
In the previous sections I have considered research from the medical and business 
contexts and drawn out some ideas that we may be able to use and develop to 
prevent the malicious use of biotechnology. By drawing on lessons learned by 
other professionals, we can now consider a range of recommendations arising 
from these sources.
Five themes have been highlighted:
• The hidden curriculum that can compromise ethical behaviour
• The clash of personal morals, professional ethical standards and power 
relationships in which private values conflict with professional principles 
that are supposed to be value-free
• Ethics training at the right time, to allow for stage-appropriate learning and 
development; culturally holistic training in which ethical behaviour and 
values are considered and developed in the context of wider society rather 
than in the rarefied atmosphere of the laboratory or classroom
• Culturally holistic training, in which scientific activity is carried out in the 
recognised framework of wider society, with an embedded acknowledgement 
of the possible affects that could result
• Ethics needs to be part of professional identity, in which students and 
scientists may be allowed opportunities to develop an ethical character and 
foster a professional identity that encourages cultural responsibility.
Within these themes we can see many practical and theoretical issues that may 





• activities involved in common-norming: a sharing of responsibilities between 
varying cultures and levels of hierarchy in any given context when planning
• the fundamental recognition of cultural and organisational values and 
traditions themselves in ‘other’  cultural settings
• the recognition that certain cultural perspectives align well with ethical 
ones, but vary considerably
• the necessity of top-down transformation in order to assure uptake by 
academics, students and professionals
• the presentation of both deontological and teleological ethical theory 
to students while engaging them with real-life scenarios along with 
consideration of a virtue-ethics approach
• the idea that more effort should be directed at maintaining ethical standards 
as they are derived from private moral values rather than in trying to alter 
behaviour
• the need to provide and support a safe community space in which to allow 
students and practising scientists to discuss and debate ethical issues safely 
without fear of personal loss of advancement
• the need to address organisational/institutional areas in order to successfully 
institutionalise ethics education in the life sciences as it applies to dual use.
These themes and issues have been identified through a relatively short review 
of the literature in just two areas. Further work will doubtless highlight more 
useful material on which we can start to build. While it is not a simple cut-to-
fit exercise in which we can lift lessons learned elsewhere wholesale into the 
biotechnology-security setting, we can in all probability move forward with 
these lessons confident that we may avoid some of the pitfalls experienced in 
medicine and business.
Conclusions
It is clear that culture plays a major part in the development of our views and 
beliefs. Even in the substantially monoculture of the US medical school, we can 
see clashes of cultural values at personal and professional levels; and how much 
more so do we see these when comparing value-sets from around the world in 
the business literature?
Some may resist enhancement of ethics education to incorporate dual-use issues 
and argue that the subject is being overcooked and that we are in danger of 
‘seeing reds under every bed’. That may be so, and perhaps only time will tell, 
once we have that great lens of hindsight through which to look back. But 
I would suggest that even if we do not eventually see as much evidence of 
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risk as we think we face from today’s perspective, we must recognise that we 
only need one or two cases of the malicious use of today’s otherwise benign 
biotechnology to potentially cause untold damage to millions of people. When 
the possible fields in which such dual use can occur are outlined (synthetic 
biology, nanotechnology, neuroscience, phytopathology, to name but a few), it 
is surely not difficult to appreciate that an over-perception of risk, if it is such, 
can be justified, when one considers the potential outcomes if it is not mitigated 
in some way.
Motivation is a key issue in much of what we have covered above. It is too 
simplistic to categorise doctors as behaving ethically because of their care for 
the best interests of the patient and businesses acting from care for their profit 
margins. Doctors may just as easily be operating ethically to protect themselves 
from being sued for negligence as for the good of the patient. Likewise, 
businesses may be acting out of good will to their own employees and their 
dependants just as much as in the interests of maximising profits. Scientists are 
faced with similar dilemmas in the life-science setting, when considering how 
to handle risks. They can act for the greater good, but also have to consider 
their own career advancement, reputation, safety, and so on, as well as the cost-
benefit equation for others. The scientific community can be quite closed against 
maverick thinkers and individuals who wish to plough a new furrow if doing so 
involves challenging accepted norms within disciplines or science as a whole. 
As academics, we may like to hold to our cherished ‘academic freedom’ but in 
reality we do not possess such a thing — everything is subject to standards and 
rules received and upheld by the majority to maintain the status quo.
What can medical and business ethics teach tell us about educating scientists 
regarding biosecurity? I would suggest we could learn a great deal, as is evident 
here. Perhaps the most important lesson is that we cannot simply apply the 
values of one culture across the board when we come to look at global issues. 
Even universal questions have a wide range of answers.
What then can be taken from this analysis for moving forward in relation to 
the concerns of this volume? I would propose we could make a decision to 
adopt a new approach, starting with that of a form of common-norming in the 
first instance, which will allow all of us space, time and an engaged audience 
with which to introduce, debate and disentangle any subject that may be or 
become of ethical concern in some way. Secondly we need to provide, as early 
as possible, safe places and opportunities to debate the issues without fear of 
repercussion. Alongside these developments we can move forward to work with 
life scientists to enhance a wider recognition and understanding of dual-use 
issues more generally. This process will take time and considerable effort on 
the part of many people and organisations, drawn from many cultural settings, 
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but is surely worth pursuing as we aim to enhance existing ethical awareness 













For the past few decades, the accelerated development of possibilities in 
engineering biological agents for specific purposes, as well as the possibility 
of using them with both peaceful and hostile intent, have posed fundamental 
challenges to security concepts at both national and international levels. 
In particular, the recent shift of emphasis in the nature of conflicts and the 
actors involved poses a challenge. Nowadays, not only states but also non-state 
actors are known to occasionally enforce their interests violently by the use of 
arms. The malevolent use of biological agents is not excluded, even though the 
number of occasions of real use by non-state actors remains limited.1 Closely 
related to this shift, the sophistication of possible means for transporting and 
spreading biological agents poses a challenge. Although their weaponisation 
remains a particularly demanding task, the possibilities to offensively spread 
pathogens nowadays go well beyond traditional military weapons and 
munitions — as the appearance of letters filled with anthrax spores in the US 
illustrated in 2001.2 In additional, challenges are posed by the genuine dual-use 
character of a vast number of products that derive from life-science discoveries 
in general and results in biological and medical research in particular.3 Finally, 
these challenges are emphasised by the rapidly increased interconnection of our 
world (‘globalisation’), resulting, amongst other things, in an almost-unlimited 
availability of products and information, but also in the facilitated and accelerated 
spread of diseases — SARS and the influenza viruses being prime examples. 
Such challenges open new fields and blur conceptual boundaries for 
1 Jeanty, B. 2009, ‘The biological weapons threat: The need for global prevention, preparedness, and 
response’, Master Thesis, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, pp. 17–22.
2 Ibid. pp. 21–2.
3 Selgelid, M. and Weir, L. 2010, ‘The mousepox experience. An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian 
Ramshaw on dual-use research’, European Molecular Biology Organization EMBO reports, vol. 11(1), p. 18.
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international, national and human security. They demand new assessments of 
threats and their origins, and ultimately call for new or additional approaches 
when developing strategies to respond and ensure security. Also, the international 
disarmament community faces the pressure to open up from the traditional 
state–military focus, to address diverse aspects of civil life, and develop novel 
measures to minimise potential security risks.4 When it comes to weapons of 
mass destruction in general and biological weapons in particular, the debates 
in recent years have increasingly focused on research by life scientists. Such 
debates have usually taken place in the context of ‘dual use’, a term that offers 
numerous definitions. In the framework of arms control, disarmament and the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ‘dual use’ is usually defined as 
the possibility that knowledge, facilities and technologies associated with civil 
applications may be used for the development, production, use or enhancement 
of military capabilities.5 Anne-Charlotte Merrell Wetterwik’s example of the 
use of sophisticated ventilation filters in a pharmaceutical laboratory for the 
production of a biological weapon illustrates this definition.6 Awareness-raising 
and education, particularly on the potential misuse of originally well-intended 
research results and infrastructure, have thus been repeatedly mentioned as 
possible preventative measures.
In the context of its disarmament policy, the Swiss government has for years 
closely followed the debates on dual-use threats as well as related debates on 
contemporary security issues. It tries to apply the conclusions in a continuous 
national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC)7 and the development of security concepts. The national implementation 
of the BTWC, as Article IV of the Convention stipulates, also requests the 
prohibition and prevention of ‘the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means 
of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of 
such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere’.8 A modern 
4 A very concise introduction to the recent developments in disarmament and the need for new perspectives 
is given in Borrie, J. and Thornton, A. 2008, The value of diversity in multilateral disarmament work, New York 
and Geneva: UNIDIR.
5 Bonin, S. 2007, International Biodefense Handbook 2007. An inventory of national and international 
biodefense practices and policies, Crisis and Risk Network Series, Zurich: Center for Security Studies, p. 390; 
Resnik, D. 2009, ‘What is “dual use” research? A response to Miller and Selgelid’, Science and Engineering 
Ethics, vol. 15, pp. 3–5; Walker, J. 2003, ‘Strengthening the BTWC. The role of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention in combating natural and deliberate disease outbreaks’, European Molecular Biology 
Organization EMBO reports, vol. 4, special issue, pp. 61–5.
6 Merrell Wetterwik, A. C. 2009, ‘Curbing illicit brokering in WMD-related items: solutions in the making’, 
Disarmament Forum, vol. 3, p. 17.
7 The full title being ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction’, as signed at London, Moscow and 
Washington on 10 April 1972, and entered into force on 26 March 1975, available: http://www.unog.ch/bwc 
[viewed 15 January 2010].
8 Ibid. Article IV.
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interpretation of this prohibition does not limit itself to a ban on ‘classical’ 
biological weapons in the sense of those intended for military use. Rather, it 
also addresses the activities of non-state actors in grey areas, and refers to the 
general availability of know-how and technology from life-science research that 
could be misused.
Based on this understanding, in the last few years government authorities have 
begun to focus on the extent to which researchers in Switzerland are aware of 
possible dual uses and this has led to a repeated outreach to academic institutions 
and the industry. The following chapter is an attempt to write a Werkstattbericht, 
a report on work in progress, on the introduction of educational aspects into 
national implementation measures in Switzerland’s disarmament policy. Taking 
a government perspective, the report first sketches the relevant conditions 
for such an initiative, focusing on the educational framework, awareness, and 
national nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection. It then highlights 
the preparation and implementation of, and lessons learned from, an awareness 
project carried out in 2009 by Professor Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford) 
and Dr. Brian Rappert (University of Exeter) and accompanied by the Swiss 
government.9 Provisional thoughts on possible further steps by authorities 
complement this part. Finally, some concluding remarks provide tentative 
thoughts in the wider context, encouraging the further development of a link 
between life scientists and practitioners in security and disarmament.
Education and NBC Protection in Switzerland
Education.and.Awareness.at.Universities.and.in.the.
Private.Sector
In line with Switzerland’s federal structure, the Swiss system of public higher 
education is characterised by a complex system of shared competences between 
the Swiss Confederation (national level) and the cantons (sub-national level). 
The Swiss Confederation, namely the Federal Department for Home Affairs and 
the Federal Department for Economic Affairs, oversees the institutions of higher 
education mainly on policy and legal aspects, and shares the main responsibility 
for the general promotion of research. Here, the State Secretariat for Education 
and Research (SER) in the Federal Department of Home Affairs also focuses on 
national and international matters of university education, while the Swiss 
9 For a detailed description of the seminar format and organisation, see Rappert, B. 2007, Biotechnology, 
security and the search for limits: An inquiry into research and methods, London: Palgrave; and Rappert, B. 




Science and Technology Council acts as a consulting body for policy matters on 
education. However, the direct influence of the Confederation on the rules and 
regulations of specific institutions is limited to the two Swiss Federal Institutes 
of Technology (Zurich and Lausanne) and to four federal research institutes.10 
In contrast, the cantons share the main responsibility for the universities, 
universities of applied sciences and further-education organisations. The cantons 
contribute substantially to the funding of the universities and have regulatory 
powers. Cantonal interests in university politics are coordinated through the 
Swiss University Conference, which simultaneously serves as the main platform 
linking the cantonal level and the Confederation.
This system of shared competences and different responsibilities, however, does 
not include a direct influence of government authorities on specific curricula; 
rather, it explicitly excludes it. Within the defined legal framework regulating 
predominantly administrative, organisational and financial matters, universities 
in Switzerland enjoy considerable academic autonomy and freedom of research 
and teaching.11 This autonomy also applies to research establishments within 
or connected to universities and the institutes of technology, even if they are 
primarily financed through public funds.
Besides research carried out in institutions of public higher education, life-
sciences research conducted by the private sector plays an important role. 
As the pharmaceutical and chemical industries in Switzerland are among the 
most important economic sectors, specific research becomes vital for private 
enterprises and is actively supported. The Novartis Research Foundation or 
Roche’s research and development activities may serve as prime examples.12 
Research results originating from, as well as education within, the industry’s 
development laboratories are primarily meant to meet the requirements of 
contemporary medicine and healthcare. In addition, they are subject to the 
economic imperatives the respective company faces in national and international 
markets. Therefore, a direct influence of government authorities on education 
and research in the private sector is practically impossible (and would be met 
with substantial mistrust and resistance), as long as education and research are 
completed within the existing legal framework.
10 State Secretariat for Education and Research SER 2008, The Swiss system of higher education (Factsheet), 
available: http://www.sbf.admin.ch/htm/dokumentation/publikationen/grundlagen/factsheets/FS01_
Hochschulsystem_e_2008.pdf [viewed 8 October 2009]; further information can be gathered from The Swiss 
Education Server Educa 2010, Universities, available: http://www.educa.ch/dyn/152941.asp [13 January 
2010].
11 The Swiss Education Server, op. cit.
12 Novartis 2010, Corporate Research, available: http://www.novartis.com/research/corporate/index.shtml 
[viewed 13 January 2010]; Roche 2010, Research & Development, available: http://www.roche.com/research_
and_development.htm [viewed 13 January 2010].
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However, the (deliberate) lack of a government influence on the subjects taught 
does not automatically lead to the complete absence of concerns about misuse of 
life sciences. Traces of such concerns among academic circles at least implicitly 
exist. As far as university education is concerned, it remains unclear whether 
any academic course broaches the topic of dual-use research and related security 
implications. The following discussion of the awareness-raising project carried 
out in 2009 highlights findings that indicate an almost complete absence of 
this topic in regular life-sciences curricula. Nevertheless, a short examination 
of various curricula reveals that there are several academic courses touching 
upon this issue, particularly in the field of biomedical ethics. Yet these courses 
appear to focus on ethical questions for future physicians, or else highlight legal 
aspects. At best, (bio)security implications and consequences for the daily work 
in laboratories seem to be placed on the sidelines.13
As far as practitioners in academic or industrial laboratories are concerned, Swiss 
laws oblige these institutions to assign a person with sufficient professional 
background to oversee biological safety. In contrast, details concerning an 
appropriate education and training in biosafety are not regulated.14 This 
certainly confirms an awareness of biosafety in laboratories, but leaves specific 
questions on the knowledge of biosecurity open. (The ambiguous translation of 
‘safety’ and ‘security’ into the official languages contributes to this apparently 
absent distinction. Both ‘safety’ and ‘security’ are translated into Sicherheit 
in German, sécurité in French, and sicurezza in Italian.15) Also, until relatively 
recently government support activities for biosafety officers were limited to very 
informal one-day seminars conducted by the Federal Office of Environment, 
the Swiss Expert Committee for Biological Safety and the Federal Office of 
Public Health. Only in 2008 did the government initiate and fund a Biosafety 
Curriculum for practitioners of the public and private sector, which will be 
discussed later.16
NBC/CBRN.Protection.in.Switzerland
An examination of the national ‘Swiss NBC-Protection Strategy’17 indirectly 
confirms these preliminary findings. The federal structure of Switzerland is 
13 See for example the information provided by University of Basle 2010, Fachbereich Medizin und 
Gesundheitsethik (German), available: http://medethik.unibas.ch [viewed 13 January 2010]; University of 
Zurich 2010, Institute of Biomedical Ethics, available: http://www.ethik.uzh.ch/ibme_en.html [viewed 13 
January 2010].
14 Streuli, J. 2008, ‘Biosafety and Biosecurity Concepts’, Statement of Switzerland at the BWC Meeting of 
Experts, 19 August 2008, available: http://www.unog.ch/bwc [viewed 9 November 2009].
15 For a discussion of this problem of terminology elsewhere, see Sawaya, D. 2009, ‘Biosecurity at the OECD’, 
in Rappert, B. and Gould, C. (eds.) Biosecurity: Origins, transformations and practices, London: Palgrave.
16 Streuli, J. op. cit.
17 Eidgenössische Kommission für ABC-Schutz (2007) Strategie „ABC-Schutz Schweiz“, available: http://
www.bevoelkerungsschutz.admin.ch/internet/bs/de/home/themen/abcschutz/strategie.html [viewed 14 
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also mirrored in the authorities’ approach to assess, prevent and respond to 
biological threats, together with chemical, radiological and nuclear risks. A 
complex web of cooperation among the Federal Office of Public Health, the 
Federal Commission for NBC Protection, the Federal Office for Civil Protection, 
the National Emergency Operations Centre, the Spiez Laboratory, the Swiss 
Armed Forces’ NBC Centre of Competence, and the Armed Forces’ Coordinated 
Medical Service characterises the approach on the national level. Again, these 
institutions closely cooperate with the cantons and municipalities, which 
are mainly in charge of the deployment of sensors and first responders such 
as police, fireguards, and first-aid providers.18 This broad variety of actors at 
national and sub-national levels can create (and has created) difficulties, often 
based on mutual misconceptions about their respective roles, unclear tasks and 
redundant structures.19 The NBC-Protection Strategy addresses these challenges 
and serves as a common base and guideline for prevention, intervention and 
coordinated leadership. It highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the 
current system and lists recommendations for improvement. When focusing on 
prevention, the strategy recommends an evaluation of existing NBC security 
laws, an assessment of the Confederation’s and the cantons’ approach to risk 
management (based on 14 scenarios, as set out in the annex to the strategy), and 
the establishment of a National NBC Protection and Coordination Office and a 
coordination platform for cantons.20
This focus on authorities and first responders illustrates that the national 
strategy is based on a well-developed awareness of threats originating from 
the accidental or deliberate release of biological agents, and the resulting 
ramifications for international, national and human security. However, the 
strategy bears the characteristics of a risk-management tool among authorities 
in a federal state, and does not serve as a comprehensive policy paper. Only 
the inclusion of the Spiez Laboratory indicates a potential and indirect link to 
academic and industrial life-science practitioners. Therefore, ‘education’ in the 
context of national strategy has little to do with a preventative awareness-raising 
among students, but is understood as being training in crisis management for 
responsible authorities.
Preliminary.Conclusion:.The.Missing.Link
The short elaboration on the system of public higher education in Switzerland 
describes an environment in which the formation of future life-science 
practitioners enjoys considerable academic freedom and is faced with few top-
January 2010].
18 Jeanty, B. op. cit. pp. 61–2.
19 Ibid. pp. 112–5.
20 Eidgenössische Kommission für ABC-Schutz, op. cit.
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down approaches from government authorities on thematic aspects. Likewise, 
education and research in the private sector is guided predominantly by actual 
needs in medicine and healthcare, as well as by economic imperatives. It is 
noteworthy that neither of these educational environments shows signs of an 
enhanced interest in security issues, despite their proximity to the topic, the 
possible relevance of security concerns to them, and the academic freedom and 
resources at hand. On the other hand, this short analysis of the Swiss national 
NBC strategy indicates an immense awareness of biosecurity concerns among 
authorities. The preventative approach, however, focuses on government 
authorities and first responders, and includes few wider references to other 
prospective or active practitioners outside.
This seems to reveal a missing link between life-science practitioners on the one 
hand, and security practitioners on the other. In simple terms, there is a missing 
link between the graduate student of biology, and the military intelligence 
officer or fireguard. Both sides have difficulties imagining the perspectives and 
concerns of the other.
The Swiss government took these findings as a call for an initiative to bridge 
this gap. The publication of a brochure titled Biology for Peace — Preventing 
the Misuse of Life Sciences21 in 2008 constituted a first step towards addressing 
the low awareness of security concerns within academic circles. Even minimal 
knowledge of obligations and debates on security at international level in 
combination with an increased personal responsibility among life-science 
practitioners should reduce the possibility of a misuse of potentially dangerous 
biological agents. After the brochure’s publication, the timely offer of an existing 
project addressing precisely the gap identified in Switzerland provided a good 
opportunity to develop a further step in this direction.
Implementing ‘Awareness Raising’: The ‘Life-
Sciences, Security, and Dual-Use Research’ 
Project
International.Impulses
The misuse of life sciences and the associated security issues are not new to 
the BTWC community. In September 2002, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) launched a public appeal on biotechnology, weapons and 
21 The brochure is available on the website of the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO: http://www.
seco.admin.ch/dokumentation/publikation/00035/02291/index.html?lang=en [viewed 15 January 2010].
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humanity, calling for a ‘web of prevention’ among academic circles to impede 
biotechnology being misused for hostile purposes.22 Despite the failure of the 
ICRC’s appeal to generate concrete results among the BTWC community, it paved 
the way for the later examination of academic research perspectives within a 
disarmament forum.23 Similarly, the discussions on codes of conduct for life 
scientists were characterised by an interest in the misuse of life sciences. Yet, 
as Dando highlights, ‘[it] has so far been unclear…to what extent this interest 
in potential dual-use aspects of the life sciences has led to concrete measures, 
particularly concerning education’.24 This is certainly true of Switzerland, as 
discussed above.
The most recent and probably major impulse for an active engagement with 
education in Switzerland was taken from the current Intersessional Process of the 
BTWC and the focus on biosafety and biosecurity, as well as oversight, education 
and awareness-raising by the States Parties, international organisations and 
non-governmental organisations in 2008. The substantial discussions during 
the experts’ meeting in August 2008 provided a fruitful basis for an exchange 
between life scientists and the BTWC community on concrete measures. Based 
on its own recent experiences at a national level, the Swiss delegation observed 
that ‘[while] governments are best placed to create the framework required, the 
individual researchers and their scientific and professional associations also 
play a crucial role’.25 This spirit of a mutual inclusion of perspectives as well 
as the need to encourage awareness within academic circles through active and 
preventative government initiatives also entered the Meeting of States Parties in 
December of the same year. The final document of the meeting states:
(26) States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring that those 
working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under 
the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have 
a clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable social, 
environmental, health and security consequences of their activities, and 
are encouraged to take an active role in addressing the threats posed 
by the potential misuse of biological agents and toxins as weapons, 
including for bioterrorism. States Parties noted that formal requirements 
for seminars, modules or courses, including possible mandatory 
22 ICRC (2010) Biotechnology, weapons and humanity, available: http://www.icrc.ch/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/bwh?OpenDocument [viewed 12 January 2010].
23 Borrie and Thornton 2008, op. cit., pp. 58–60.
24 Dando, M. 2009, ‘Dual-use education for life scientists?’, Disarmament Forum, vol. 2, p. 41.
25 Streuli 2008, op. cit.
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components, in relevant scientific and engineering training programmes 
and continuing professional education could assist in raising awareness 
and in implementing the Convention.26
This agreed language provided a useful backdrop for a follow-up to the 
publication of the aforementioned brochure. The Swiss government authorities 
directly involved in the BTWC process considered the proposal by Dando and 
Rappert to conduct a series of seminars on current debates on life sciences, 
security, and dual-use research as very timely and relevant.
The.National.Legislation
Regardless of the modalities of Switzerland’s participation in a project, all 
activities of the government require the existence of a relevant legal base. Again, 
the federal structure of Switzerland is mirrored in its legal system, resulting in a 
patchwork of national and cantonal regulations. Switzerland identifies with the 
monist system and treaties such as the BTWC automatically become part of the 
domestic legal system. However, Switzerland does not have one, single, specific 
act implementing the BTWC’s obligations. Instead, the Convention’s obligations 
are implemented through the sum of numerous national and cantonal legal texts 
covering a large spectrum of aspects, which inter alia, also relate to specific 
obligations of the BTWC.27 Consequently, the legal base for the awareness-
raising project could not be derived from a single act, but was provided by 
various legal foundations. In addition to the BTWC and the 2008 Report of the 
Meeting of States Parties, the following national laws also pertain here:
• Federal Act on Combating Communicable Human Diseases (Epidemics Act) 
1970.28 The Confederation and the cantons are obliged to implement all 
necessary measures to prevent and combat the transmission of such diseases. 
The act furthermore specifies certain containment measures and names the 
responsible authorities. The Federal Act on Animal Epidemics 196629 and 
the Federal Act on Agriculture 199830 address animal and plant aspects, 
respectively.
26 Meeting of the States Parties to the BTWC 2008, Report of the meeting of states parties (UN document 
BWC/MSP/2008/5), Geneva: United Nations, pp. 6–7. 
27 For a detailed description of the relevant legal framework on the prevention and response to biological 
threats, see Guery, M. 2004, Biologischer Terrorismus in Bezug auf die Schweiz (Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
rechtlicher Aspekte), Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik Nr. 74, Zurich: Center for Security Studies, pp. 
102–14. A comprehensive list of BTWC-relevant legal texts was similarly collected in the context of a study 
by Scott Spence/VERTIC in relation to the implementation of the BTWC in Switzerland.
28 Swiss legislation number SR 818.101.
29 Swiss legislation number SR 916.40.
30 Swiss legislation number SR 910.1.
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• Federal Act on War Material (War Material Act) 199631: Article 7 stipulates 
the comprehensive prohibition of the development, production, brokering 
and acquisition, and any kind of transfer of nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons. Article 34 punishes offences committed wilfully or through 
negligence.
• Swiss Criminal Code of 1937:32 Article 231 punishes the transmission of a 
dangerous communicable human disease, whether the offence is committed 
wilfully or through negligence. Articles 232 to 234 equally punish the 
transmission of epizootic diseases, pests, and the contamination of drinking 
water.
• Federal Act on the Control of Dual-Use Goods and of Specific Military 
Goods (Goods Control Act) 1996:33 The act creates the base to implement 
international agreements on respective goods, and enhances international 
non-binding control measures through specific national control measures. 
It particularly introduces the obligation to license and report the research, 
production and storage, as well as the (international) transfer of, dual-use 
goods, and enables the authorities to punish offences.
• Federal Act on the Protection of the Environment (Environmental Protection 
Act) of 1983:34 Preventative measures must be taken to protect and preserve 
people, animals and plants as well as biological communities and habitats. 
Articles 29a to 29h focus on handling organisms and regulate responsibilities, 
licensing and reporting for activities in contained areas or for experimental 
releases.
Taken together, the Swiss legislation related to the implementation of the 
BTWC gives a comprehensive legal base covering both civil and military 
aspects and actors. In this sense, it addresses the ambiguous nature of biological 
threats and occasionally focuses directly on dual-use goods. Also of particular 
interest is the repeated reference to acts committed through negligence, which 
delegates responsibility to individual researchers. In addition, the respective 
responsibilities and duties of the relevant authorities to prevent the spread 
of diseases are clearly defined (thus setting the base for the NBC-protection 
strategy discussed above). However, the act leaves enough room for further 
preventative measures by the Confederation or the cantons. Based on these 
findings, implementing an awareness-raising project was a logical next step 
from a legal perspective.
31 Swiss legislation number SR 514.51.
32 Swiss legislation number SR 311.0.
33 Swiss legislation number SR 946.202.




Whilst the Political Secretariat of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
(FDFA) takes the lead regarding BTWC matters, the Federal Office of Public 
Health (FOPH), the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), and various 
offices in the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) 
— including the Spiez Laboratory — contribute their expertise and participate 
in the decision-making processes. In late 2008, these offices jointly decided to 
implement the seminars in the 2009 calendar year as a next step in an emerging 
long-term outreach towards academic institutions.
Making use of the experience accumulated by Dando and Rappert in conducting 
seminars in various countries, and to minimise the authorities’ influence on the 
content and approach, in January 2009 the Swiss authorities, in conjunction 
with the two researchers, defined the basis for the project, as follows:
• The target audience should primarily include graduate students, faculty 
staff, and practitioners. The format foresees an interactive seminar of roughly 
an hour and a half.
• With regard to the content and educational material, the responsibility for 
the implementation remains fully with the two researchers who will conduct 
the seminars.
• The budget to cover all of the researchers’ expenses directly related to the 
seminars, including travel expenses, was provided by the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation.
• The Swiss authorities act primarily as door-openers, establishing the contact 
between the researchers and potentially interested institutions. After a first 
contact, details in administration and teaching would be directly organised 
between the two researchers and the respective institution. Thus the role of 
the authorities would be an accompanying one rather than a supporting one.
• The authorities will provide logistical support to the two researchers in 
Switzerland.
Opening.Doors
The Arms Control and Disarmament Policy branch of the Federal Department 
of Defence provided the administrative support, sending out an introductory 
letter to potentially interested academic and research institutions in early 
2009. Referring to the current debates on dual-use research and its security 
implications, the letter invited expressions of interest from academics in a free 
seminar on the topic, organised by the two researchers, and accompanied by 
representatives from the federal government. The institutions were only required 
to organise a suitable classroom, date and time. To avoid the time-consuming 
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process approaching the universities’ hierarchies, the introductory letter 
was specifically targeted to the relevant institutes or university departments. 
Research institutions in the private sector were addressed via their official 
contact details. Interested academics and practitioners were then invited to deal 
directly with Rappert for all further administrative details.
The response was mixed. From the 12 institutions approached, seven indicated 
some or great interest, and six (in alphabetical order below) then agreed to 
conduct the seminars:
• Friedrich Miescher Institute, Basle
• Spiez Laboratory
• Swiss Society for Microbiology
• University of Basle, Biozentrum (Department Biozentrum)
• University of Geneva, Section de Biologie
• University of Zurich, Institute of Molecular Biology
The other five institutions showed no interest, or left the introductory letter 
unanswered.
The seminars were held in the summer of 2009, taking place in very diverse 
settings, as the following brief chronological abstract highlights:
• 4 June 2009: Seminar on the occasion of the Annual Conference of the Swiss 
Society for Microbiology. Time constraints meant that the seminar was slotted 
in between two other presentations and was limited to just 30 minutes. The 
fact that there were only two participants also hampered the debate. This 
early experience revealed the need to address life scientists within their own 
environment, as discussed later.
• 23 June 2009: Seminar at the Section de Biologie, University of Geneva. 
Attended by more than two dozen students, the increasingly lively 
discussions indicated an interest in the topic.
• 20 August 2009 (am): Seminar at the Department Biozentrum, University of 
Basle. A lively discussion among some 50 participants made the seminar one 
of the most successful of the series.
• 20 August 2009 (pm): Seminar at the Friedrich Miescher Institute, Basle. Despite 
there being only five participants, the researchers and the accompanying 
government official were confronted with very critical questions, finally 
indicating a crucial divide between life-science practitioners and security 
practitioners in the assessment of biological threats and their origins.
• 21 August 2009 (am): Seminar at the Spiez Laboratory, followed by a train-
the-trainer session. The in-house seminar for an authority directly involved 
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in the implementation of the BTWC and the national NBC protection allowed 
the participants to gather provisional conclusions for possible further steps.
• 21 August 2009 (pm): Seminar for the Institute of Molecular Biology, 
University of Zurich. The seminar’s very active debates among approximately 
30 participants indicated a substantial interest in the topic. This was followed 
by further questions from students after the session.
The.Seminar’s.Framework.and.Resulting.Debates
The fundamental issue for the seminar was the question of whether life scientists 
should publish research results (and to whom) if there was a potential danger 
that the results would attract the attention of those with dubious motives for 
wanting such information and (theoretically) provide them with know-how 
to develop biological pathogens for offensive purposes. This represents the 
reformulation of the crucial assessment by every scientist whether the value 
of a publication outweighs the potential risks. The seminar was not intended, 
however, to provide a definitive answer to the question but to stimulate debate 
and perhaps challenge existing opinions.
Dando kicked off the debate by summarising the mousepox experiment, about 
which very few of the participants had heard. In that experiment, researchers 
had genetically engineered a virus for pest-control purposes, but this ultimately 
resulted in the creation of a lethal virus that even killed vaccinated mice. In 
theory at least, this opened the possibility of genetically engineering a lethal 
human virus, against which vaccination would be ineffective.35 The seminar 
participants were asked whether, in such circumstances, they would publish 
the research result and how they would come to their decision. Based on the 
first responses, which usually supported the idea of publication, the angle was 
changed to highlight possible sequences in publishing the results in various 
scientific journals. This model of stimulating an open debate with questions 
was continuously applied throughout each seminar, with reference to recent 
developments in biotechnology as well as occasional responses by governments 
such as intensified biodefence programmes or tightened control over scientists.
The responses from participants were strikingly similar throughout the seminar 
series. A large number found themselves confronted with a new perspective 
on their work. In various after-class conversations, participants repeatedly 
admitted that they had never previously considered a potential misuse of their 
research. Despite this, the clear majority ultimately felt the value of a publication 
outweighed the potential risks, and justified their position in various ways. Some 
35 Jackson, R. et al. 2001, ‘Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses 
cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’, Journal of  Virology, vol. 
75(3), pp. 1205–10; cited in Selgelid and Weir 2010, op. cit., pp. 18–24.
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referred to publication as a basic professional requirement (‘publish or perish’). 
Others were of the opinion that, sooner or later, potentially dangerous know-
how would be published in any case; if they did not publish it, someone else 
would. The prospect of a governmental top-down approach to regulate research 
publications was generally met with substantial scepticism. When asked about 
threats, the participants’ description of potential dangers and possible actors 
with malign intent remained very vague most of the time. Few narrowed their 
answer to terrorists (namely Al-Qaeda), and only one or two mentioned states 
with extensive biodefence programmes. International regimes such as the 
BTWC or relevant national legislation were almost never referred to by (and 
were seemingly unknown to) the vast majority of participants. There were no 
further indications that contributors had reconsidered their research activities 
in light of national and/or human security prior to the seminars. Nevertheless, 
most participants repeatedly agreed that researchers in the life sciences share 
a moral responsibility; living this responsibility is, however, often limited by 
professional and economic imperatives.
Analysis, Lessons Learned, and Possible Ways 
Forward
Addressing.Existing.Needs
A provisional analysis seems to confirm a generally low awareness of the potential 
misuse of dual-use research within Swiss life-science research institutions. This 
manifests itself not only in a repeated unawareness of often-quoted research 
experiments among university students in particular, but also in a frequently 
diffuse or narrow assessment of potential dangers and actors. While the complete 
absence among life scientists of references to security policy or disarmament 
regimes is perhaps understandable, the lack of references to relevant acts in the 
national legislation is noteworthy. Nevertheless, the readiness of a number of 
institutions to implement the seminars and distribute the ‘Biology for Peace’ 
brochure, and the interest many participants showed, seems to verify that many 
life-science practitioners consider further thought on dual-use research, ethics, 
and (moral) responsibility by researchers to be important. The existence of 
several courses in biomedical ethics corroborates this trend. These findings lead 
to the conclusion that the government initiative to support debate on dual-use 
research and related security issues addresses existing needs. Moreover, further 
steps will be necessary if sustained awareness is to be generated.
However, the government will have to consider approaches that are not perceived 
as interference with the freedom of research or as an obstacle to economic 
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independence. A direct top-down approach from national authorities on the 
curriculum of universities or enterprises would not only generate scepticism 
among practising life scientists, but would also stand in sharp contrast to the 
federal structures on which the Swiss educational and legal systems are based. 
Any further outreach initiatives will have to take into account existing patterns 
of shared competences and cooperation. For example, approaches that inform 
researchers on current debates on dual use and security during established 
courses, and convince them to introduce the topic into their daily environment, 
are more likely to succeed. Similarly, another promising method includes the 
sensitisation of first responders and security practitioners, encouraging them 
to address life scientists in the context of their daily professional activities and 
thus act as close and credible intermediaries.
Lessons.Learned
Several points raised by Dando and Rappert during the train-the-trainer session 
in the Spiez Laboratory provide practical hints for possible further activities. 
Only a few institutions are likely to create new courses or lectures specifically on 
dual-use research and security. The authorities’ initiatives are likely to generate 
sustainable solutions if incentives exist for the integration of the topic into 
current curricula. Such motivations could include elements or even ready-made 
packages of teaching material. In this context, the low attendance during the 
first seminar (and the speakers’ experience elsewhere) confirms the necessity 
for addressing life scientists within their regular study and work environments, 
rather than trying to lure them to separate or peripheral events. This was borne 
out by the success of ensuing seminars that were held within frameworks familiar 
to the scientists by taking advantage of existing seminar series. If the topics 
are presented openly and the questions are debated freely, without imposing 
solutions, this should prove fruitful and encourage further reflection. Other 
methods could be based on role-plays, which force participants to argue from 
a specific perspective (researcher, industrialist, security coordinator, publisher, 
military, and so on) and thus encourage them to engage with other views.36
Further lessons learned refer to the necessity to minimise the number of 
‘gatekeepers’ by, wherever possible, making direct contact with the most 
appropriate office or department. Initial contact with potentially interested 
institutions should be made by a suitable communicator among the various 
offices concerned. For example, the response of universities or enterprises to 
36 Dando and Rappert provide these lessons learned, principally based on their personal experience 
accumulated during the seminars held in various countries. The points were presented and discussed 
during the train-the-trainer session in the Spiez Laboratory, 21 August 2009. For teaching material, see also 
Rappert, B. 2009, The life science, biosecurity and dual-use research, available: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/
codesofconduct/BiosecuritySeminar/Education/index.htm [viewed 5 March 2010].
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a first contact made by, say, the Federal Department of Defence (despite its 
competence and close involvement in BTWC affairs) is likely to be different from 
that to contact established perhaps through the Federal Office of Public Health.
Possible.Ways.Forward
Based on these lessons, the Swiss authorities are currently exploring possibilities 
for a follow-up. Admittedly, resources in this area are limited, but the seminars 
were carried out successfully with almost no (financial) resources. Though any 
further steps are likely to be similarly constrained, this does not necessarily 
mean a hindrance to future progress. For example, the analysis above indicates 
there is little need for changes in the legal framework — the relevant provisions 
already exist. Similarly, the educational system offers various platforms, and 
a substantial number of life-science researchers share at least implicitly the 
concerns of security practitioners, as the seminars confirmed. The existing 
awareness among first responders and security practitioners on national and 
cantonal levels provides a further important base. In summary, this indicates an 
existing potential, and illustrates numerous points to build on.
In practical terms, possible ways forward could include the following:
• Based on the initiative of various government offices such as the Federal 
Office for the Environment (FOEN) or the Federal Office of Public Health 
(FOPH), the recently established Biosafety Curriculum serves as a tool to 
harmonise the biosafety standards within Switzerland. This is implemented 
in courses for biosafety officers for safety levels one to three.37 Incorporating 
references to the debates on dual use and security into the courses would 
open the possibility of spreading the word directly into research facilities via 
the acting biosafety officers, and follow the principle of building on existing 
patterns of cooperation.
• Similarly, first responders could be made more aware of the issues through 
the existing patterns of shared competences and cooperation in the context 
of the national NBC-Protection Strategy. Via the Federal Commission for NBC 
Protection, thoughts on a conceptual extension of preventative measures 
with education could be introduced, while the Coordination Platform of the 
Cantons could serve as a gateway to cantonal authorities and their influence 
particularly on universities on the one hand, and first responders on the 
other.
37 B-Safe 2009, The Curriculum Biosafety — An initiative of the FOEN, the FOPH, the SUVA and the FECB, 
available: http://www.b-safe.ch/?mid=1379&pid=1381&lang_id=0&lang_id=1 [viewed 22 January 2010]; 
and Federal Office for the Environment 2010, Biotechnology / Activities with genetically modified or pathogenic 
organisms in contained use, available: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/biotechnologie/01744/index.html?lang=en 
[viewed 22 January 2010].
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• The militia system of the Swiss armed forces provides a further possibility. 
All armed forces personnel enjoy a basic education in NBC protection, 
particularly specialist troops such as the NBC troops or the medical corps, 
which are manned by civil experts working in comparable professional 
fields. The militia could be encouraged to actively introduce the topic into 
the civil workplace.
• Finally, education could be included as an element in a comprehensive political 
strategy on the national implementation of the BTWC. Such a strategy could 
serve as a guideline to the activities of authorities directly included in the 
BTWC process, and thus serve as a complementary element to the existing 
NBC-Protection Strategy (which focuses on operational aspects in the case of 
a crisis and includes no disarmament features, as discussed above).
Concluding Remarks: Linking Life Sciences 
with Disarmament
Serving as a report on work in progress, this chapter has described the 
implementation of an awareness-raising project on dual-use research in 
Switzerland as part of a continuous implementation of the BTWC. It has 
highlighted the lessons learned and possible ways forward. Switzerland still 
needs to define concrete lines of a long-term perspective. In addition, the 
importance of accounting for national particularities has been highlighted 
— the deliberately liberal environment limits government influence, and the 
federal structures generate an enormous number of actors and authorities. This 
often results in balanced and democratic solutions, but often requires time-
consuming processes, and the national implementation of the BTWC is no 
exception.
Despite the current lack of a universally applicable implementation model, 
this chapter has also shown that — as is probably the case elsewhere, too — 
many of the prerequisites are already in place, making it easier to address 
some general concerns among life scientists. The fact that the final impulse 
was provided by a ‘classical’ disarmament regime did not hamper addressing 
actors and perspectives beyond the ‘classical’ disarmament horizon. Referring 
to recent successes in disarmament negotiations, John Borrie and Ashley 
Thornton extensively elaborated on the necessity to include diverse experts, 
and concluded that negotiating parties should think ‘outside the box’ and reach 
for experts far outside diplomatic circles.38 For Borrie and Thornton, this does 
not only mean the inclusion of international organisations, civil societies or 
victim associations, but also the establishment of diverse negotiation formats 
38 Borrie and Thornton, op. cit.
Education.and.Ethics.in.the.Life.Sciences
74
outside conventional diplomatic procedures.39 The findings of the present 
chapter imply that both negotiations and the implementation of disarmament 
regimes may require diversity. In the case of the BTWC and the prohibition 
of offensive uses of biological agents, such diversity could be provided by the 
deepened exchange between the life-science and disarmament communities. 
Indeed, classrooms where graduate students, fireguards, military intelligence 
and disarmament experts meet seem to be unusual. Yet whether implemented 
metaphorically or in reality, such classroom settings might contribute to the 
necessary diversity and formulation of new long-term approaches that help to 
create the missing link.




This chapter examines recent activities in Israel to promote awareness and action 
in relation to biosecurity. ‘Biosecurity’ here refers to the sum total of measures 
aimed at preventing deliberate attempts to obtain dangerous biological agents 
or technologies and information that will grant the capability to make biological 
weapons. In other words, all the steps that must be taken to deny access by 
unauthorised actors to dangerous biological agents, information and technology 
that can be used to manufacture bioweapons.
Israel is an important country for examination in this regard. As the 2006 Lemon-
Relman Committee Report by the US National Research Council1 noted, almost 
60 per cent of Israeli-authored scientific publications are in the life sciences, 
including medicine and the agricultural sciences. This report also indicated that 
the impact of citation of scientific research to the gross national product (GNP) 
scores highly in Israel compared to life-science industries in some 30 other 
global competitive countries. This means that scientific research is a key feature 
of Israel’s GNP and 60 per cent of that research is related to the life sciences.
Much of this chapter focuses on the activities associated with the recently 
formed Steering Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
(COBRAT). However, prior to that it is important to detail the context of attention 
to biological weapons in Israel along with its research system.
Background: Combating the Threat from 
Biological Weapons
To combat the bioterror threat effectively, a multi-system strategy is essential. 
Such a comprehensive plan must address prevention, defence, and consequence 
management. The objective of prevention is to stop or limit hostile forces from 
obtaining, developing, producing or using biological weapons. To prevent 
1 Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 2006, Globalization, biosecurity, and the future of the 
life sciences, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
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states with developed scientific and technological infrastructures from attaining 
and manufacturing bioweapons if they choose to is almost impossible, although 
sometimes they can be deterred from using them. On the other hand, although it 
is difficult, it should be possible to prevent terrorist organisations from acquiring 
bioweapons, especially the more sophisticated, advanced and dangerous ones. 
However, this would require global cooperation, something not forthcoming 
when the terrorist organisation has a national sponsor or purveyor.
Traditionally, the majority of resources have been invested in defence, a 
strategy composed of protection, detection and early warning. When the main 
threats were from hostile states, this was justified. In order to design, develop 
and acquire an effective defence system, it was necessary to have accurate 
intelligence data concerning the enemy’s plans, which was possible, albeit 
difficult. In contrast, it is almost impossible to predict the exact scenario of a 
bioterror attack. Therefore, defence systems may not give an optimal response 
when a strike occurs.
The aim of consequence management is to treat and save the lives of mass 
casualties. The basic building blocks of this goal are mainly medical measures, 
decontamination procedures, quarantine and evacuation. The source of an 
attack (terrorist or hostile state) is irrelevant. The only significant parameters 
are the number of casualties and the nature of the disease. Therefore, a country 
that is well prepared for a state-based biological threat will also be prepared for 
a bioterror attack. Moreover, since there is a great similarity between a bioattack 
and a natural epidemic, the most cost-effective approach is a ‘dual-use’ medical 
system, where the national medical setup is prepared for both cases.
Israel has had 50 years of experience in fighting conventional terrorism of 
various kinds. For most of that time, it also has been living under the shadow 
of a very real chemical and biothreat from many of its neighbours (for example, 
Syria, Iraq and Iran).2 Over the years, Israel has developed very good defence 
and public-health (consequence-management) systems. It should be emphasised 
that the chemical and bioweapon threats are not only military ones; they are 
also a concrete threat to the Israeli civilian population.
When the biothreat re-emerged as an issue at the end of the 1990s, Israel 
recruited all its know-how and resources to modify its existing defence systems 
to include the new scenario. More recently, Israel has also begun to increase its 
emphasis on, and activity in, prevention.
2 Tucker, J. B. 2006, War of nerves: chemical warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda, New York: Pantheon 
Books; Ali, J. 2001, ‘Chemical weapons and the Iran-Iraq war: a case study in non-compliance’, Nonproliferation 
Review, CNS, vol. 8(1).
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Recent years have seen a revolution in the biological sciences. New molecular 
biological approaches and related technologies promise great benefits, but could 
also create more virulent micro-organisms that are resistant to antibiotics and 
vaccines, or that have other characteristics of effective biological weapons.3 
Initially, such new technologies may only be available to a select few, but the 
rapid dissemination of information through modern communications makes it 
possible for hostile forces to access them. Such forces can use them to develop 
and produce sophisticated, dangerous biological weaponry that would be very 
difficult to counter.4 Thus, it is imperative to prevent organisms, knowledge and 
materials relevant to the production of bioweapons from reaching hostile hands.
Israel conducts world-class biomedical research. This is done in a number 
of sectors — at universities, research institutes, hospitals and government 
laboratories. A 2003 Israel National Security Council (INSC) survey performed 
by the Center for Technological Analysis and Forecasting (ICTAF, Tel Aviv 
University) identified close to 500 Israeli focal points of biological research, 
development, and manufacture of potential relevance to biological weapons. The 
analysis includes academic and non-academic research institutions, government 
organisations (for example, the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Science), 
and industry.
Work on micro-organisms, often virulent ones, takes place in about 50–100 
laboratories. Most use advanced biological methods and technologies, and 
possess considerable manufacturing expertise and knowledge that is potentially 
relevant to developing bioweapons.
Israel’s Biomedical Research and Development 
System  
Organisationally and functionally, the system is extremely decentralised, with 
no single national authority having comprehensive responsibility for these 
laboratories and focal points. Instead, accountability is divided between a 
number of government ministries, authorities and academic institutions. No 
sole centralised authority deals formally with professional issues relevant to the 
3 Chyba, C. F. and Greminger, A. L. 2004, ‘Biotechnology and bioterrorism: an unprecedented world’, 
Survival, vol. 46(2), pp. 143–62.
4 The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, materials and technologies to state and sub-state 
actors 2001, testimony by Jonathon B. Tucker, before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation and Federal Service, available: http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/cbwol.html; Pate, J. and 




proper performance of this system, and neither does any national organisation 
possess complete information about the system’s scientific personnel, their 
research interests and their laboratory’s research.
Ministry.of.Industry,.Trade.and.Labour.(MITL)
De jure, the primary legislated responsibility for worker and workplace safety, 
and hence laboratory biosafety, rests with the MITL. De facto, oversight and 
supervision of Israel’s biomedical laboratories is considerably more complicated. 
The MITL tends not to focus its attention, expertise and inspections in the 
science sector. In contrast, the Ministry of Health (MOH) has major, expanding 
interest, expertise and, increasingly, activity in the field, which falls under the 
rubric of its general mandate to promote national health (see later in chapter).
The MITL’s Laboratory Accreditation Authority (LAA) was established by law to 
accredit and inspect laboratories and ensure their compliance with international 
quality and safety standards. Observance of each measure is judged separately; 
there is no evaluation of the laboratory as a whole. Israeli law requires LAA 
accreditation only in specific sectors; for example, cement standards. In all non-
specified areas, it is voluntary. This can lead to some unevenness. For example, 
the MOH’s water and food laboratories must be certified, but the same ministry’s 
medical laboratories are exempt. A few Israeli medical laboratories do seek 
voluntary endorsement for commercial reasons; but the lack of a comprehensive 
accreditation requirement for all biomedical laboratories prevents their effective 
central regulation.
Ministry.of.Health.(MOH)
The MOH’s responsibilities vary for Israeli biomedical laboratories in different 
sectors. Most conduct research and undertake routine diagnoses, are situated 
in hospitals, and many work with virulent bacteria or viruses. Laboratories in 
state-owned hospitals are under full MOH supervision. Other hospitals and 
laboratories belong to one of Israel’s Kupot Holim (private health plans [HMOs]). 
These are not under MOH supervision, direct or indirect. The country’s medical 
schools enjoy absolute independence and are not supervised by the MOH; 
rather, each medical school/university has its own safety committee.
The MOH’s own Department for Laboratories, part of the Public Health Service, 
is directly and fully responsible for the operation of the ministry’s six internal 
public-health laboratories. It also provides varying amounts of administrative 




The MOH must approve medical laboratories in hospitals and HMOs and their 
professional staff. However, the ministry’s Department of Laboratories does not 
possess information about, much less oversee, the research actually carried out 
in such environments. A dwindling number of private medical laboratories 
(only 13 are still operating today) are, in principle, supervised by the MOH.
Recently, the MOH has begun to expand its oversight of medical laboratories in 
hospitals and health-service organisations, including the tracking of biological 
agents, the registration of workers, and, for the last few years, a regime of regular 
inspections. The Ministry’s six public-health laboratories follow orderly safety 
procedures, including registration and documentation. However, the MITL 
biosafety regulations provide oversight and supervision of all other medical-
laboratory work. The MITL regulations assign broader responsibility for these 
issues to the laboratory director, who must also appoint a safety supervisor.
Other (often industrial) private laboratories are not classified as ‘medical 
laboratories’, but as ‘biological laboratories’, although they do work with 
dangerous biological agents. The MOH does not oversee these laboratories in 
any way. Such laboratories just need a MITL business licence and are subject 
only to the usual MITL biological-safety oversight. This potentially serious 
problem should be tackled within some appropriate framework.
Institutions.of.Higher.Education
The lion’s share of Israeli life-sciences and medical research and development 
is conducted at the country’s universities and academic-research institutions: 
the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, Ben-Gurion University, Bar-Ilan 
University, the University of Haifa, the Technion, and the Weizmann Institute 
of Science.
Israel’s universities are not formally subordinate to any government or public 
body, although they retain strong links to the Council for Higher Education and 
its Planning and Budget Committee that divides the government’s total budget 
for higher education among them. All Israeli institutions of higher education 
share a similar organisational structure — a president, who usually appoints a 
vice-president for research and development, heads each.
Individual university scientists usually enjoy considerable scientific freedom 
with no institutional reporting, oversight or supervision. Their work is only 
reviewed once every few years in the framework of institutional promotion 
committees. Only a few special activities are regulated by national or 
organisational procedures. For example, an Animal Experimentation Law 
establishes standards for the use of research animals; and Helsinki Committees 
oversee experiments on humans. Work with dangerous biological agents and 
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poisons are regulated under Israel’s extensive biosafety legal infrastructure, 
and academic establishments have appropriate procedures and organisations 
to ensure compliance (dangerous biological agents, defined as micro-organisms 
and toxins that cause disease in humans, are listed in the law).
The awareness of biosafety and its legal requirements is increasing. Since 
international research funding bodies (for example, the US National Institutes of 
Health and the US military) are demanding more effective biosafety supervision 
and oversight in the foreign laboratories they support, Israel’s academic 
biosafety procedures are continuously improving. All educational research 
institutions have safety units, a full-time safety director, and safety committees. 
Each safety system complies with the relevant laws and directives of the MITL 
Workplace Inspection Division. Appropriate laws include the Workplace Safety 
Order (1970), the Workplace Inspection Organisation Law (1945), and the Safety 
Oversight Order for Medical, Biological and Chemical Laboratories (2001).
An institution’s safety officials oversee work with dangerous biological agents 
as listed in the law, with human blood and tissue samples, DNA manipulation, 
toxic materials, and pathogenic organisms. Workplace regulations and 
guidelines are constantly updated, and laboratories are inspected regularly to 
ensure compliance. Record-keeping and periodic reporting regarding high-risk 
materials are required, and automated systems are being created to track the 
purchase of dangerous strains and special biological materials.
Biosafety oversight in academia takes place at two loci: first, when research 
proposals are submitted, and second, during its progress. In addition, safety 
authorities conduct instructional workshops for scientists, laboratory workers 
and students in safety procedures. In some institutions, when a research 
project requires safety certification, it is given only after the safety division has 
confirmed that the laboratory’s work conditions meet legal requirements.
Biosecurity in Israel
Israel, the US and Western Europe share common views concerning the threat of 
bioweapons, bioterror and the creation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
among rogue states and terror organisations.5 Israel has repeatedly stated that 
its national policy is to prevent such proliferation, and has taken concrete steps 
in this direction, some in the framework of internal legislation and some as part 
of international initiatives, including those of the UN.
5 Danzig, R. 2003, Catastrophic bioterrorism: what is to be done? Center for Technology and National Security 
Policy, National Defense University, Washington, DC.
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Although Israel has not formally joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC), regarding it as an inseparable part of a general and 
comprehensive regional political arrangement, it wholeheartedly adheres to 
the US, EU and UN initiatives combating bioterror and WMD proliferation. It 
adheres to and coordinates its activities with the AG regime and fully supports 
UN Resolution 1540. Israel also has consistently supported the policy of the US 
in its war against international terror of all kinds.
However, unlike the US, Western Europe and other countries, Israel has yet to 
adopt legislation directly aimed at preventing or minimising the spread from its 
own laboratories, of non-conventional weaponry and its components, including 
dangerous biological agents.
While, as outlined in the previous section, Israel has a well-developed system of 
civilian biosafety (as distinct from biosecurity) laws and regulations, these can 
make only a limited and indirect contribution to oversight and inspection aimed 
at preventing the seepage of dangerous agents or information into hostile hands. 
There is also an executive order issued by the MITL in 2004 which mandates 
the oversight of chemical, biological and nuclear exports ‘to help prevent 
the spread of non-conventional weaponry… [by] forbidding the export from 
Israel of products, technologies and services that can be used to develop and 
manufacture chemical, biological or nuclear weapons’. It is important to note 
that to minimise any harm to basic and clinical biomedical research this MITL 
order specifically exempts the export of chemical and biological agents used 
for medical and veterinary diagnosis, treatment or research, and information 
related to such agents.
The prevention of biological terror remains of supreme importance at national 
level. A preliminary study at the INSC in 2003 produced the following findings:
• There is virtually no awareness of the need for biosecurity within Israel’s 
civilian life-sciences research community.
• Israel has no legal and/or regulatory infrastructure directed specifically 
towards biosecurity. Existing biosafety laws and regulations provide only 
indirect and partial means for dealing with biosecurity.
• Institutions where biomedical research and development and other work 
(diagnosis, production, and so on) is performed are not subject to inspection 
or supervision by any single Israeli authority or ministry. Instead, this 
responsibility is shared between a number of ministries, where division of 
responsibility is often not clear.
• As a result, neither at national or ministerial level is there a system of control 
or supervision of biomedical research laboratories, nor is there sufficient 
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information about any dangerous biological agents used, the types of research 
performed, or the technologies employed.
The COBRAT Report and its Recommendations
The big challenge now is to incorporate biosecurity concerns into the system, in 
particular, to upgrade measures to prevent the leakage of dangerous organisms, 
information and technologies to terror organisations. To this end, the INSC 
and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (IASH) initiated a national 
project called ‘Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism’, and formed a 
special Steering Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
(COBRAT) to analyse and report on the current situation and recommend future 
action.6 The committee was composed of well-known scientists and biologists 
from Israeli academia and industry and experts in regulatory and legislative 
law, similar to the Fink Committee in the US.7
COBRAT took the situation in which authorities and the scientific community 
are oblivious to biosecurity issues as its starting point in seeking more effective 
and systematic ways to meet biosecurity concerns without compromising 
academic freedom and creativity. In its final report the Committee formulated 
specific recommendations to address:
• the changes required in Israel’s existing legislative infrastructure
• the compilation of an updatable list of biological agents and research topics 
requiring inspection and supervision
• the establishment of a regime for tracking, supervising and enforcing all 
areas of biosecurity
• the need for a national inter-ministerial body or professional committee to 
guide, monitor and maintain biosecurity.
In pursuing these goals, COBRAT was confronted by several daunting but not 
atypical facts: (1) no biosecurity legislation exists in Israel; (2) the legislative 
process, as practiced by the Israeli parliament (Knesset), is long, complicated 
and uncertain; (3) a response to the bioterror threat cannot wait for long-
term solutions. COBRAT’s innovative yet practical interim solution to these 
problems may also serve as a useful model for others. COBRAT recommended 
modifying Israel’s biosafety committees and empowering them, by executive 
order, to undertake responsibility for biosecurity concerns as well. In addition 
to reducing duplication, disruption and delay, this scheme avoids many of the 
6 Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism 2008, Report by the 
Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the Israeli National Security Council.




sensitivities, suspicions and conflicts inherent in the regulation of dual-use 
research. The existing biosafety committees are of long standing, sensitive to 
scientific concerns (and those of the individual scientist), well-tolerated by the 
scientific and academic communities, and unlikely to trigger the hostility and 
‘graft rejection’ typical of introducing a ‘foreign body’ into academia. Trust and 
comfort are indefinable, but their effects are all too real.
With this introduction let us proceed to the Committee’s (edited) 
recommendations given in Table 1.8
Table 1: COBRAT’s Recommendations
Recommendation 1: awareness, consciousness and education








existing. Israeli. secondary. legislation.on.biosafety.should. immediately.be.
used. as. a. model. for. ministerial. executive. orders. and. institutional. (for.
example,.university).procedures.designed.to.prevent.the.potential.seepage.
of.organisms,.materials.and.information.to.hostile.elements .
In. parallel,. specific. longer-term. legislation. should. be. formulated .. This.
legislation.must.be.comprehensive.and.cover.all.aspects.of.biosecurity .




8 Friedman, D., Rager-Zisman, B., Bibi, E. and Keinan, A. 2008, ‘The bioterrorism threat and dual-use 
biotechnological research: an Israeli perspective’, Science and Engineering Ethics vol. 16(1), pp. 85–97.
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Local. responsibility. for. the.enforcement.should.be.delegated. to.existing.
institutional. biosafety. committees. (renamed. “biosafety. and. biosecurity.
committees”). for. the. academic. sector. and. special. Central. Biosafety.
and. Biosecurity. Committees. for. biomedical. laboratories. affiliated. with.
government. ministries .. National. biosecurity. policy,. procedures. and.
enforcement.should.be.overseen.by.a.National.Biosecurity.Council.(NBC).
to.be.appointed.by.the.Ministry.of.Health.(MOH) .






data. and. information. are. not. limited. to. research. connected.with. these.
agents,.but.also.can.stem.from.work.with.other,.in.themselves.harmless,.
strains .
Recommendation 5: publication of information generated by dual-use 
research






Recommendation 6: consideration of biosecurity issues by funding agencies
It.is.recommended.that.the.Israel.Science.Foundation.(ISF).and.government.
research.foundations.require,.as.part.of.their.approval.process,.biosecurity.
approval. from. the. applicant’s. institution .. This.would. ensure. that. these.
issues.are.considered.by.applicant.institutions.and.that.proper.safety.and.





Recommendation 7: supervision of importation and sale of dual-use 







Recommendation 8: national responsibility for biosecurity
The. establishment. of. a. biosecurity. regime. and. its. enforcement. should.
be. assigned. to. the.Ministry. of. Health. (MOH),. which. has. both. primary.
responsibility.for.public.health.and.the.requisite.scientific.knowledge.and.
professional. experience .. MOH. should. establish. a. National. Biosecurity.
Council. (NBC) .. The. Chairman. and. members. of. the. Council. should. be.
appointed.by.the.Minister.of.Health.in.consultation.with.the.head.of.the.
National. Security. Council. and. the. president. of. the. Israel. Academy. of.
Sciences.and.Humanities .
 
The New Legislation Process
In its work the Committee has sought to clarify the extent to which Israeli law 
contains normative instructions to deal with bioterror threats that could result 
from scientific research conducted in Israel’s biological and medical laboratories. 
The Committee found that Israel lacks legislation specifically addressing this 
goal, although there are many relevant existing statutes. In particular, there 
is a clear link between the need to protect the safety and health of laboratory 
workers handling dangerous biological agents and the public at large. Thus the 
Committee carefully examined existing biosafety laws that address inspection, 
work safety, hygiene and public health as they relate to biological laboratories.
The Committee has concluded that, although Israel has an effective legal 
framework for biosafety, it urgently needs a similar normative structure for 
biosecurity. A statutory list of dangerous biological agents and their forbidden 
uses must be drawn up and updated frequently. Relevant laboratories must be 
identified and certification procedures for using dangerous organisms legislated. 
Legislation must also provide for the adequate supervision of anti-theft, transfer 
and storage procedures. Clearly, existing biosafety provisions intended to protect 
people working with dangerous biological agents from laboratory accidents are 
also relevant for biosecurity.
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Other efforts must include raising the awareness of laboratory directors, scientists 
and students regarding existing legal requirements, the current bioterror threat, 
and the vital need for biosecurity and biosafety procedures. An active concern 
for biosecurity plays an important role in establishing standards for working 
with dangerous biological agents. International initiatives followed by national 
legislation in many states focus on laboratories holding stores of dangerous 
biological agents, because these are prime targets for hostile forces.
‘Preventative caution’ requires rules that specify how to prevent hostile forces 
from acquiring bioweapons. The Committee believes that any framework must 
provide for the continued performance, publication and implementation of 
scientific research, as well as the defence, oversight and inspection mechanisms 
needed to prevent or minimise hostile use of ostensibly positive research results.
The committee assumed that introducing a new law would be a lengthy process 
and therefore recommended an interim step be taken. This step was to integrate 
biosecurity laws into the existing biosafety laws and regulations. Fortunately, 
and contrary to the committee’s expectations, a separate biosecurity law was put 
on fast track, thanks to the combined efforts of several members of parliament.
The.Regulation.of.Research.into.Biological.Disease.
Agents.Act,.2008
In November 2008, the Israeli parliament passed legislation on a set of laws that 
cover biosecurity issues. Moreover, the main recommendations of the committee 
were made law thanks to their cooperation with the different government 
departments, mainly the MOH and Ministry of Justice.
The main points of the law are as follows:
• The law applies to all institutions and laboratories (universities, research 
labs, industry and hospitals), in all sectors, that have in their possession 
disease-causing biological agents as listed in the law or conduct research or 
diagnostics in said agents.
• The Minister of Health will be in charge of enforcing this law in all institutions.
• Possessing, conducting research or working with these biological agents 
requires an authorisation from the Ministry of Health.
• Possessing, conducting research or working with these biological agents 
must be performed so as not to impinge upon safety or security concerns.
• No one shall conduct research whose sole purpose is to cause or exacerbate a 
disease or illness or to impair the ability to prevent or treat it.
• A person or institution that has conducted a research study for which 
permission did not have to be obtained under the Act, but which has made 
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findings of a nature to increase the virulence or the contagiousness of disease 
agents not included in the list, or findings of a nature to alter the host range 
of the said disease agents, so that the disease can pass to humans, shall halt 
the research and submit a request to the ‘institutional committee’.
• All institutions that possess disease-causing agents will establish an 
‘institutional committee’ whose purpose is to supervise the research 
conducted in that institution. The committees will comprise scientists as 
well as security and safety personnel from the institution.
• A council for biological disease-agent research will be created to advise the 
Minister of Health and will comprise professionals and members of relevant 
government ministries. The council’s responsibilities will be to advise the 
Minister of Health regarding research authorisation, to supervise the various 
institutions, and to promote training workshops and courses in institutions 
that work with biological agents.
Since the Act itself does not define what ‘public information campaigns’ and 
‘in-service training courses’ are, it is understood that the Council has a duty to 
oversee those through to their implementation. Based on the Act, the Council 
can approve operating rules that are implemented by institutional committees 
(of a corporation or company conducting research, whether scientific, medical, 
industrial-commercial or educational, including hospitals and government 
organisations) to approve scientific research in Israel. Therefore, the Council 
can guide research establishments to adopt such campaigns or training courses 
as a part of their operating rules, notably so for educational institutions. 
Moreover, the Council also has the right to oversee the institutional committees’ 
compliance with their operating rules based on the Act. Once certain educational 
programmes are set out, research establishments need to be compliant with them. 
Education of life scientists about dual use in Israel will be an important case 
where specific national legislation to deal with biosecurity is achieved alongside 
the establishment of specifically dedicated committees to address biosecurity 
issues.
The authorisation process allowing institutions to posses and/or conduct 
research with biological-disease agents was launched in Israel in 2009 and 
organisations have begun establishing their own internal committees. Towards 
this end, a nationwide workshop is planned to take place at the end of February 
2010. Participants will include members from the Council and institutional 
committees, plus other representatives from various establishments. The current 
legislation and regulations will be discussed and clarified and the participants 




The recent Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents Act is 
without a doubt a giant step forward in Israel’s awareness and attitude towards 
biosecurity. Nevertheless, we should anticipate a long and gradual process that 
will require a great deal of effort and patience. The success of this legislation is 
largely dependent on researchers and their cooperation is crucial. For biosecurity 
regulation to succeed, researchers must first be well-informed about the topic. 
It is important that they recognise and understand the potential harm that can 
be caused by the technologies they are developing and the research they are 
conducting.
In this regard, it is important to note that raising awareness about biosecurity has 
already received some attention in Israel in recent years. Numerous programmes 
have been launched to assess the level of knowledge among different research 
communities, as well as offer ways of increasing awareness. Two major figures 
in this move are Malcolm Dando and Brian Rappert, 9who have been very active 
in launching programmes and publishing a large number of papers and books 
on the topic. Such a programme is currently running in Israel, with the support 
of the Sloan Foundation. The initial stage of this programme — which included 
a survey conducted by the author — investigated the relevance of courses in 
bioethics, biosecurity and biosafety within Israel’s research universities. 10
The survey examined the syllabi of 35 courses offered at the Faculty of Life 
Sciences of six research universities in Israel. Courses were sampled by focusing 
on those that provide specific educational modules on biosafety, biosecurity, 
and bioethics. The rationale for the survey was that we aimed to investigate 
the current state of awareness regarding these topics within the research 
communities of life sciences, as it manifests itself in the curricula.
In general, we found that very little biosecurity education is offered to 
researchers in the life sciences. Moreover, the results indicate there is currently 
no academic course at Israeli universities that is specifically designed to educate 
life scientists on the issue of biosecurity. Interestingly, comparable surveys 
conducted in different parts of the world have rendered very similar results 
(see the chapters in this volume by Minehata and Shinomiya, and Mancini and 
Revill).
9 Rappert, B. 2007, ‘Education for the life sciences’, in Rappert, B. and Mcleish, C. (eds), A Web of prevention: 
Biological weapons, life sciences and the future governance of research, London: Earthscan; Rappert, B., Chavrier, 
M. I. and Dando M. R. 2006, In-depth Implementation of the BTWC: Education and Outreach, Bradford Review 
Conference Papers, no. 18.
10 Minehata, M. and Friedman, D. 2010, Biosecurity education in Israeli research universities: Survey report, 
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC) and Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
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Given these results, it would be reasonable to assume that insufficient education 
is a major contributing factor to the lack of awareness of biosecurity issues 
amongst life scientists. In a similar vein, the COBRAT Report also noted the 
lack of legal infrastructure for biosecurity and the fact that there is virtually 
no knowledge of the need for biosecurity amongst Israel’s scientific-research 
community as well as within Israeli civilian life. What is more, this lack of 
awareness was concluded to be the likely reason for biosecurity education also 
being essentially non-existent in Europe and Japan.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that even universities that were informed 
about biosecurity issues, in Israel as well as Europe and Japan, still encounter 
difficulties when attempting to include biosecurity education in their curricula. 
These difficulties may include:
• insufficient time available in the existing curricula
• time constraints and insufficient resources required for the development of 
new curricula
• lack of expertise and available literature on biosecurity education
• lack of interest in biosecurity education.
With the results of the survey in mind, the second part of the Sloan Foundation-
supported programme aims to raise awareness. In this part of the programme, 
10 life-science faculties and/or departments at research universities in Israel (Tel 
Aviv University, Ben-Gurion University, the Technion, Bar-Ilan University and 
the Hebrew University) were targeted and an hour-long seminar was given in 
each on the subject of dual-use research and biosecurity. The audience comprised 
faculty members as well as graduate students. The seminar discussed the threat 
of bioterrorism, the potential dangers posed by advanced biotechnological 
research and the possible systems that can be implemented to stop or greatly 
hinder the transfer of biohazardous material and sensitive information into 
the hands of terrorists. In addition, the new Israeli legislation was presented 
and discussed. Following the lectures, a questionnaire was sent to all who had 
attended. These questionnaires will be analysed and used to determine the 
programme’s next steps.
This series of seminars, limited as it may be, is nevertheless an important first 
step towards increasing awareness regarding biosecurity issues. Therefore, one 
of the main goals of the programme, which will be based on the analysis of 
the questionnaires, is to build a lesson plan or course syllabus on the subject. 
With the help of the Council for Biological Disease Agent Research and the 
MOH, we will encourage research institutions that deal with biological agents to 
incorporate such courses in their curriculum. With this, we hope to contribute 
considerably to biosecurity education and expect to see a significant rise in 
knowledge of biosecurity issues in Israel.
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In the context of raising awareness, it is important to discuss the above-
mentioned Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents Act, which 
was recently passed in Israel, as well as the Council for Biological Disease Agent 
Research, which was established under this Act. Although Israel is not a State 
Party to the BTWC, this legislation certainly conforms to the spirit of the treaty 
and puts Israel at the forefront of confronting the issues of biosecurity. In this 
sense, the education of life scientists about dual use in Israel will be an important 
test for examining the effects of national legislation on biosecurity and national 
committees specifically targeting biosecurity issues.
To sum up, based on the data presented above, this investigation indicates 
that there is a lack of biosecurity education and educational content on dual-
use issues in Israel at the time of inquiry. However, this certainly does not 
mean that promoting biosecurity education in Israel cannot be done. In fact, 
we believe precisely the opposite is the case, perhaps most importantly as a 
result of the Regulation of Research into Biological Disease Agents Act and the 
establishment of the Council for Biological Disease Agent Research. The Council 
is responsible for outlining, recommending and overseeing the implementation 
of regulations enhancing biosecurity at research institutions in Israel alongside 
raising awareness of biosecurity issues amongst life scientists. Hence, the Israeli 
government’s initiative to develop infrastructure for biosecurity policies is 
evident in this Act and, in this sense, is an example of a top-down approach 
to the promotion of biosecurity education whereby raising awareness begins 
with legislation, then trickles down to the level of educational institutions and, 
finally, reaches the public sphere.
Summary and Conclusion
Over the past 40 years, the state of Israel has been facing chemical and biological 
threats, not only to its military but also mainly to its civilian population. Until 
the late 1990s, the threat emanated primarily from hostile states that developed 
and stockpiled bioweapons and chemical weapons. However, from that time, 
and especially after the 11 September attacks and subsequent distribution of 
anthrax envelopes around the US, bioterror has become a global threat. Israel 
joined the international effort spearheaded by the US to curb this threat, 
investing much of its resources on building an effective biodefence system, 
as well as joining efforts to prevent bioweapons and their components from 
reaching hostile hands, and mostly stopping the leakage of dangerous biological 
agents and dual-use technologies and information to terrorists.
In order to assess and investigate the issues in Israel, the COBRAT was 
assembled. The committee’s main recommendations were: 1) to initiate and 
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enhance education and awareness in the life-science community; 2) to promote 
legislation; and 3) to establish a regulation system regarding research with 
dangerous biological agents and dual-use technologies. These proposals were 
quickly implemented, as evidenced by the establishment of the Council for 
Dangerous Biological Agents as well as novel legislation, placing Israel at the 
forefront of countries confronting these issues successfully.
The following list summarises the most important and effective properties of the 
Israeli approach to the fight against bioterror:
• a top-down approach, whereby official agencies initiate assessment and 
research of the issues, leading to legislation, which is subsequently followed 
by structured education at university level, and finally, the launching of 
public campaigns
• the assessment and research is independent and conducted by senior 
scientists from the academic life-science community, rather than government 
officials
• cooperation between the INSC, which represents the interests of national 
security, and the Israeli Academy of Science, which stands for pure academic 
research
• the support of public officials, such as members of Parliament
• the establishment of a professional advisory council that is responsible for 
implementation and supervision of the law
• the legislation regulates not only research with specifically listed biological-
disease agents but also dual-use research
• although research institutes are regulated by the Council for Dangerous 
Biological Agents they each have the mandate to work as an independent 
entity; a configuration which significantly reduces bureaucracy.
In conclusion, we strongly believe that the Israeli approach for addressing 
and confronting current biosecurity issues and, in particular, the top-down 




Chapter 5: Japan: Obstacles, Lessons 
and Future
MASAMICHI.MINEHATA.AND.NARIYOSHI.SHINOMIYA
Japan has a clear rationale to discuss the introduction of ethical education 
for life scientists regarding its dual-use dimensions.1 This partly derives from 
the size of its life-science industry and from the actual threats posed by the 
misuse of science. Japan has been one of the leading global marketplaces of 
the life-science industry.2 This indicates that a large number of life scientists 
are practising cutting-edge research in Japan. Importantly, some of them have 
misused their knowledge in the form of biocrimes and bioterrorism. One of 
the most prominent cases of such misuse was that of the religious group Aum 
Shinrikyo. By recruiting scientists from top academic institutions, the group 
was able to conduct sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The group also 
attempted several biological attacks using botulinum toxin and anthrax from 
1990 to 1995.3 Therefore, enhancing ethical awareness among scientists is of 
critical importance in extending their moral responsibility to do no harm and 
minimise any potential damage to humans, animals and plants.
Although attempts to define ‘biosecurity’ are not straightforward,4 in this 
chapter it is conceptualised as taking both ‘preventative and responsive 
measures, in a multifaceted manner, to mitigate the multidimensional threat 
1 In this chapter, dual-use refers to the possibility whereby peacefully developed scientific research can be 
applied for malign purposes, such as biowarfare and bioterrorism.
2 See Chapter 3 of National Research Council 2006, Globalization, biosecurity and the future of the life sciences, 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 
3 Sugishima, M. 2003, ‘Biocrimes in Japan’, in Sugishima, M. (ed.), A comprehensive study on bioterrorism, 
Legal Research Institute Monograph, Japan: Asahi University; Wheelis, M. and Sugishima, M. 2006, ‘Terrorist 
use of biological weapons’, in Wheelis. M., Rozsa, L. and Dando, M. R. (eds), Deadly cultures: Biological 
weapons since1945, MA: Harvard University Press; Takahashi, H., Keim, P., Kaufmann, A. F., Keys, C., Smith, 
K. L., Taniguchi, K., Inouye, S. and Kurata, T. 2004, ‘Historical review: Bacillus anthracis incident, Kameido, 
Tokyo, 1993’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 1(1), pp. 117–20.
4 The term ‘biosecurity’ has been defined in different concepts in different social and linguistic backgrounds 
in different countries. See Sunshine Project 2003, ‘Biosafety, biosecurity, and biological weapons’, background 
paper on three agreements on biotechnology, health, and the environment, and their potential contribution 
to biological weapons control, October 2003, available: http://www.natwiss.de/publikationen/Biosafety_
and_Biosecurity.pdf [viewed 17 January 2010]; Fidler, D. and Gostin, L.L. 2007, Biosecurity in the global age: 
Biological weapons, public health, and the rule of law, CA: Stanford University Press.
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posed by bioterrorism, biowarfare, and the potential advertent or inadvertent 
misuse of the life sciences’.5 This is a broader concept than that often given to 
‘laboratory biosecurity’,6 although in Japan at this time the latter is generally 
understood as ‘biosecurity’.7 Therefore, in this chapter biosecurity education is 
also widely envisaged as a process to better inform understanding of how the 
possible misuse of the life sciences can be prevented. It includes themes such as, 
inter alia, the history of state-level offensive biological-warfare programmes and 
biological terrorism; the history and evolution of the international prohibition 
regimes and their national implementation;8 dual-use risks and ethical 
responsibilities of life scientists; and building an effective set of preventative 
policies to ensure benign development of the life sciences.
In order to improve biosecurity education in Japan, it is necessary to understand 
the existing provisions regarding dual-use issues and learn lessons from the 
implementation of such teaching. This is useful for accumulating knowledge in 
biosecurity education to share with other countries. To achieve this purpose, 
this chapter will give a brief overview of Japan’s stance towards international 
efforts to mitigate the threat posed by misuse of the life sciences. Secondly, the 
chapter shifts its focus to a domestic context by providing the survey results 
on biosecurity educational provisions in 197 university-level life-science 
degree courses. Thirdly, biosecurity education at Japan’s National Defense 
Medical College (NDMC) will be used as an example of the introduction of such 
education. Finally, the way forward for the education of life scientists in Japan 
will be envisaged.
5 Minehata, M. and Shinomiya, N. 2009, Biosecurity education: enhancing ethics, securing life and promoting 
science: dual use education in life-science degree courses at universities in Japan, Saitama and Bradford: 
National Defense Medical College and the University of Bradford, available: http://www.dual-usebioethics.
net/ [viewed 17 January 2010]. There have been efforts to conceptualise a multifaceted approach comprising 
several practical measures through what is termed the Web of Prevention (WoP). For the conceptual evolution 
of the WoP in literature, see Feaks, D., Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. 2007, ‘Introduction: A web of prevention’, 
in Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds), A web of prevention: Biological weapons, life science and the governance of 
research, London: Earthscan.
6 The World Health Organisation definition of laboratory biosecurity refers to ‘institutional and personal 
security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens 
and toxins’. See World Health Organisation 2004, Laboratory Biosafety Manual, Geneva: WHO, p. 47.
7 Furukawa, K. 2009, ‘Dealing with the dual-use aspects of life science activities in Japan’, in Rappert, B. 
and Gould, C. (eds), Biosecurity: Origins, transformations and practices, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
8 Such as BTWC of 1972, Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 or Geneva Protocol of 1925.
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Japan’s Stance on the Dual-Use Issue: 
The International Context 
Amongst other calls to the international community,9 States Parties of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have in recent years 
conducted in-depth discussions on, for example, national measures to implement 
laboratory biosecurity (2003), the adoption of codes of conduct for scientists 
(2005) and the promotion of education on dual-use issues (2008).10 As a result of 
these processes, Japan has been constantly considering its own views.
In the discussion on codes of conduct for life scientists, in particular, Japan 
addressed some key elements of awareness-raising among scientists. It explained 
that the lack of awareness among scientists was not to be taken as a sign of 
‘the immorality of scientists’; rather, ‘the misconduct and failures of scientists 
are not caused by a lack of ethics but rather by ignorance’.11 Therefore, the 
objective of the codes was the reduction of ‘the risk of sciences causing negative 
effects on human beings and society through establishing specific rules that 
scientists should abide by’.  Japan proposed to ‘ensure scientists realize the 
risks of biological agents they handle, the possibility their research results may 
be abused and the effects of them actually being abused’.  Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged that scientists themselves should be the ‘core people’ to formulate 
such codes, although involvement by other people concerned is also necessary.12 
At the same meeting the Japan Bioindustry Association (JBA) also illustrated its 
mandatory professional rules and guidelines, stating that such standards were 
important in ensuring both ‘corporate compliance’ and social responsibility of 
the industrial sector.13
9 The necessity of education wastouched upon in the Statement on Biosecurity by the InterAcademy Panel, 
which was endorsed by the national science academies of more than 60 states in 2005; see InterAcademy 
Panel 2005 Statement on Biosecurity, available: http://www.interacademies.net/?id=4909[viewed 17 December 
2008]; World Health Organisation 2007, Scientific working group on life science research and global health 
security: Report of the first meeting, Geneva: WHO.
10 United Nations 2002, Final Document of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/17, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ [viewed 
17 January 2010]; United Nations (2006) Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the States Parties to 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.VI/6, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ 
[viewed 17 January 2010].
11 Japan 2005a, Codes of conduct for scientists: Discussions in Japan on the issue, BWC/MSP2005/MX/WP.21, 
Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ [viewed 17 January 2010], p. 4.
12 .Ibid. p. 4.
13 Japan 2005b, Codes of conduct for scientists: A view from analysis of the bioindustrial sectors in Japan, 




Despite the amount of international attention given to awareness-raising among 
scientists, specific provisions for biosecurity education are not prevalent in many 
countries. This deficiency has been elaborated in the national papers of States 
Parties to the meetings of the BTWC, particularly by Australia,14 the UK and 
the Netherlands.15 Experts within the non-governmental community have also 
reached similar conclusions. For example, after conducting some 90 interactive 
seminars with more than 2500 life scientists in 13 different countries, Dando 
and Rappert concluded that there was a pervasive lack of awareness amongst 
individual scientists of the dual-use aspects of their research.16 This was further 
supported by the survey on biosecurity education in European universities by 
Giulio Mancini and James Revill, demonstrating the deficiency of education in 
dual-use issues for life scientists.17
At a BTWC meeting in 2008, Japan acknowledged that ‘the development of 
educational programmes at the government level has not seen great progress’.18 
One explanation for this is that, despite a growing attention to biosecurity 
issues and the development of some related regulations, human and financial 
resources to institutionalise and coordinate preventative measures to minimise 
dual-use risks in the life sciences are still limited amongst relevant ministries and 
scientific communities.19 Thus it could be expected that biosecurity-education 
provisions have not been prevalent in higher-education institutions in Japan.
14 Australia 2005, Raising awareness: Approaches and opportunities for outreach, BWC/MSP/2005/MX/
WP.29, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ [viewed 17 January 2010].
15 UK and Netherlands 2005, Oversight, education and awareness-raising: Report of a UK seminar, BWC/
MSP/2008/MX/WP.10, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ [viewed 17 January 2010].
16 Dando, M. R. and Rappert, B. 2005, ‘Codes of conduct for the life sciences: Some insights from UK 
academia’, Bradford Briefing Papers, no. 16, available: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/
BP_16_2ndseries.pdf [viewed 17 January 2010]; Rappert, B., Chevrier, M.I. and Dando, M.R. 2006, ‘In-depth 
implementation of the BWC: Education and outreach’, Bradford Review Conference Papers, no. 18, available: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_18.pdf [viewed 17 January 2010]; Rappert, B. (2009) 
Experimental secrets: International security, codes, and the future of research, New York: University Press 
of America.
17 The survey reported that only three out of 57 universities investigated in Europe offered 
specific biosecurity modules. See Mancini, G. and Revill, J. 2008, Fostering the biosecurity norm: 
Biosecurity education for the next generation of life scientists, Como and Bradford: Landau Network-
Centro Volta and the University of Bradford, available: http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/2008/11/07/
FosteringTheBiosecurityNormAnEducationalModuleForLifeSciencesStudents.aspx [viewed 17 January 
2010]; Revill, J., Mancini, G., Minehata, M. and Shinomiya, N. 2009, ‘Biosecurity education: Surveys from 
Europe and Japan’, Background paper for the international workshop on promoting education on dual-use issues 
in the life sciences, 16-18 November 2009, Warsaw, Poland: Polish Academy of Sciences, available: http://dels.
nas.edu/bls/warsaw/background.shtml [viewed 18 January 2010].
18 in consultation with Australia, Canada, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway and New Zealand2008, 
Oversight, education, awareness raising, and codes of conduct for preventing the misuse of bio-science and bio-
technology, BWC/MSP2008/MX/WP.21, Geneva: UN, available: http://www.opbw.org/ [viewed 17 January 
2010], p. 4.
19 Furukawa 2009, op. cit.
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If there has been little evidence of such instruction, it is worth investigating why 
these subjects have not been incorporated and how faculty members view the 
relevance of issues such as dual use, biosecurity and biosafety. It is important 
to identify what kinds of obstacles exist in order to implement such education. 
In other words, a focused investigation would be able to identify how faculty 
members recognise ‘uncertainties, unknowns, and doubts’ about education 
on dual-use issues, as illustrated in the introductory chapter of this book. By 
identifying these obstacles it will be possible to envisage effective future polices 
to help mitigate the current lack of awareness about dual-use issues.
Survey.on.Biosecurity.Education.in.Japan
In this context, the NDMC in Japan and the University of Bradford in the UK, 
conducted a survey to analyse the current state of biosecurity education in 
Japan.20 The investigation looked at 197 life-science degree courses consisting 
of 98 undergraduate and 99 postgraduate curricula at 62 universities from 36 
different prefectures/regions in Japan. Employing the same basic structure 
and methodology as the survey on biosecurity education in European 
universities,21the study consisted of two data-collection stages. The first was an 
online investigation focusing on publicly available syllabi and other information 
from the websites of life-science degree courses. Specifically, this investigation 
looked for six possible indicators of biosecurity-education topics. The first 
three indicators were used to identify the ‘presence of modules’ on respective 
subjects within the existing curricula. Thus, the survey asked whether there 
was evidence of specific modules on ‘biosecurity’, ‘biosafety’22 and ‘bioethics’.
The remaining three indicators were used to identify the ‘presence of references’ 
to respective topics within existing modules, even though there are no particular 
modules on such topics. Thus, the survey asked whether there was evidence of 
specific references to the following topics within current curricula: dual-use 
issues; international arms-control or disarmament regimes; and ethical guidelines 
as well as codes of conduct. The second stage was a follow-up questionnaire to 
clarify the findings of the online investigation.
20 Minehata and Shinomiya 2009, op. cit.
21 Revill 2008, op. cit.
22 In Japan the terms ‘biosecurity’ and ‘biosafety’ are used differently. Regarding the former, see note 5. 
Biosafety measures have been taken in laboratories by safely managing pathogens and toxins with a view 
to preventing accidental release of bioagents into the field and the exposure of people. Moreover, scientific 
research on genetic engineering has been taking place internationally based on the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted in 2000. Japan introduced the Law Concerning 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity through Regulations on the Use of Living 
Modified Organisms, which came into force in 2004.
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The available information was organised into four categories, as follows:
Exist: refers to data where we can say with a degree of certainty that the 
required information was present
Not Exist: refers to data where we can say with a degree of certainty that 
the required information was not present
Unclear: refers to data where there is some information available but we 
cannot say with certainty whether the required information exists or 
not
Not Available: refers to data where there are significant constraints upon 
access to the required information.
Survey.Results
Figure 1 shows that the survey identified three specific biosecurity modules 
and some other instances of biosecurity-specific teaching. Although there were 
only 18 cases of biosafety modules, biosafety education has been provided 
in many universities by means other than a single educational component. 
Bioethics modules were the most commonly found topic in this survey, with 
138 examples. In a small number of cases these also dealt with dual-use issues. 
Some 34 universities included topics of relevance to dual-use issues without 
using this specific term. References to international prohibition regimes against 
biological and toxin weapons were also limited, with only 11 cases found. 
Finally, references to ethical guides or codes were fairly prevalent, with 94 cases 
largely included in bioethics modules. However, only a small number of ethical 
guides or codes addressed dual-use issues.
The survey questionnaire asked whether faculty members were familiar with 
the investigation topics. If they were not familiar with the terms of enquiry, it 
is very difficult to expect the presence of either modules or references. In view 
of this, the beginning of the questionnaire asked: ‘Have you ever heard about 
the terms ‘biosecurity’, ‘biosafety’ and ‘dual use’?’ Figure 2 shows the extent of 
familiarity with these specific references as demonstrated by the questionnaire 
results. The terms ‘biosecurity’ and ‘biosafety’ were relatively well known to 
the respondents (with 21 positive recognitions). Although this survey broadly 
defined ‘dual use’ as referring to the possibility of a misuse of science for hostile 
purposes, in Japan the term more commonly refers to the possibility of military 
technology being applied for civilian purposes, and vice versa.23 Thus, the 
familiarity of respondents with the term within this survey could be expected 
to be low. Indeed, 17 respondents were not familiar with the reference.
23  Yamada, N. 2008, ‘Advances in science and dual-use’, presented to the Symposium on bioterrorism 
prevention and biosecurity education, 17 April, Tokyo, Japan.
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Figure 1: Implementation of Surveyed Topics in Japan
Specific modules on biosecurity, biosafety and reference to arms control have been less developed (n=3, n=17, 
n=10), whilst modules on bioethics and references to ethical guides were numerous (n=137, n=94).
Figure 2: Level of Familiarity with the Terms





Quantitatively, three cases of biosecurity module were discovered, and all 
of these were at postgraduate level (see Figure 3). These existing modules 
were primarily focused on public-health preparedness against the threat of 
the deliberate use of pathogens or accidental release of diseases. Thus, one 
module provides an educational course that considers biological risks vis-à-vis 
international public-health policy, mainly focusing on public-health responses 
to biological and chemical weapons; surveillance of infectious diseases in Japan; 
and issues related to international public-health policy and processes. Similarly, 
another module introduces risk-management policy in the public-health sphere 
in relation to biological and chemical terrorism.
Figure 3: Number of Biosecurity Modules
Only three specific modules on biosecurity have been developed (n=3) at postgraduate level.
Among the universities that had not conducted any biosecurity modules, 
some have been implementing education in this area on a more ad hoc basis 
by organising seminars/conferences or providing online educational facilities. 
There is a trend for such events and materials to focus on the following aspects: 
laboratory biosecurity and biosafety measures, national and local responses to 
bioterrorism, and emerging and re-emerging diseases. Amongst the examples 
identified is a medical department which has a ‘Bio-Preparedness Wiki’ 
providing an online and open information-exchange platform for users to both 
download and upload information to this website.24
24 Keio University 2009, Keio Bio-Preparedness Wiki, available: http://biopreparedness.jp/index.




In respect to the introduction of the national legislation to implement the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2004, universities have set up committees to 
inform university members and students about the characteristics and physical 
management of pathogens and relevant national regulations for the prevention 
of the spread of diseases. Some committees have both laboratory biosafety and 
biosecurity measures, and mandate their university to provide certain types of 
education for students. Moreover, there were already some biosafety measures 
that had been developed in Japan by the National Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (NIID) and encoded in the ‘Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 
Laboratories’ guidelines.25
Figure 4: Number of Biosafety Modules
A small number of specific biosafety modules have been developed at undergraduate (black, n=5) and 
postgraduate levels (white, n=13).
However, as Figure 4 indicates, this does not mean universities are obliged to 
provide a specific module on biosafety for the purpose of educating students. 
Nonetheless, 18 cases of particular modules were identified, and more than two-
thirds were at postgraduate level. Although we found examples of modules 
using the term ‘biosafety’ in subject titles, more generally biosafety measures 
tend to be mentioned as part of other modules. Some of the biosafety processes 
are provided in relation to laboratory biosecurity systems to physically contain 
dangerous pathogens and toxins.




Bioethics modules were found in 138 out of 197 courses in this survey (see 
Figure 5). Amongst other things, the main components included the history 
of medicine, the self-determination of patients, informed consent, transplants, 
gene therapy and counselling. These elements could overlap with ethical 
guidelines and codes of conduct for scientists such as the Declaration of Geneva 
of 1948, the Hippocratic Oath and the Declaration of Helsinki of 1964 for medical 
professionals.26
Although the majority of bioethics modules were not framed in the context of 
dual-use issues, there were some that arguably considered them. For example, 
there was a module, Ethics in Human Experiments, which reviews the history of 
German, US, and Japanese human experiments since World War I and includes 
the Japanese bioweapons programme. Another module, Science Technology and 
Society, considers the conduct and dual-use ethics of scientists using nuclear 
science and nuclear weapons as examples.
Figure 5: Number of Bioethics Modules Bioethics modules were prevalent at 
both undergraduate (black, n=64) and postgraduate levels (white, n=74).
A graduate school of science gives specific educational content on dual-use 
issues in the life sciences. A module, Introduction to Research Ethics, provides 
a specific lecture on Social Responsibility of Scientists: From a Perspective of 
National Security, including the issue of dual use and biosecurity. The school 
also provides a bioethics module, Bioethical Science, which considers security 
and social dangers derived from unpredictable risks in new life-science research. 
The research centre associated with the school offers seminars including 
26 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical principle for medical research involving human 




Promoting Research Ethics: From a Web to Practice in Preventing the Destructive 
Application of Science. This exhibits one of the most comprehensive approaches 
towards dual-use issues by indicating the necessity of multifaceted measures to 
deal with threats posed by the misuse of the life sciences, including biosecurity 
and biosafety measures.27
Dual-Use.References
Figure 6: Number of Dual-Use References
The presence of educational content on dual-use issues was notable at undergraduate (black, n=16) and 
postgraduate levels (white, n=18).
Figure 2 showed the low level of familiarity of faculty members with the term 
‘dual use’. However, the quantitative results indicate that some 34 universities, 
of which 16 cases were in undergraduate and 18 in postgraduate courses (see 
Figure 6), have been providing dual-use content in their academic modules — 
but, interestingly, without using the term itself; that is, the relationship between 
science and its potential misuse was a relatively common topic in existing course 
content at the universities surveyed.
A trend in dual-use content in existing education is illustrated by the history of 
science and its exploitation for violent purposes in wider fields other than the 
life sciences. One university had a module on Science and Society that considered 
what science introduced into society, including both social benefits and harmful 
consequences. The graduate school of the same university also had a module, 
Scientific Technology and Society, which reviewed the historical evolution of 
science and its dual-use aspects, and included illustrations of chemical and nuclear 
weapons. A History of Science module in another university demonstrated the 
27 The second ASMeW international ethics seminar, available: http://www.waseda.jp/scoe/
sympo/080204seminar/080204e.html [viewed 17 January 2010].
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scientific evolution from antiquity to the modern times of mass production and 
mass destruction. There was a further example, more specifically, Introduction to 
Medical Zoology, which studied a diverse range of animals and insects. Alongside 
its research on toxins for pharmaceutical purposes, it discussed considerations 
such as the many types of biotoxins that have been developed for biological 
weapons that can also be of concern in biocrimes.
Arms-Control.References.
Figure 7: Number of Arms-Control References 
This was the second least prevalent topic in this investigation at undergraduate (black, n=6) and 
postgraduate levels (white, n=5).
This topic was one of the most unfamiliar themes of education found in this 
survey, with only 11 cases in total (see Figure 7). Unless faculty members had 
a specific interest in security issues, international prohibition regimes against 
biological and chemical weapons were not included as part of science and 
medical teaching. However, an undergraduate course had a forum containing 
a series of online papers,28 one of which provided a brief illustration of modern 
biowarfare programmes worldwide, with a specific focus on smallpox and 
anthrax. Also, the forum highlighted the potential threat of bioterrorism, 
using the case of Aum Shinrikyo and the anthrax attacks after 11 September in 
the US, to illustrate contemporary concerns over this risk. Having considered 
those dangers, the series moved on to cover the international prohibition 
against biological weapons, including the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and what should be done in Japan 
to strengthen these regimes. Another module at a faculty of science entitled 
28 See Research Center for Animal Life Science Shiga University of Medical Science 2008, Primate forum: 
Lectures on Zoonotic diseases, available: http://www.shiga-med.ac.jp/~hqanimal/ [viewed 17 January 2010].
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Chemistry, referred to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), whilst the 
Department of Chemistry listed the domestic laws undertaken to implement the 
CWC within the Department.
Ethical.Guidelines
Figure 8: Number of Ethical Guideline References
Usually, being referred to within bioethics modules, this topic was widely provided at undergraduate (black, 
n=47) and postgraduate levels (white, n=47).
Some universities have been implementing education in this area not as full 
modules but with reference to relevant ethical guidelines within courses on 
other topics. As Figure 8 shows the references to these standards or codes of 
conduct for scientists have a relatively high degree of presence in our survey 
with 47 cases both at undergraduate and postgraduate levels.29 In addition, 
investigation results from the more prevalent bioethics modules could indicate 
a much higher presence of references to ethical guidelines or codes, because of 
the close overlap between both topics.
These topics are primarily provided with a view to ensuring good practice 
in medicine or preventing misconduct in scientific research rather than 
promoting understanding of dual-use issues. Most of the guidelines that could 
be found were in relation to research areas on the human genome, genetic 
engineering and human embryonic stem (ES) cells. As was the case with 
Living Modified Organisms (LMO) and biosafety, these have been guided by 
respective government regulations. However, some dual-use references could be 
recognised. A school of medicine noted that their university did not authorise 
a patent to a product of scientific research if it raised concerns regarding public 
safety or weapons development. Another university listed the websites of the 
29  For further information, see Hara, S. and Masuda, K. 2007, ‘Current state of institutional review boards 
(IRB) of special functioning hospitals in Japan’, Clinical Evaluation, vol. 35(2), pp. 375–408.
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World Health Organisation (WHO) and the US Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) with a view to providing information on biological, toxin and 
chemical weapons, and also references to incidents of bioterrorism with anthrax.
Existing.Interest.in.Biosecurity.Education
The survey results indicated that there was a clear lack of educational topics on 
biosecurity despite a certain level of presence on dual-use references. However, 
this does not necessarily mean there is a lack of interest in such education. 
In cases where there was no such module or reference at the investigated 
university, the questionnaire provided multiple-choice options related to each 
topic: ‘Although we (the investigated university) have not provided such a 
topic: A, we should implement the topic; B, we are interested in the topic but it 
is difficult to implement at the own university; C, we do not think it is necessary 
for our academic curricula’.
Figures 9 (undergraduate level) and 10 (postgraduate level) suggest that many 
universities had a positive interest in the subjects in general, especially the 
implementation of research guides or codes of conduct at postgraduate level. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the feedback also noted that it was difficult to 
introduce such topics in their current academic environment. The respondents 
also suggested there were a series of difficulties that caused the lack of provision 
for such education. These are elaborated in the following section.
Figure 9: Interests of Faculties on Educational Topics: Undergraduate 
Except for bioethics modules (gray, n=1), the majority of all other educational topics were categorised into ‘B. 
Interested in but difficult to implement’. The interest in biosecurity modules (gray, n=9), dual-use issues (gray, 
n=10) and arms control (gray, n=10) was high. Numbers on ‘C. No need for implementation’ were also notable 
for arms control (black, n=5) and ethical guidelines (black, n=5). 
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Figure 10: Interests of Faculties on Educational Topics: Postgraduate 
At postgraduate level, references to ethical guidelines for research scored good interest with faculty 
members (white, n=7), a contrast to undergraduate level (see Figure 9). There was relatively high interest 
on biosecurity modules (gray, n=9), dual-use issues (gray, n=6) and arms control (gray, n=8), but the 
majority of answers indicated that it is difficult to implement within the current curricula.
Obstacles.to.the.Implementation.of.Biosecurity.Education
Although the limited number of responses from 48 departments in 24 universities 
does not permit a statistically significant generalised analysis, it does illustrate 
the difficulties faced by university lecturers. We found that the responses to our 
questionnaire indicated there was:
• an absence of space in the existing curricula
• an absence of time and resources to develop new curricula
• an absence of expertise and available literature on biosecurity education
• doubt about the need for biosecurity education.
Dual-Use.Bioethics:.A.Starting.Point
Despite the commonly addressed obstacles, the survey still indicates the 
possibility of promoting biosecurity education in Japan. Existing curricula, 
including courses on bioethics, would be a key intervention point for its 
introduction. By integrating biosecurity considerations into existing bioethics 
education, the ethical considerations of life scientists can be expanded to 
include the potential misuse of scientific knowledge. ‘Dual-use bioethics’ is one 





In order to research the possibility of dual-use bioethics education, the survey 
team conducted an additional questionnaire by specifically targeting lecturers 
on bioethics education at some of the same universities. The new questionnaire 
asked, ‘What kind of obstacles can be expected in the process to introduce dual-
use issues into the existing ethical education for life scientists?’ As in the earlier 
survey, some of the respondents identified similar uncertainties, unknowns, 
false starts, and doubts towards biosecurity education.
However, at the same time they addressed a certain possibility of dual-use 
bioethics education. One respondent noted, ‘Even without a specific module on 
dual-use issues, introductory education for bioethics can cover dual-use issues’. 
Another pointed out in this regard that within the already busy curricula of 
universities it was of critical importance to achieve ‘understanding [of the topic] 
and coordination amongst relevant stakeholders in the department, particularly 
by personnel from each research division, to develop academic administration’. 
To indicate how awareness of matters pertaining to dual-use bioethics could be 
introduced, another respondent commented that he felt that is was worthwhile 
and that he would ‘cover the issue of dual use, including the case of Aum 
Shinrikyo, for about 15 minutes’ in his lecture at the faculty of life science, from 
the following semester.
In addition to such bottom-up approaches, some top-down methods also 
prove useful in promoting dual-use awareness. In view of this, the additional 
questionnaire also asked whether ethical awareness of dual-use issues among 
life scientists should be used as an assessment criterion for grant applications 
to funding bodies, for the review processes of scientific journals, or for ranking 
systems of universities.
The responses to these questions varied. For example, on a positive note, one 
contributor noted that ‘many Japanese scientists are internationally recognised 
with their scientific research through publication in top scientific journals, but 
they should also make additional efforts in order to assure the international 
confidence in ethical awareness of scientists about dual-use issues...and those 
top-down methods facilitate the latter’. Another respondent argued that 
‘although the establishment of such assessment criteria is necessary, raising 
awareness [among relevant actors involved in this evaluation process] should be 
a higher priority’. 
 This point was reinforced by other respondents, who pointed out that it would 
be preferable to assess the level of awareness of scientists of ethical conduct in 
dual-use issues and their practice to prevent the potential misuse of science. The 
question regarding whether awareness of such issues should be used in ranking 
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universities, however, would require careful consideration. As one respondent 
noted, different universities ‘put different emphases on science education. Some 
do not have faculties of science or medicine but are teaching bioethics in the 
social science faculties.’ Whether the same standard of ethical awareness should 
be required within social science and natural science faculties remains a matter 
for further discussion.
Need.for.an.Accessible.Educational.Resource
As Malcolm Dando argues elsewhere in this volume, placing open-source 
teaching material online, via the internet, could assist in the assimilation of 
biosecurity education into existing curricula, ease constraints on time spent 
planning and preparing material, overcome financial constraints on the 
development of biosecurity programmes, and provide the expertise required for 
efficient and effective integration of such material.30
One of the Japanese lecturers who responded to the questionnaire commented 
that ‘comprehensive educational material is welcome, but what may be more 
useful would be a concise scenario-based education, backed up by audio-
visual material to catch the attention of students’. The lecturer explained this 
is because ‘many university lecturers and students in science departments may 
feel distant from the dual-use topics’.
By using such educational resources, a next stage to promote biosecurity teaching 
would be to build capacity through the implementation of such modules in 
different academic contexts and institutions. Knowledge gained during this 
process could then be used to develop best-practice standards. Specifically with 
regard to the second and the third stages, the following sections illustrate the 
experience of the NDMC.
Biosecurity.Education.at.the.NDMC.in.2008.and.2009.
By using a freely available online teaching resource, specifically designed 
for facilitating easier implementation of biosecurity education for university 
lecturers (that is, for ‘train-the-trainers programmes’31) biosecurity educational 
agendas were provided at the NDMC in October 2008 and March 2009.32 The 
30 R. 2008, ‘Developing educational modules for life scientists accelerating the process though an open 
source initiative’, presented to the IWG–LNCV Biological workshop and round table on fostering the biosecurity 
norm: An educational module for life sciences students, 27 October at the Municipality of Como, Italy.
31  University of Bradford 2009, Dual-use Bioethics.net, available: http://www.dual-usebioethics.net/ 
[viewed 17 January, 2010].
32  Minehata, M., Yamada, N., Kobayashi, Y., Shinomiya, N., Miyahira, Y., Dando, M. R. and Whitby, S. 
M. 2009, ‘Developing an Educational Module Resource for Life Sciences through the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention’, paper presented to the 2nd Biosecurity symposium, 9–10 February Sydney, Australia.
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teaching programme in 2008 involved a five-day course for 19 postgraduate 
students at the beginning of their graduate degree in Medicine (see Table 2). 
This process was carried out using similar content for 57 medical students at the 
end of their six-year curriculum in 2009. These topics have now been integrated 
more systematically into the syllabus to raise the awareness of students.





















Note: * NDMC staff modified the online educational module resource to tailor the content into the scheduled 
educational time available for the course. For the online educational module resource, see University of 
Bradford 2009, Dual-use bioethics.net, available: http://www.dual-usebioethics.net/ [viewed 17 January 
2010].
The students’ understanding of the course content was tested using multiple-
choice questions. The open-ended questions presented in the feedback and 
discussion sessions enabled students to give their views on such areas as 
whether they thought their own research could be a cause for concern. While 
some acknowledged that this could be the case, others pointed out that the 
awareness of scientists plays an important role in preventing possible threats, 
since it is difficult to verify malicious intent in life-science research. At the same 
33 Source: Shinomiya, N. 2008, ‘Developing the material required for mandatory dual-use education of 
life scientists (Part 2)’, presented to the IWG – LNCV Biological workshop and round table on ‘Fostering the 




time, some argued that regulations introduced without careful consideration 
might harm the scientific freedom of individuals without producing effective 
results.
In discussing the kinds of research in the life sciences that could give rise to 
concern, many students referred to the Fink Committee’s report on the seven 
categories of research areas of concern.34 Some students paid specific attention 
to synthetic biology. A recurring response was that synthetic biology could 
enable researchers to manipulate a virus’s antigenicity, pathogenicity and 
toxicity to a great extent. Misuse of such agents makes effective prevention 
and response difficult. In relation to biosecurity measures, one student pointed 
out that ‘without a host or parent virus, new viruses can be cultured based on 
DNA sequences and chemical synthesis…therefore, misuse cannot be prevented 
solely by physical control of biological agents’ and would require greater 
governance of information and expertise.
Finally, an anonymous questionnaire was circulated to check the accessibility 
of each taught topic in this educational process by asking whether ‘your 
understanding on the following aspects of the module was developed’ Scoring 
five indicated the highest positive mark and one, the lowest. The results of 
the questionnaire, shown in Diagram 1, indicate that students assessed the 
programme very positively.
There are several lessons that can be learned from this process. Firstly, since 
the NDMC programmes were specifically designed for the medical students at 
a defence college, these programmes may not necessarily prove useful for other 
universities in Japan. Secondly, in light of ever-advancing life-science research, 
the educational content needs to be constantly updated to ensure that scientific 
and technological discussions about dual-use issues remain up-to-date and 
relevant. Furthermore, a clearer assessment framework to measure the impact of 
biosecurity education needs to be developed to show the value of such teaching 
as an academic subject.
On the positive side, the example at the NDMC demonstrates how an open-
source educational module resource can be modified for specific teaching 
purposes in busy curricula at the university. It also shows how raising 
awareness is possible through lectures on essential regulations in biosecurity 
and letting students consider the potential dual-use consequences of their own 
research. It is recommended that the sharing of information among universities 
on experiences and lessons learned in this field should be further promoted to 
develop best practices in biosecurity teaching.
34  Including research on making virus resistant to a vaccine, enhancing the virulence of a pathogen or 
modifying the host range of a pathogen. See National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in an age 
of terrorism, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
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Diagram 1. Mean Score of Questionnaire by the Students on the NDMC 
Module35
Conclusion
The experience of Japan indicates that university-level ethical education on 
dual-use issues for life scientists can be implemented successfully. The key 
stages of the strategy adapted in Japan included:
• surveys of existing educational courses
• contact with and among lecturers
• setting up national and international networks
• provision of assistance
• resurveys to check the implementation of education.
A focused survey is useful for investigating the current state of biosecurity 
teaching or educational content on dual-use issues for life scientists at 
institutions for higher education. At the surveyed universities, biosecurity 
modules, followed by arms-control and dual-use references, were the least 
prevalent topics within the life-science degree courses. However, universities 
with no biosecurity in their curricula expressed an interest in its introduction. 
The survey also helped reveal possible reasons why such content had been 
missing from existing curricula. The identification of ‘uncertainties, unknowns, 
false starts, and doubts’ can be an essential understanding prior to an effective 
35 Shinomiya 2008, op. cit.
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policy-making process to help remove existing obstacles. The survey recognised 
a possible starting point of biosecurity education by integrating dual-use 
content into existing bioethics teaching.
A second conclusion to be drawn is that developing contact with (and among) 
university lecturers is important. This enables universities to share their 
experience of the implementation of biosecurity education to pursue best practice 
in such teaching. Importantly, commonly addressed obstacles by university 
lecturers to introduce such education seem to be structurally embedded and 
should be dealt with by efforts not only from individual universities, but also 
from government experts on security and education issues.
Thirdly, for this purpose, setting up national and international networks will 
be important. Through this process, the promotion of biosecurity education can 
accommodate the interests of practising scientists and security policymakers 
and make it possible to strike an appropriate balance between the freedom of 
scientific research and oversight of science for national security requirements. 
Education within scientific communities, such as domestic scientific associations 
and international research groups, is also a key factor to raise biosecurity 
awareness among life scientists.
The Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX) of the 
Japan Science and Technology Agency is an important initiative in setting up 
a national network of ‘a few hundred stakeholders in biosecurity, including 
officials of all relevant ministries and agencies, and experts of universities 
and research institutions as well as journalists’.36 This platform will play an 
essential role to help promote biosecurity education in Japan. Another project 
is an international seminar framework and a ‘Safety and Secure Science & 
Technology’ project supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology (MEXT), through which rules for preventing the malign 
use of science, the introduction of biosecurity/dual-use bioethics training 
programmes, strategies for developing secure research environment, and so on, 
can be discussed.
In 2006, the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) introduced a code of conduct for 
scientists, partly as a basis for an assessment criterion for grant applications to 
the Council.37 Though the code was not originally developed to promote ethical 
responsibility to prevent potentially dangerous consequences of dual-use life 
science research,38 Katsuhisa Furukawa argues that the SCJ code was ‘drafted in 
such a way as to cover dual-use risks’ as it underlines the ethical responsibility 
36  Furukawa 2009, op. cit.
37 Science Council of Japan 2006, Statement: Code of conduct for scientists, available: http://www.scj.go.jp/
ja/info/kohyo/pdf/kohyo-20-s3e-1.pdf [viewed 17 January 2010].
38 Ibid. 
for the safety and security of society as well as educational programmes at 
research institutions.39 However, as Furukawa points out, the SCJ code has not 
been extended to explicitly deal with dual-use issues.40 The problem is that, to 
date, the academic community in Japan has paid little attention to this point 
and no associations for medical or life sciences are taking positive action to 
prevent the malign use of scientific knowledge. No Japanese scientific journals 
have so far introduced biosecurity review systems. Providing opportunities for 
life scientists to learn dual-use examples through congress seminars may solve 
these problems.
The provision of assistance may also include an accessible and shared 
education resource. The benefits of developing an open-source biosecurity 
education programme were demonstrated by the NDMC experience. Other 
possible provisions may include making ethical awareness of dual-use issues 
an evaluation criterion for grant applications by funding bodies or review 
processes for scientific journals, as well as a ranking system for universities. 
However, such processes require further discussion. A re-survey to analyse the 
implementation of education will be necessary if further provisions of assistance 
are provided from scientific, academic and government bodies, to facilitate the 
accumulation of several examples of biosecurity teaching in Japan. This process 
will enable the evaluation of such programmes and the sharing of knowledge of 
best practices of biosecurity education in Japan.
Finally, it should be noted that the series of strategic elements to implement 
biosecurity education in Japan would not necessarily be sufficient or available 
in other countries. However, Japan’s experience may prove valuable to others 
nevertheless, whilst Japan also has much to learn from other nations. Indeed, 
the significance of raising awareness among life scientists should be recognised, 
at least amongst the member-states of the Inter-Academy Panel (IAP).41 To 
achieve securer advancement of the life sciences in the twenty-first century, 
implementation of biosecurity education and a sharing of knowledge need to be 
coordinated nationally and internationally, backed up by the active engagement 
of both scientists and other social actors.
39 See the section of codes of conduct in Furukawa 2009, op. cit.
40 Ibid.
41 Inter-Academy Panel 2005, op. cit.
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Chapter 6: Bioethics and Biosecurity 
Education in China: Rise of a 
Scientific Superpower
MICHAEL.BARR.AND.JOY.YUEYUE.ZHANG
This chapter explores ethics, education and the life sciences in China. It is based 
on work conducted by the authors in two separate but complimentary projects. 1 
Barr’s observations derive from interviews and discussions in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou with life scientists and policymakers in infectious-disease 
hospitals, university-research labs, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the 
Ministry of Health. Zhang’s study focused on China’s governance of stem-cell 
research and involved interviews with scientists, ethicists and policymakers at 
more than 25 sites across China. Below, we set the context by describing the 
role of science in China’s quest to become a leading power and then consider 
the place of bioethics within China. We follow this with a discussion of three 
key areas that have impacted our work and describe some of the lessons we 
have taken from our experience for future research on bioethics education and 
biosecurity in China. We conclude with a set of suggestions about what can be 
done to further biosecurity awareness within China.
For the sake of clarity, we should note our use of terms. By ‘biosecurity’ we 
refer to the protection and control of pathogens and toxins to prevent their 
deliberate theft, misuse, or diversion for the purposes of biological warfare or 
terrorism. According to our use of the word, this includes researchers’ personal 
knowledge, choices and behaviour, as well as society’s collective responsibility 
to safeguard a population from the dangers of pathogenic microbes. We use 
the term in contrast to ‘biosafety’, which we see as laboratory procedures and 
policies aimed at reducing accidental exposures. Contained within the term 
‘biosecurity’ is the dual-use dilemma, which refers to the possibility that 
the same scientific research, products, or facilities which are meant for social 
good could also have an unintended result of threatening a population, either 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the support of our funders for this research. The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 
in the US and the UK Department of Universities, Innovation and Skills funded Barr’s work. Zhang held a 
Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Studentship Award for her study.
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inadvertently or through a deliberate act of bioviolence. Finally, by ‘awareness-
raising’, we accept the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention’s (BTWC) 
definition of ‘improving dialogue and communication’ between all ‘relevant 
stakeholders, including policymakers, the scientific community, industry, 
academia, media and the public in general’.2 However, our own work (and thus 
our focus in this chapter) concentrates mainly on educational and informational 
initiatives aimed at the scientific and academic community in China, mainly life 
scientists and ethicists.
Rise.of.a.Scientific.Superpower
The rise of China constitutes one of the greatest stories of the early twenty-first 
century. China’s impact extends across nearly every sphere — from international 
finance and trade, to culture and soft power, to global security and weapons 
proliferation. In the West, when observers discuss Chinese power, there is often 
a fear palpable beneath the surface: will this country of 1.3 billion people seek 
to play by the rules of the game (that is, be ‘status-quo’) or will it become a 
revisionist state, intent on re-writing the norms of the international system in 
line with its own perceived interests?3 And on this question, perhaps no sector 
raises more concern than the nexus between security and technology.
Since the 1990s science has been a cornerstone of Chinese development. 
Expenditure on research and development rose from 0.6 per cent of GDP in 
1996 to 1.4 per cent in 2006.4 During this time, the Chinese government set 
up numerous policies to attract talented life-science researchers, including ‘the 
one thousand talents’ campaign which seeks to lure foreign-trained Chinese 
scientists back home with the contractual promise of high salaries and state-of-
the-art facilities.
Beijing’s ambitions to become a world leader in science and technology should 
not be underestimated. President Hu Jintao noted in 2006 that China’s general 
goal was to ‘visibly increase the country’s indigenous innovation capacity, 
visibly increase the capacity of science and technology to promote economic 
and social development and guarantee national security, visibly increase the 
overall research strength of basic sciences and frontier technologies, strive for 
scientific and technological achievements of major world implications’.5
2 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 2007, Report of the 2007 Meeting of States Parties, BWC/
MSP/2007/5, para. 21.
3 Johnston, A. 2003, ‘Is China a status quo power?’ International Security, vol. 27, pp. 5–56.
4 Chen, Z. 2008, ‘Biomedical science and technology in China’, The Lancet, vol. 372, pp. 1441–3.
5 Zhu, Z. and Xu, G. 2008, ‘Basic research: Its impact on China’s future’, Technology in Society, vol. 30, p. 296.
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These comments were soon supported by very real and quantifiable goals:
By the year 2020, the ratio of gross expenditure on research and 
development will rise to over 2.5 per cent; the contribution rate of 
scientific and technological advance to economic growth will rise to 
over 60 per cent; the dependence on foreign technologies will drop to 
less than 30 per cent; and the annual granting of invention patents to 
Chinese nationals and the international citation of scientific papers will 
rank among the world’s top five.6
Approximately 20 per cent of this total investment goes to the life sciences, an 
area in which China has made considerable progress.7 As early as 2000, Beijing-
based genomic centres were estimated to have had more sequencing capacity 
than France and Germany combined.8 Whilst the most visible success of Chinese 
life scientists was the 2002 decoding of the rice genome, China has attracted the 
attention and interest of both European and US audiences across a number of 
fields.
China’s great leap forward in science and technology begs the question 
whether similar gains have been made in attempts to socially regulate emerging 
technologies. The answer, as in most countries, is mixed. Some still portray China 
as a ‘Wild East’, a place where scientific progress need not be hampered by 
ethical reservations or public unease.9 With doubts over standards in regulatory 
enforcement and of transparency, combined with large amounts of funding for 
scientists who are under pressure to generate results, and a culture that — on 
the surface at least — seems to downplay the importance of individual rights, 
critics contend that biomedical research in China remains ethically problematic.10 
However, what such accounts miss is the sizable body of regulation pertaining 
to biological research, including guidelines on biomedical studies involving 
human subjects, specific advice on clinical drug trials and embryonic stem-
cell research, as well as provisions for good clinical and laboratory practice. 
Crucially, informed-consent requirements, provisions for review by ethics 
committees, and legal sanctions feature prominently in many regulations.11 Of 
course, germane to successful regulation is education and awareness-raising.
6 Ibid.
7 Chen, Z., Wang, H. G., Wen, H. J. and Wang, Y. 2007, ‘Life sciences and biotechnology in China’, 
Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society, vol. 362, pp. 947–57.
8 Schneider, L. 2003, Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
9 Wilsdon, J. and Keeley, J. 2007, China: The next science superpower? The Atlas of Ideas: Mapping the new 
geography of science, London: DEMOS, available at: www.demos.co.uk
10 Hennig, W. 2006, ‘Bioethics in China’, EMBO Reports, vol. 7, pp. 850–4.





Medical ethics teaching in China began in the 1980s. However, early courses 
were limited to abstract (and solely Western) theories and principles of general 
ethics. In order to help boost student interest in ethics, Chinese lecturers, with 
assistance from The China Medical Board in New York and the Chinese Society 
of Medical Ethics (formed in 1988), sought to reform teaching to incorporate 
ideas and cases relevant to Chinese culture.12
A number of factors have since contributed to the steady growth of ethics 
teaching.13 First, the jump in numbers of science students in China has 
meant that universities have had to expand their provision of ethics courses. 
Postgraduate programmes in biomedical ethics have been established in a 
number of key institutions, with the first Master’s degree being offered at Tianjin 
Medical University in 2000. A second reason is the manifold problems faced 
by China’s public-healthcare system. The benefits of China’s rapid economic 
growth have been uneven, badly affecting healthcare services. For instance, it 
is estimated that only 10 per cent of the rural poor have adequate facilities for 
sanitation, whilst less than 30 per cent have a reliable source of drinking water.14 
Exacerbating these problems is the plight of China’s migrant population: 140 
million people are excluded from public medical insurance as they move 
between cities and the provinces in search of improved opportunities.15 In this 
context, it is not surprising that China has sought to develop greater capacity 




The connection between public health, public policy, and ethics education is 
evident when examining biosecurity in China.16 Chinese leaders were deeply 
embarrassed by the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, 
which some estimate cost the country US$10 billion in lost tourism revenues 
12 Yali, C. 2003, ‘Comparison of medical ethics education between China and the United States’, in Song, S. 
Y., Koo, Y. M. and Macer, D. (eds), Bioethics in Asia in the 21st Century, New Zealand: Eubios Ethics Institute; 
Doering, O. 2003, ‘Teaching medical ethics in China. Cultural, social and ethical issues’, in Song, Koo, and 
Macer (eds), op. cit.
13 Li, E. C. 2008, ‘Bioethics in China’, Bioethics, vol. 22, pp. 448–54.
14 Tang, S., Meng, Q., Chen, L., Bekedam, H., Evans, T. and Whitehead, M. 2008, ‘Tackling the challenges 
to health equity in China’, The Lancet, vol. 372, pp. 1493–501.
15 Hu, S., Tang, S., Liu, Y., Zhao, Y., Escobar, M. L. and de Ferranti, D. 2008, ‘Reform of how health care is 
paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities’, The Lancet, vol. 372, pp. 1846–53.
16 Barr, M. 2009, ‘China’s role as a biosecurity actor’, in Rappert, B. and Gould, C. (eds), Biosecurity: Its 
Origins, Transformations and Practice, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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alone.17 Whilst fears that the epidemic would spread to rural areas were not 
realised, SARS nonetheless highlighted the inequalities of China’s healthcare 
system. Its impact on China can hardly be understated. One microbiologist and 
biosecurity expert at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences explained that 
SARS was as important to China as the 11 September terrorist attacks were to 
the US in terms of their political, economic and psychological consequences.
Whilst China responded to the crisis with a range of new regulations (including 
revision of its 1989 Law on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases), the need for greater education and training was brought rudely to 
attention again in 2004. A batch of the SARS virus at the National Institute of 
Virology in Beijing, mistakenly thought to have been inactivated, was moved 
from a BSL-3 storage container to a non-regulated lab where medical students 
were working on diarrheal diseases. The breach of security subsequently 
resulted in eight infections and one death, as well as the temporary closure 
of the Institute and quarantine of over 700 individuals suspected of coming 
into contact with the virus. The accident had clearly been the result of human 
negligence. One microbiologist at Fudan University refers to this as a ‘software’ 
problem — meaning that whilst much attention has been paid to the ‘hardware’ 
(the building of hi-tech labs, autoclaves, cabinets, locks, doors, and so on), 
the human element of biosecurity has been neglected. That is, the training, 
behaviour, management skills, expert knowledge, and duties of care needed to 
operate high-level laboratories safely have not kept pace with the introduction 
of new facilities.
The ‘software’ problem includes much more than lab safety. Yet statements 
by the Chinese Delegation to the BTWC Meeting of Experts show that their 
focus is almost entirely on safety, not the wider issue of dual use. According 
to their declaration, biosecurity ‘education and awareness raising’ refer solely 
to ‘laboratory safety management and technical training, biosafety licensing, 
preparedness for health emergency and response and veterinary biosafety’.18 
These efforts are obviously important and are to be supported. However, 
like other countries with growing biotechnology sectors, China’s adoption of 
educational measures and codes of conduct aimed at addressing a broader agenda 
of oversight of the life sciences and how biological research might be exploited 
for illegitimate purposes, remains uneven. A small number of top universities 
and scientific associations, including the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
have sought to establish an internal code of ethics that aims to promote scientific 
ethics, as well as the integrity and moral character of staff. CAS has also set up 
17 Wen, H. 2004, ‘The Short Term Impact of SARS on the Economy’, Asian Economic Papers, vol. 3, pp. 
57–61.
18 Chinese Delegation to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts 2008a, Statement 
made on Biosafety & Biosecurity Capacity Building; Chinese Delegation to the Biological Weapons Convention 
Meeting of Experts 2008b, Poster on China’s Practice on Biosafety and Biosecurity.
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a special commission for scientific integrity to promote transparency, autonomy 
and accountability of research. These types of codes are to be encouraged and 
broadened to specifically promote dual-use awareness. Yet it must be noted that 
CAS is essentially the scientific arm of the government, supported by the State 
Council itself, and considered to be the most prestigious scientific institution in 
the country. Whilst bodies like CAS may set a useful example, the real challenge 
lies in reaching provincial and district-level labs, especially outside the main 
urban settings, where it is harder to monitor activities.
It is important to reiterate that the amount of attention paid to dual-use issues 
varies according to the site. In 2002, China’s main legislative body, the State 
Council, passed two sets of regulations regarding dual-use equipment and 
technologies.19 The directives contained measures to strengthen export controls 
to prevent the diversion of dual-use biological agents, related equipment, 
and technologies that could be used in weapons production. It also included 
an export-licensing system and provisions for the criminal prosecution of 
domestically based violators. Significantly, the export-control list covered 
within the regulations provided an extensive list of pathogens and toxins, 
thus putting China in accord with control lists of the Australia Group (to 
which it still does not formally belong). Whilst we have no reason to doubt the 
enforcement of these regulations, on the wider issues of personal responsibility, 
we found that most Chinese life scientists we interviewed were not particularly 
concerned about the dual-use implications of their work and did not regard 
bioterrorism or bioweapons as substantial threats. The reasons for this varied, 
but, as in the West, many scientists in China tend to view scientific progress as 
inevitable and generally think that pressures to publish and present findings 
mean that research will, one way or another, be conducted and find its way into 
the public domain.20 Our findings were confirmed by the views of participants 
at China’s first ever, international meeting dedicated to the dual-use dilemma. 
Organised by CAS in 2008, with the support of the Inter Academy Panel and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), delegates 
to the workshop expressed concern over dual-use issues but also agreed that 
different stakeholders tended to view the concerns differently. Compared to 
security specialists, scientists in general were seen as being unaware of the 
potential dual-use nature of their research.
The remainder of this chapter will address several themes from our experience 
of researching and promoting bioethics in China and propose a series of practical 
steps that could help promote biosecurity education.
19 State Council of China 2002a, Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use 
Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies; State Council of China 2002b, Dual-Use Biological 
Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List.
20 For more on scientists’ levels of awareness, see Rappert, B. 2007, Biotechnology, Security, and the Search for 





In the West, social scientists working in the area of science and security studies 
are alert to how key actors transform certain issues into security concerns. This 
process is referred to as ‘securitisation’ and involves studying ‘who securitises, 
on what issues, for whom, why, with what results, and under what conditions’.21 
Similarly, during our work in China we came to see that it was necessary to 
heed attention to the way in which an issue becomes a source of bioethical 
(and biosecurity) concern. Zhang has coined the term ‘ethicisation’ to refer 
to a process of raising awareness.22 Its function is to map out the social, legal, 
political and financial concerns that scientists should take into consideration. 
Like securitisation, ethicisation embraces no specific moral objectives. It can, 
however, lead to a re-evaluation of existing judgments.
In this context it is important to remember that life-science research cannot 
be conducted without international collaboration. Chinese scientists are not 
only heavily involved in joint projects with Western colleagues but participate 
in a multitude of exchange programmes and seek to publish their results in 
English-language journals. So, as transnational investment and communication 
become standard practices, ‘ethical concerns’ in need of regulation become 
‘infectious’. The necessity to facilitate cooperation has resulted in the request for 
increased compatibility of local frameworks with that of the potential partners. 
Consequently, bioethics is no longer a segmented social aspect rooted solely in a 
specific cultural milieu. The perception of research priorities is shaped as much 
by national factors as they are by debates in the global scientific and bioethical 
communities. And this, of course, has knock-on effects for how ethics is taught.
One example may help to shed light on this process. On a visit to a regional 
headquarters of the China Hematopoietic Stem Cell Data Bank, the director told 
Zhang how visiting Western stem-cell banks expanded her awareness of ethical 
issues. In the original planning of their cell bank’s office space, people walk 
in and are first welcomed by a whole wall of glass-panelled covered shelves, 
with hundreds of neatly arranged binders holding donor data. The director felt 
this was a nice way to store data and incentivise employees. She explained as 
follows:
It wasn’t considered an ethical issue. It was an aesthetic issue. Plus, it is 
difficult to persuade people to donate blood stem cell in China [because 
21 Buzan, B., Waever, O. and Wilde, J. 1998, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.
22 Zhang, J. Y. 2010, ‘China’s Regulation of Stem Cell Research in the Context of Cosmopolitanisation’, 
Doctoral Thesis, Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science.
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traditionally blood is considered an essence of vitality]. I thought a whole 
wall display of the data books behind the glass panel is a magnificent 
display of our hard work. It would boost morale… But during my visit 
to stem-cell donor data banks in the US, I didn’t see any data-collection 
shelves throughout my whole trip. I asked them why. They told me data 
books are stored in limited-access rooms to protect patients’ privacy. 
Then I realised: Ah! The display of shelves is an ethical issue.
So whilst in the US, arrangement of data books implies protection of patients’ 
confidentiality and professional accountability, in China, it was originally 
perceived as an ‘aesthetic issue’. The director’s trip to the US made her think 
from an alternative perspective: office-space arrangement not only matters to 
staff members, but also has wider implications to stem-cell donors, patients and 
medical practitioners. One consequence of the exposure to foreign practice, 
however, is that it unexpectedly extends the range of ethical-related issues that 
Chinese stem-cell banks acknowledge.
There is no textbook answer to the complete set of ethical issues that scientists 
or administrators should be aware of. Instead, what stakeholders have on 
hand is a growing list of items they need to consider. This list increases as 
stakeholders’ communicative circles expand. The internationalisation of science 
rewrites the criteria for good practice through the process of ethicisation, or 
the institutionalisation of a societal issue. Such institutionalisation leads to 
the encouragement and requirement that scientists and other stakeholders 
(policymakers, educators, patients) consider a specific concern whilst reflecting 
on their practice and outcome.
A similar process can be seen in relation to biosafety. Whilst biosafety was 
considered a personal lab issue prior to the SARS outbreak in 2003 and accidental 
exposure in 2004, it is now a matter of national — indeed international — 
security. This has prompted China to pay far more attention to biosafety and pour 
considerable resources into ensuring ethical conduct within labs. For instance, 
during a visit to an infectious-disease hospital in Shanghai, Barr was struck 
by the status and level of respect paid to two young staff members who had 
recently returned from a World Health Organisation (WHO)-sponsored training 
programme on biosafety. Although they were quite junior staff, the director of 
the hospital and another senior colleague indicated that the two employees were 
in high demand and crucial to the successful running of the site since work in 
their newly built BSL-4 lab could not proceed without their assistance. Thus, 
an issue that was previously of local or even personal importance has become 
institutionalised as a wider ethical and security matter.
One lesson we draw from this is that it is vital to be attuned to how the global or 
local interface may influence, in any given national context, what type of issues 
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are on the educational agenda (or, crucially, not). In China, where science is a 
key component of its national development and political and economic strategy, 
it is imperative that staff are aware of foreign practices and concerns as to what 
constitutes an ethical or security issue. It is vital for Chinese scientists to be seen 
to be doing the right thing. This means that a balance must be achieved between 
advocating an educational agenda, based on international norms, that is ‘right’ 
and ‘ethical’ and, as we shall discuss below, not overselling or pushing foreign 
solutions onto Chinese partners.
Scientists.as.Ethics.Decision-Makers
After an issue makes its way onto the agenda, a key question then becomes 
who has the social power and authority to negotiate it? Earlier we discussed 
the nascent but growing role of bioethicists in China. In line with this, Zhang 
has found that it is often scientists who are the key players in ethical policy 
matters but that ethicists have been slowly making progress in getting their 
voices heard. One respondent put it this way:
We are entitled to the right of speech. We can express our opinions 
towards the policy, but that is all. For most major policy, it is still made 
according to what the officials envisaged. In other words, we can criticise 
the policy, both through public media and through official administrative 
channels, but they [government policymakers] don’t really listen to all 
the experts’ advice… Of course they listen to the ‘hard-core experts’ 
advice, especially for stem-cell research, MOST [Ministry of Science and 
Technology] won’t listen to us [ethicists], it only turns its ear to real 
scientists.
Another senior bioethicist spoke of her efforts to travel across China in order to 
raise awareness of the non-scientists’ ability to help adjudicate bio problems.
My role was to ‘make a little noise’… Really, what is essential in 
promoting bioethics in China is, as my colleagues and I call it, ‘to make a 
little noise’… In the past few years, my colleagues and I have been invited 
by institutions across China to give lectures, give speeches, provide 
training or write for newspapers. Whenever the topic touches on bio-
regulation, we tell people our perspectives on biomedical research. In 
fact, we are creating general alertness. We try to raise others’ attention, 
make people think about these issues, and see whether we should [have 
some form of administrative action].
Whilst in many Western countries, bioethics as a discipline, has been 
professionalised and is part of the institutional framework for debating ethical 
issues, in China bioethics has shown a degree of separation between its social 
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function and professional merit. On reflecting how Chinese ethicists could 
improve their social functions, one ethicist at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) said: 
Bioethicists should not be living in a vacuum. I think most of the 
ethicists [in China] are familiar with Western thinking. In what is 
considered ethical and what is not, [Chinese] ethicists don’t really follow 
the Chinese convention. As a profession, we are heavily influenced 
by American and European academia. Especially after our [stem cell] 
guideline was issued, questions arise from both inside and outside 
China. We [ethicists] must change our approach towards addressing 
ethical concerns [in China], and start thinking about these questions. 
Therefore, we really should examine our own tradition and how it is 
different from the West… I’m not quite sure how ethical consulting 
agencies work in the US, how they function, but I do feel that they have 
a say in policymaking. What is more, they always incorporate a wide 
range of concerns, religion, science, ethics, law… Their report includes 
all kinds of opinion from all kinds of social groups. In comparison, when 
bioethicists are contributing to policymaking in China, I feel we can only 
propose some personal opinion on this issue. We cannot mobilize a wide 
range of social groups [to participate]. Public participation is minor and 
professionals at different levels also have little chance of being involved.
Similarly, during trips to Fudan University in Shanghai and Sun Yat-sen 
University in Guangzhou, Barr discovered that most, if not all, biosecurity 
classes and textbooks were being designed and taught without any input from 
ethicists or social scientists. The only survey that seems to have been conducted 
into biosecurity educational curriculum in China was organised by a leading 
microbiologist at Fudan. We discuss some of the possible reasons for the lack of 
input from social scientists and ethicists below. Furthermore, from our vantage 
point, the dominant role of scientists as ethics deciders in China implies several 
key lessons.
Firstly, it was important to know the social and academic status of the actors we 
wished to reach and what was and was not within their abilities to deliver. In our 
case, we learned that involving bioethicists was a useful way of getting insights 
into the larger context of Chinese humanities and social-sciences education but 
that crucially, if we wanted to make real progress in getting biosecurity modules 
into the classroom, we needed to collaborate extensively with life scientists. 
Secondly, when dealing with scientists, we went out of our way to gain their 
trust by showing that we knew what we were talking about and could relate 
in some sense to their priorities as leading life scientists. Thirdly, we found it 
tricky to share a common language with those not well versed in the humanities 
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or social sciences (a problem obviously not unique to China). This meant that 
we had to be more creative, for example, in discussing why seemingly abstract 
ethical theories may be appropriate to scientists engaged in dual-use research.
The.Status.of.the.Social.Sciences
Some of the challenges described above can be traced to the general status of 
the social sciences (and by association, humanities) in China. We have identified 
three broad areas in which the history and role of social scientists and ethicists 
in China may impact efforts to promote bioethical and biosecurity education.
Firstly, there is the question of self-censorship within Chinese academia. CASS 
was established in 1977 to advise the government and Communist Party and 
acted as an in-house think-tank for various political factions. It was set up to 
serve the reforms of Deng Xiaoping and essentially to separate the social from the 
natural sciences. After the involvement of many CASS staff in the 4 June 1989 
demonstrations, the Academy was reformed — or one might say, ‘rehabilitated’. 
Whilst there are ample outlets for CASS academics to publish, many think twice 
before exposing their work to political criticism. Li Tieying, former President of 
CASS is rather clear on this point: ‘At CASS, behaviour that damages the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), socialist China, the world of social science, or CASS 
itself is absolutely intolerable’. If, as is sometimes the case, writers do not know 
where the border lies between safety and punishment, then understandably 
there is a tendency to ‘retreat into a conspiracy of silence’, with a reluctance to 
take on issues which may be seen as sensitive — such as biosecurity.23
Secondly, twentieth-century social science in China maintained not only a 
uniform tendency towards empirical research but also a belief in its technocratic 
potential to transform society.24 Despite the effects of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–76), when academic inquiry ground to a halt, the social sciences in China 
today tend to hold similar beliefs. It is only a slight generalisation to say that in 
China academics often view their work as service to the nation. This is perhaps 
a difficult concept for Western academics to appreciate. It is impossible in 
China today to speak against patriotism. The term youhuan yishi (忧患意识) is 
relevant here as it refers to worries about the future of China, common amongst 
intellectuals.25Youhuan yishi constitutes a moral concern with improving the 
nation’s wellbeing. It denotes rhetoric of worrying about the nation that remains 
integral to Chinese intellectual discourse, whether it be interpreted as simply 
23 Sleeboom-Faulkner, M. 2007, ‘Regulating intellectual life in China: The case of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences’, The China Quarterly, vol. 189, p. 99.
24 Chiang, Y. 2001, Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919–-1949, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.




improving the socio-economic plight of the Chinese, or recovering a genuine 
way of ‘being Chinese’ and China’s international status as a great scientific and 
cultural power.26 One consequence of this is that amongst Chinese intellectuals 
(that is, some of the key academics, whose support is necessary to help further 
biosecurity awareness), there is ambivalence towards foreign or imported ideas.
Thirdly, one consequence of the state of social sciences in China is that there 
are sometimes no comparable fields to the ones we tend to take for granted 
in the West. For example, there is no real equivalent in China to Science and 
Technology Studies. Thus, some of the academic terms, theories, concerns, and 
norms that we use do not necessarily carry over. In the West, for instance, 
many working along the science/society/security interface subscribe to the 
notion of the co-production of knowledge — that is, to the belief that the 
natural and social order are produced together and the ways in which we know 
and represent the world are inseparable from the ways we chose to live in it. 
According to this view, science does not mirror reality. Rather, it both embeds 
and is embedded in social practices, norms, identities, and institutions.27 Such a 
school of thought may seem out of place in China. Gloria Davies who writes that 
‘Unlike its Western counterpart, Chinese academic discourse remains a quest for 
certainty, a quest envisaged in terms of the acquisition of better, more rational, 
and theoretically refined knowledge’, captures this difference nicely.28
All of this may seem far removed from bioethics and biosecurity education. But 
there are several lessons we take from these points. In one recent case, Barr sought 
funding to undertake a project on biosecurity in China. The funder stipulated 
that Chinese partners must come from CASS. However, it emerged that there 
was no one at the Academy who had relevant expertise for the application.29 
Although we cannot know for certain, it seems possible that one reason this 
area is avoided is its political sensitivity; that is, its proximately to questions 
of national security. During an earlier experience in China, Barr was told by a 
senior ethicist that conducting ethics research into infectious disease would be 
very sensitive and that it would be necessary to proceed cautiously since some 
people may not be willing to talk about the topic given its connection to matters 
of security and government censorship.
It is interesting here to consider the official oath taken by medical students. In 
addition to the usual duties of moral discipline and medical skill, it includes 
mention of love of country and people:
26 Link, P. 1998, Evening chats in Beijing, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.
27 Jasanoff, S. 2004, States of knowledge: The co-production of science and the social order, London: Routledge.
28 Davies 2007, op. cit.
29 In a way this may not be surprising since, as discussed above, biosecurity is new to the policy agenda. 
Yet despite being ‘new’, it has not stopped some life scientists from getting involved with biosecurity work.
Chapter.6:.Bioethics.and.Biosecurity.Education.in.China
127
I will devote my life to the cause of medicine. I love my country. I will be 
loyal to the people. I will adhere to strict medical ethics. I will respect my 
teachers and observe discipline. I will study diligently and constantly in 
order to perfect my medical skills and to develop myself in all possible 
aspects — morally, intellectually and physically.30
The point here is that, in China at least, there is sometimes a strong (techno) 
nationalist backdrop to many issues, especially ones such as the science/society/
security interface. This is important, in part, since the government is by far 
the largest funder for scientists. Seen this way, promoting a patriotic discourse 
may serve several purposes. One key strategy the government has used to lure 
scientists back to China is to appeal to their sense of nationalism in helping 
to build a scientifically competitive superpower. This relates to a final point 
worth considering for foreign researchers wishing to collaborate with Chinese 
partners. It has to do with earning trust — or, to put it another way, avoiding 
suspicion. As we went about our separate studies, it was not uncommon for 
us to be asked whether or not we were journalists. This fear seemed to stem 
not so much from concerns over security but rather that we would do or print 
something to harm our respondent’s (and China’s) reputation. Some the most 
damaging stories about hospitals, doctors, and ethics violations have sprung 
from the media in China. As we conducted our work in the run up to the 2008 
Olympics, we could not help but notice a worry over being embarrassed whilst 
the international spotlight shone on the Beijing Games. Of course, it is always 
the case that researchers must work in partnership with each other. Our point 
here is for foreign researchers working in China to be sensitive to the patriotic 
backdrop to Chinese science, an element that is often missing in Western 
academia.
Conclusion:.What.Can.Be.Done?
There are numerous ways to help promote biosecurity education in China. We 
conclude this chapter by suggesting three key interrelated contributions that 
researchers (Chinese and foreign) may make.
First, there is a need to improve data sharing and cross-lab communication in 
China. Our work has found that whilst scientists in China tend to talk about 
collaboration with other local sites, in fact, communication between labs is 
more limited than one might expect.31 The first step here is to help promote 
the type of workshop that CAS ran in 2008 on dual-use research (cited above). 
30 People’s Republic of China Ministry of Education 1991, Official Oath for Medical Students, Appendix 4 
of Document No. 106.
31 Zhang, J. Y. 2010, ‘The organization of scientists and its relation to scientific productivity: Perceptions of 
Chinese stem cell scientists’, BioSocieties, vol. 5(2).
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The goal of such a meeting is not only for biosecurity-minded staff in China to 
exchange views with foreign experts. Whilst this is important, there is also a 
great need for researchers within China to share and learn from one another. 
China is in the unique position of having the second-largest economy in the 
world and yet in per-capita income terms, it ranks ninety-ninth.32 This shows 
just how uneven growth and development has been, which has knock-on effects 
for what different sites will consider to be the range of biosecurity issues and 
priorities it faces. Of course income gaps will also have significant effects on 
levels of resources and abilities to promote biosecurity awareness. Thus, it is 
crucial that scientists from China’s leading centres are brought together with 
staff from less-resourced hospitals and labs. Only in this way can we ascertain 
across sites what is already being done, at what levels, and for which students 
and lab workers. This leads us to our second point, which is to use this data to 
help build biosecurity capacity in China.
Second, biosecurity-minded researchers ought to work towards establishing 
compulsory biosecurity classes for all life-science students. This could 
supplement scientific-morality courses that are already required of most students. 
It is sometimes mistakenly assumed that in China all change comes from the 
top down. Whilst government statements at the BTWC illustrate the political 
importance of biosecurity, our experience is that the fastest way to change is 
when leading institutions — such as CAS — make grass-roots initiatives that, 
once established, draw the attention and support of government ministries. 
The aim here is to work with interested staff at high-profile key sites to assess 
the possibilities and practical issues that must be overcome in establishing a 
required course (including instructors who are trained to deliver such a class). 
These moves can then be supported with biosecurity and dual-use teaching 
resources appropriate to the needs and context of the life sciences in China. This 
leads to our third point.
Third, in order to help facilitate mandatory courses, appropriate materials are 
needed. One way to do this would be to draw on the EMR, an open-access series 
of lectures to support life scientists and educators in learning about biosecurity 
and dual-use issues (see the chapter by Whitby and Dando). The aim here is to 
help interested social and life scientists in China design resources and methods 
suitable to their context (with, for example, particular emphasis on the security 
implications of infectious-disease research). This suggestion requires researchers 
working together, across sites, to develop and share texts and ideas for the 
effective delivery of biosecurity classes. It would not necessarily require starting 
from scratch, as part of the aims in our first suggestion would be to assess which 




sites are using which materials and provide the chance for biosecurity educators 
to reflect with one another on the usefulness or otherwise of the books and 
examples they employ.
If adopted, these suggestions could have positive knock-on effects. One of the 
main regulatory challenges in China is not a lack of rules but rather, a lack 
of effective enforcement of the rules that already exist. Thus, our suggestions 
are practical steps that aim to help create a culture of responsibility, whereby 








In early 2001, the year of the anthrax envelope attacks in the US, research 
conducted by a group of Australian scientists highlighted the security 
implications of the dual-use dilemma in the life sciences. This group was 
attempting to produce an infectious contraceptive for mice, which periodically 
breed out of control in parts of Australia. The scientists first spliced the zona 
pellucida glycoprotein 3 (ZP3) gene into a mild mousepox virus in the hope of 
inducing antibodies with a contraceptive effect.1 They subsequently inserted the 
interleukin-4 (IL-4) gene, which helps regulate immune system reactions, to boost 
this genetically engineered sterility treatment. However, the IL-4 gene increased 
the virulence of the virus such that it rapidly killed normally resistant mice. The 
researchers subsequently showed that the expression of IL-4 resulted in a strain 
of mousepox so powerful that it killed even vaccinated mice.2 A disturbing 
implication of this finding is that adding an IL-4 gene might similarly increase 
the fatality rate of smallpox (or some other poxvirus that infects humans) and 
potentially allow the virus to circumvent vaccination. The Australian group’s 
findings were published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Virology, but they 
also attracted attention in the popular magazine New Scientist as well as in the 
mainstream media.3 Ethical questions posed to this experience included: Should 
this research have been done? Should the results have been published? How 
1 Jackson, R. J., Maguire, D. J., Hinds, L. A. and Ramshaw, I. A. 1998, ‘Infertility in mice induced by a 
recombinant ectromelia virus expressing mouse zona pellucida glycoprotein 3’, Biology of Reproduction, vol. 
58(1), pp. 152–9.
2 Jackson, R. J., Ramsay, A. J., Christensen, C. D., Beaton, S., Hall, D. F. and Ramshaw, I. A. 2001, ‘Expression 
of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and 
overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’, Journal of Virology, vol. 75(3), pp. 1205–10.
3 Nowak, R. 2001, ‘Killer virus’, New Scientist, 10 January, available: http://www.newscientist.com/article/
dn311 [viewed 23 February 2010]; Broad, W. J. 2001, ‘Australians Create a Deadly Mouse Virus’, New York 
Times, 23 January, available: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/23/health/23MOUS.html?pagewanted=all 
[viewed 23 February 2010].
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should scientists and governments respond to dual-use dilemmas? This chapter 
explores recent efforts by four Australian academics, one of whom was involved 
in the mousepox IL-4 research, to facilitate discussion among life scientists of 
these and related questions.
In 2009, the US-based Alfred P. Sloan Foundation funded a pilot series of four 
interactive seminars for Australian scientists and students on the potential 
security risks of laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms. The 
seminars were designed and facilitated by a team of academics from the National 
Centre for Biosecurity (NCB), a collaboration of the University of Sydney and the 
Australian National University (ANU). This project was part of a multinational 
programme of education and awareness-raising on the dual-use dilemma in the 
life sciences, coordinated by Brian Rappert of the University of Exeter (UK). 
The Australian team was multidisciplinary and consisted of virologists Belinda 
Herring (Sydney) and Ian Ramshaw (ANU), bioethicist Michael Selgelid (ANU), 
and political scientist Christian Enemark (Sydney). We had sought funding to 
conduct these seminars because we perceived that the issue of the dual-use 
dilemma in the life sciences had received scarce attention in Australia at the 
level of higher education and professional training. In 2005 the Australian 
government had acknowledged, at a meeting of Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) member-states in Geneva, that ‘Amongst the Australian 
scientific community, there is a low level of awareness of the risk of misuse of 
the biological sciences to assist in the development of biological or chemical 
weapons’.4 Over the course of 2009, we gained the impression that little had 
changed since that observation was made.
At the level of government policy, Australia had recently introduced a scheme 
under the National Health Security Act 2007 to regulate the handling, storage, 
transfer and disposal of ‘Security-Sensitive Biological Agents’ (SSBAs). A 
government-run ‘road show’ of workshops in major Australian cities in 2008–
09 sought to inform ‘affected stakeholders’ about the SSBAs scheme. As part 
of this, the ‘dual-use dilemma’ was mentioned briefly at the start of each 
workshop.5 After attending one of these, our impression was of a top-down, 
rulers-to-the-ruled, regulations-oriented approach to awareness-raising. We felt 
the time was ripe for some bottom-up, non-official, ethics-oriented engagement 
with Australian life scientists and students on the challenge of preventing the 
4 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Meeting of Experts, 
Raising awareness: Approaches and opportunities for outreach (working paper prepared by Australia), BWC/
MSP/2005/MX/WP.29, Geneva, 21 June 2005: 1.
5 Department of Health and Ageing 2010, 2009 SSBA regulatory scheme road show, available: <http://www.
health.gov.au/ssba#roadshow> [viewed 20 January 2010].
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destructive use of science. Our hypothesis was that an interactive seminar on 
the dual-use dilemma, facilitated by academics, would make for a more relaxed 
and fruitful forum for raising questions and discussing concerns.
Preparation
Our team of facilitators prepared for the 2009 seminar series by undertaking two 
days of training in December 2008. Rappert and his US colleague Nancy Connell 
(University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey) visited the University of 
Sydney and we spent the first day airing our views on the dual-use dilemma 
and exploring issues of seminar content and awareness-raising methodology. 
The following day, the team and its trainers jointly conducted a two-hour 
demonstration seminar on campus involving around 20 participants from a 
variety of academic and government backgrounds. This was an opportunity for 
us not only to get a feel for an interactive seminar on the dual-use dilemma but 
also obtain feedback from participants and each other on matters of substance 
and style. Four weeks prior, we had distributed an invitation flyer via email to 
relevant university mailing lists. The flyer was reused for all four seminars in 
2009 and was worded as follows:
International concern about biological weapons has increased 
significantly, particularly since the anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United 
States. Biotechnology research has great potential to benefit health and 
agriculture, but questions arise as to whether it might aid the deliberate 
spread of disease. Traditional concerns about laboratory biosafety are 
being increasingly complemented by growing attention to biosecurity 
practices within and outside of laboratories. In Australia, this is reflected 
in the ‘security-sensitive biological agents’ (SSBAs) scheme to be 
introduced in 2009. Beyond legal regulations, ethical questions remain 
including what novel threats might stem from life science research, 
whether and how scientists should contribute to national defence, and 
whether some lines of investigation are too contentious to pursue.
This interactive seminar has three aims:
1. Inform participants about current international discussions surrounding 
‘dual use’ and ‘biosecurity’.
2. Generate debate about the merits and pitfalls of proposed policy responses.




Topics for discussion will include the funding of research, communication 
of research results, oversight of experiments, the responsibilities of 
scientists and other biosecurity stakeholders, and examples of various 
national and international measures being implemented or considered.
The flyer appeared on NCB letterhead featuring the University of Sydney 
and ANU logos and the NCB website URL (www.biosecurity.edu.au), and it 
acknowledged funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. We wanted to make 
clear to prospective participants that the seminar was academic in nature and 
not associated with government in any way. Our intention in so doing was to 
distinguish the seminar from the SSBAs ‘road show’ passing through Australian 
cities in 2008–09.
Participants at the December 2008 demonstration seminar were reminded at 
the outset that it was being conducted primarily for training purposes. After 
a brief introduction to the problem of biological weapons and the awareness-
raising rationale for the following year’s seminar series, Rappert spent one hour 
taking participants through a seminar similar to those that he and his British 
colleague Malcolm Dando (University of Bradford) had been conducting with 
scientists worldwide since 2004.6 Rappert’s content, structure and style were 
the model for the seminars we conducted in 2009. Connell and the Australian 
team of facilitators then spent around 50 minutes asking participants to expand 
on points they had raised earlier. We concluded the demonstration seminar 
by eliciting feedback, thanking our guest facilitators and the participants and 
then inviting everyone to join us for lunch. Immediately afterwards, Rappert 
and Connell debriefed us on possible reasons for the success or otherwise of 
different aspects of the seminar. Taking these lessons on board, and building 
on our collective research and teaching experience as academics, we were now 
trained and ready to conduct discussions around Australia on the dual-use 
dilemma in the life sciences.
The Seminars
Over the course of 2009 we undertook seminars at the John Curtin School of 
Medical Research at ANU (20 March), the Department of Microbiology and 
Immunology at the University of Melbourne (9 June), the Centre for Infectious 
Diseases and Microbiology at the Westmead Hospital campus of the University 
of Sydney (23 July), and the Queensland Institute of Medical Research in 
Brisbane (17 August). Each of these took place over a one-hour period and on 
average attracted around 50 scientists and students. Many of the participants 
6 Rappert, B. 2009, Experimental secrets: International security, codes, and the future of research, New 
York: University Press of America.
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in the December 2008 demonstration seminar had provided feedback that 
even two hours was not enough time. However, in the interests of maximising 
participation, we decided it would be better to have our seminar included in 
existing programmes of weekly one-hour seminars which scientists and students 
are in the habit of attending. Given limited time and a desire to avoid ‘death-by-
PowerPoint’, we settled on 11 slides:
1. Title slide (‘The Dual-Use Dilemma in the Life Sciences’) including NCB 
banner, names and university affiliations of seminar facilitators and name 
of sponsor.
2. Three questions:
What research should or should not be done?
How should research results be communicated?
What forms of security oversight, if any, are required for life scientists?
3. What research should or should not be done?
Example: synthetic poliovirus
4. How should research results be communicated?
Example: resurrected 1918 flu virus
5. What forms of security oversight, if any, are required for life scientists?
Example: laws and codes of conduct
6. 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Text of Article 1
7. National Health Security Act 2007
List of security-sensitive biological agents
8. A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity (Royal Netherlands Academy for Arts 
and Sciences (RNAAS) 2007)
Basic principles and target groups
9. A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity (RNAAS 2007)
Research and publication policy
10. A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity (RNAAS 2007)
Accountability and oversight
11. Thanks and contact information
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The first task was for the team of seminar facilitators to introduce themselves 
and their academic backgrounds. Some participants in the December 2008 
demonstration seminar had indicated in feedback that they would also have 
liked everyone else in the room to introduce themselves. The reason given was 
typically that this would reveal ‘who people are and where they are coming 
from’. Nevertheless, we decided against this, partly because it would take up 
too much time and most seminar attendees at a given research institution would 
probably already know each other, but mainly because we felt that people would 
speak more freely and frankly (to us) under conditions of relative anonymity.
After the facilitators’ introductions, we briefly explained why the seminar 
was being conducted. The ‘dual-use dilemma’ is nothing new, we assured 
the participants, and can arise in any and every branch of science. Simply 
stated, it is the notion that the fruits of scientific endeavour can be used for 
purposes both good and bad. But whereas the downsides of nuclear science, for 
example, have been comprehensively canvassed, there has hitherto been little 
open discussion of the dual-use dilemma and biological weapons risks among 
life-science professionals. This is despite the fact that the Australian Academy 
of Science, along with 67 other academies worldwide, has endorsed the 2005 
Statement on Biosecurity by the Interacademy Panel on International Issues. 
The statement acknowledges that ‘some science and technology can be used 
for destructive purposes as well as for constructive purposes’, and among the 
principles it offers to guide individual scientists is that ‘scientists should be 
aware of, disseminate information about and teach national and international 
laws and regulations, as well as policies and principles aimed at preventing the 
misuse of biological research’.7 We explained that this was a challenge around 
the world, and that our Australian series of seminars in Canberra, Melbourne, 
Sydney and Brisbane was roughly mirroring the work of seminar teams based 
in the UK, South Africa, Israel, Japan and the US. Our seminar, unlike those 
the participants were used to attending as part of their institution’s weekly 
programme, was not about presenting research findings and nor was it a research 
exercise in itself.
After setting the scene, we briefly explained how we wanted the seminar to 
run. While pointing to the political reality of government concern about the 
problem of biological weapons, it was not our role to make judgments about 
if or the extent to which this concern is justified. Nor was it the purpose of 
the seminar, we explained, to advocate specific practices and policies. Rather, 
we wanted to provide Australian life scientists and students with a forum for 
structured discussion among themselves of the dual-use dilemmas associated 
with their work. In any event, we the seminar facilitators were ourselves divided 
7 Interacademy Panel on International Issues 2005, Statement on biosecurity, available: <http://www.
interacademies.net/Object.File/Master/5/399/Biosecurity%20St..pdf> [viewed 9 January 2010].
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on possible solutions to dual-use dilemmas. Our objectives of education and 
awareness-raising would be best achieved if the seminar participants did most 
of the talking over the hour. We then indicated our intention to allow roughly 
equal time for participants to discuss each of three questions:
• What research should or should not be done?
• How should research results be communicated?
• What forms of security oversight, if any, are required for life scientists?
These questions are along the same lines as those that Rappert and Dando 
have identified as central to current dual-use knowledge debates.8 A different 
facilitator would initiate discussion of each question with a real example of 
a dual-use dilemma, then it would be up to the seminar participants to talk 
through the issues as they saw them and in the light of any comments we made. 
At the first two seminars (Canberra and Melbourne), it was difficult to get 
someone in the room to be the first to talk about each question. On the advice 
of a Melbourne seminar participant who had lunch with us afterwards, we later 
employed the device of first asking for a show of hands. This quickly served to 
demonstrate to each participant that others in the room also had an opinion and, 
more importantly, that opinions differed.
To stimulate discussion on our first question (what research should or should 
not be done?), we referred to an experiment that involved synthesising the 
genome of a pathogen. The dilemma is:
1. Synthesis of the genomes of viruses theoretically allows the introduction 
of mutations or novel sequences that can be used to study the function of 
particular genes or regulatory sequences.
2. Synthesis technology would obviate the need to source pathogens from 
natural reservoirs in other parts of the world or from other laboratories. 
It could also facilitate recotnstruction of extinct pathogens and enable 
construction of novel pathogens.
Our example was a project in which US scientists sponsored by the US Department 
of Defense spent three years synthesising the 7500 chemical units of poliomyelitis 
(polio) virus. Referring to the published polio virus RNA genome, they strung 
together corresponding DNA sequences purchased over the Internet. This was 
used in a cell-free extract to create live virus that paralysed and killed mice. 
The results, published in 2002, showed that eradicating a virus in the wild 
might not mean it is gone forever.9 We asked the seminar participants: Should 
8 Rappert, B. 2007, ‘Education for the life sciences’ in Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds), A web of prevention: 
Biological weapons, life sciences and the future governance of research, London: Earthscan, p. 60.
9 Cello, J., Paul, A. V. and Wimmer, E. 2002, ‘Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious 
virus in the absence of natural template’, Science, vol. 297(5583), pp. 1016–8.
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this research have been done? In general, responses to this question tended 
towards preferring a permissive approach, but there was some variation from 
one institution to the next. In Brisbane, an initial show of hands indicated a 
majority were in favour of the experiment having been done, but most Sydney 
participants adopted a neutral position. Nobody offered the view that polio 
virus synthesis was particularly groundbreaking or important work. Rather, as 
one Brisbane participant observed, ‘This was not research, it was just applying 
known technology’. A Melbourne participant posed the rhetorical question: 
‘why would you bother?’ and in Sydney one person likewise suggested that the 
experiment was ‘pointless’ but otherwise ‘morally neutral’.
At this point the seminar discussion would usually quickly turn, as we 
anticipated, to a more general consideration of scientists’ freedom to experiment. 
A common theme was that no experiment exists (or can be judged) in isolation, 
but rather builds on research that has gone before; there is a general backdrop 
of pre-existing scientific knowledge and technological capabilities. To test this 
view, we would offer a proposition along the lines of ‘But what if one research 
project was what turned a reasonably foreseeable, dangerous but theoretical 
possibility into a real danger?’ A Canberra participant commented that ‘evil 
applications of science cannot always be predicted’ and an attitude prevalent 
throughout the seminar series was that shutting down lines of research might 
deprive humanity of important, life-saving discoveries. On this point, one of 
the more interesting moments during the Melbourne seminar was when one 
participant, an influenza researcher, pointed to work currently being carried 
out which involves increasing the transmissibility of a pathogen. The dilemma 
is:
1. For public-health planning purposes, it may be important to know whether 
a naturally occurring infectious-disease threat could be worsened by the 
evolution of a pathogen into a more transmissible form.
2. A pathogen might be more useful for biological weapons purposes if it is 
more easily transmitted through a target population.
The World Health Organization is presently sponsoring research to find out 
whether the H5N1 avian influenza virus could mutate to produce a human 
influenza pandemic. There is hope that, by re-assorting (mixing) H5N1 
with human influenza viruses in the laboratory, scientists may determine 
how dangerous the hybrid virus would be and the likelihood of it causing a 
pandemic. One such experiment in re-assortment has found that transmissibility 
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is not increased.10 However, a successful experiment of this kind could result 
in a man-made pandemic influenza virus that would need to be kept extremely 
secure against theft or leakage from the laboratory.
From time to time, some participants appeared reluctant to mesh scientific and 
ethical concerns. One pragmatic pronouncement made at the Brisbane seminar 
was that ‘if I don’t do it, someone else will, unless you inhibit us all’. This 
then prompted the observation that ‘any restriction not globally applied has 
no value’. At all the seminars, there invariably arose a question along the lines 
of ‘Who decides at which point something is too dangerous?’ In reply, one of 
the facilitators would ask participants their views on a hypothetical experiment 
involving chemical synthesis of variola (smallpox) virus, a pathogen which 
no longer exists in nature. There was some disagreement over the technical 
feasibility of producing a virus capable of infecting and sickening humans, but 
no one argued that there would be much scientific merit in doing so. On the 
question of whether such work should or should not be done, as a matter of 
morality, one Melbourne participant replied by asking the group: ‘Hang on, is 
this a scientific or a social issue?’ This in turn received the reply ‘Others will say 
it is a social issue, even if we don’t think so.’
Attention then turned to what might be considered the lifeblood of science — 
information and its sharing. The second question we posed was closely related to 
the first: a person’s opinion on whether or how to communicate research results 
is likely to be impacted by whether they think the research should have been 
done at all. To stimulate discussion, we referred to a pair of experiments that 
centred on genetic sequencing of a pathogenic micro-organism. The dilemma is:
1. Sequencing the genetic code of entire pathogens or specific genes of 
pathogens could assist in understanding the nature of the pathogen and 
in the development of new vaccines or treatments for the disease it causes.
2. Gene-sequence data could be used to reconstruct a pathogen (or one with 
its harmful characteristics) for deployment against a target population with 
no natural immunity.
Our example was research results, published in 2005, on the complete genetic 
sequencing of the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) virus and the resurrection thereof 
using reverse genetic techniques.11 This revealed (and reproduced, in animals 
10 Maines, T. R., Li-Mei Chen, Matsuoka, Y., Chen, H., Rowe, T., Ortin, J., Falcón, A., Nguyen, T. H., Le 
Quynh Mai, Sedyaningsih, E. R., Syahrial Harun, Tumpey, T. M., Donis, R. O., Cox, N. J., Subbarao, K. and 
Katz, J. M. 2006, ‘Lack of transmission of H5N1 avian–human reassortant influenza viruses in a ferret model’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 103(32), pp. 12,121–6.
11 Taubenberger, J. K., Reid, A. H., Lourens, R. M., Wang, R., Jin, G. and Fanning, T. G. 2005, 
‘Characterization of the 1918 influenza virus polymerase genes’, Nature, vol. 437(7060), pp. 889–93; Tumpey, 
T. M., Basler, C. F., Aguilar, P. V., Zeng, H., Solorzano, A., Swayne, D. E., Cox, N. J., Katz, J. M., Taubenberger, 
J. K., Palese, P. and Garcia-Sastre, A. 2005, ‘Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza 
pandemic virus’, Science, vol. 310(5745), pp. 77-80.
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at least) the traits that made the pandemic influenza virus so virulent (the 
‘Spanish flu’ killed around 50 million people). However, the publication of this 
information gave rise to concerns that would-be bioterrorists could use it to 
reconstruct this strain of H1N1 for malign purposes. The US National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity, a non-government advisory body, was asked 
to consider the relevant papers before publication (in Science and Nature) and 
concluded that the scientific benefit of the future use of this information on the 
1918 virus far outweighed the potential risk of misuse.12 We asked the seminar 
participants: ‘Was publication the right thing to do?’
The overwhelming majority favoured publication, and the ensuing discussion 
typically included appeals to scientific values. As scientific discovery is a 
cumulative process, as one Canberra participant observed, it is ‘essential to 
provide [publish] methodology so it [the experiment] can be replicated’. Another 
argument frequently advanced was one that challenged the premise of our second 
question: ‘You can’t control publication; we’ve got the Internet.’ In Canberra this 
elicited the reply ‘but you can control publication in a commercial or military 
context’, and one Sydney participant said ‘I’m more worried about results not 
being published because of government classification.’ The implication was 
that governments themselves could secretly be using life-science technology 
for malign purposes, or that classification could be hindering efforts to protect 
the community at large. On the latter point, a Brisbane participant argued that 
‘publication raises awareness and makes us more prepared’. As a way of testing 
the assumptions underlying the fiercely pro-publication sentiments expressed 
at all the seminars, we would ask: ‘Can you imagine any research results that 
should not be communicated at all?’ At the Melbourne seminar, one participant 
replied with the hypothetical example of ‘accidentally’ discovering a method 
of making HIV transmissible as an aerosol. Under no circumstances, he argued, 
would he seek to place that method in the public domain.
Our third question (What forms of security oversight, if any, are required for 
life scientists?) invited participants to critically assess existing and proposed 
governance mechanisms, whether grounded in specific laws (for example, 
biosecurity regulations) or ethical principles (for example, professional codes of 
conduct). Whereas the previous two questions had canvassed possible problems 
associated with pursuing particular lines of research and communicating 
results, participants were now offered an opportunity to exchange ideas in a 
solutions-oriented frame of mind. In this third and final part of the seminar, 
our aim was to shift life scientists’ attention away from the relatively familiar 
terrain of laboratory techniques and research publication and towards the more 
exotic realm of national security concerns. As an exercise in awareness-raising, 
12 Miller, S. and Selgelid, M.J. (2008) Ethical and philosophical consideration of the dual-use dilemma in the 
biological sciences, Springer, p. 26.
Chapter.7:.Raising.Awareness.among.Australian.Life.Scientists
141
we set about acquainting participants with the existence and content of some 
relevant biosecurity laws as well as a sample code of conduct. It was not our 
role, however, to champion legal or ethical oversight per se or any specific mode 
thereof. It was up to those attending the seminar to discuss among themselves 
whether particular oversight mechanisms were feasible and/or desirable and 
why.
Turning first to the issue of legal regulation, we framed the security dilemma in 
the life sciences as follows:
1. Biological weapons threats can emanate from trusted laboratory personnel, 
even those with high-level security clearances.
2. Governments need to manage the risk of imposing too great a regulatory 
burden. A reduction in potentially life-saving research, precipitated by 
scientists opting out of laboratory work, could undermine capacity to resist 
both natural infectious-disease outbreaks and biological attacks.
We illustrated this dilemma by briefly referring to two recent episodes from 
the US with which a minority of participants appeared to be familiar. The first 
example concerned a Yersinia pestis (plague) bacteria expert, Thomas Butler. 
Formerly chief of the infectious-diseases division at Texas Tech University, 
Butler was the first US scientist to be put on trial for biosecurity offences under 
post-9/11 legislation. In the US, federal laws regulate the storage, handling, 
transfer and disposal of 82 named Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSATs). 
Butler faced charges including that he smuggled (that is, transferred without 
permission) Y pestis, an agent on the BSATs list. In December 2003 a Texas 
jury found Butler guilty on three charges related to the shipment of samples 
to a Tanzanian researcher without the proper permit, the package having been 
labelled merely as ‘laboratory materials’.13 On 10 March 2004 he was sentenced 
to two years in prison. The judge had cut seven years off a possible standard 
nine-year sentence set by federal guidelines, citing testimony that the bacteria 
shipment was done for humanitarian reasons and that the US Department of 
Commerce would have approved a transportation permit had Butler applied for 
one. The judge also cited Butler’s early work on treatment of diarrhoeal diseases 
and oral rehydration as having ‘led to the salvage of millions of lives throughout 
the world’.14
The second example concerned a Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) bacteria expert, 
Bruce Ivins. A microbiologist employed for 28 years at a US Government 
laboratory, Ivins committed suicide on 29 July 2008 before he could be 
13 Chang, K. 2004, ‘Scientist in plague case is sentenced to two years’, New York Times, 11 March, p. A18; 
Piller, C. 2003, ‘Plague expert cleared of serious charges in bioterror case’, Los Angeles Times, 2 December, 
p. A16.
14 United States v Butler, 5:03-CR-037-C, US District Court, Northern District of Texas, 10 March 2004, 
available: <http://www.fas.org/butler/sentence.html> [viewed 7 January 2010].
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charged in connection with the anthrax envelope attacks of 2001.15 Ivins was a 
published expert on anthrax vaccines,16 and in 2003 had received the US Defense 
Department’s highest civilian honour for his work in this area.17 Affidavits for 
search warrants published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in August 
2008 included a description of Ivins’s job at the US Army Medical Research 
Institute for Infectious Diseases in Maryland. One of his tasks was to prepare 
‘large batches’ of aerosolised anthrax bacteria. Animals were then subjected to 
‘aerosol challenges’ to test the effectiveness of vaccines. Ivins knew how to use 
devices such as lyophilisers, incubators and centrifuges which are ‘considered 
essential for the production of the highly purified, powdered anthrax used 
in the Fall 2001 mailings’.18 The picture that emerged from published case 
documents was that Ivins knew how to make and use biological weapons, and 
the FBI’s scientific and documentary evidence indicating that he did so in 2001 
was compelling.19
By this stage of the seminar it was easy to elicit opinions, some strongly 
worded, on what were commonly regarded as shocking real-life experiences 
of lost innocence in the life sciences. One participant at our Brisbane seminar 
knew many of the details of Thomas Butler’s case and expressed outrage at what 
he perceived to be an injustice. In Sydney, by contrast, several participants 
expressed views along the lines of ‘he was unlucky; these days you just have to 
be more careful’. There appeared to be less awareness of, or willingness to talk 
about, Bruce Ivins, although some participants knew enough to be able to voice 
doubts about the scientific foundations of the case against him. When this issue 
was raised at two of the seminars, the facilitators did not express a view but 
instead pointed to the FBI’s decision in May 2009 to commission an independent 
review of its investigation by the US National Academy of Sciences.20
After allowing time for some discussion of the above two criminal cases, the 
facilitators briefly explained the relevant international legal context and then 
drew the focus of attention back to Australia. At all four seminars, almost all 
the participants seemed unaware of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention or BTWC). However, out of concern that delving too deeply 
15 Johnson, C. 2008, ‘US settles with scientist named in anthrax cases’, Washington Post, 28 June, p. A01.
16 Hewetson, J. F., Little, S. F., Ivins, B. E., Johnson, W. M., Pittman, P. R., Brown, J. E., Norris, S. L. and 
Nielsen, C. J. 2008, ‘An in vivo passive protection assay for the evaluation of immunity in AVA-vaccinated 
individuals’, Vaccine, vol. 26(33), pp. 4262–6.
17 Dance, A. 2008, ‘Death renews biosecurity debate’, Nature, vol. 454(7205), p. 672.
18 Dellafera, T. F. 2008, Affidavit in support of search warrant, US Department of Justice, available: <http://
www.usdoj.gov/amerithrax/07-524-M-01%20attachment.pdf> [viewed 13 August 2008].
19 Johnson, C., Leonnig, C. D. and Wilber, D. Q. 2008, ‘Scientist set to discuss plea bargain in deadly attacks 
commits suicide’, Washington Post, 2 August, p. A01.
20 Shane, S. 2009, ‘F.B.I. to pay for anthrax inquiry review’, New York Times, 7 May, p. A25.
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into legal provisions might be a turn-off for a scientific audience, we felt it 
was enough simply to display the text of Article 1. The Convention’s in-built 
recognition of the dual-use dilemma is highlighted in italics:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances 
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
We explained that the BTWC applies to the actions of states rather than 
individuals, but that the wording of the above provision is reproduced in 
Australian criminal law. The maximum penalty for an individual convicted of 
developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining biological agents 
and toxins for a non-peaceful purpose is life imprisonment.21 Again, most 
seminar participants appeared to be unaware of this. However, they were 
generally much more familiar with the list of 22 SSBAs which we displayed 
next. Supplementing the general prohibition on bad intentions contained in 
international and domestic law, the National Health Security Act 2007 authorised 
the Australian government’s recent introduction of detailed rules for the day-
to-day activities of those with access to and knowledge of hazardous pathogens. 
The SSBAs scheme, although similar to the US BSATs scheme (of which Thomas 
Butler fell foul) that dates from the mid-1990s, is virtually unprecedented in 
Australia. Of particular interest to seminar participants was the requirement 
that persons authorised to handle the most dangerous (Tier 1) SSBAs must 
undergo a National Criminal History check by the Australian Federal Police and 
a Politically Motivated Violence check by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation.22 It was not our role to explain, attack or defend the SSBAs 
scheme. Rather, we wanted each of our seminars to be an opportunity for 
Australian life scientists and students to engage in frank discussion of a clear 
and present mechanism of security-oriented oversight. Opinions varied as to the 
wisdom and effectiveness of biosecurity regulations in general. At the Sydney 
seminar, for example, one participant warned that ‘gene-technology regulations 
[dating from 2000] did impede research’ but another said that ‘sometimes you 
have to legislate to bring about changes in behaviour’. A laboratory manager in 
Sydney observed that ‘younger scientists are more likely to adhere to biosafety 
rules’ but additional biosecurity rules would bring, according to a Brisbane 
21 Crimes (Biological Weapons) Act 1976(Cth), s 8.
22 Department of Health and Ageing 2009, SSBA Standards, 3.3 Authorised persons, available: <http://www.
health.gov.au/ssba#standards> [viewed 11 January 2010].
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participant, ‘compliance overload’. Another opinion voiced in Brisbane was: 
‘It’s like Aboriginal housing; layers of bureaucracy make it impossible to get 
things done.’ Towards the end of the Sydney seminar, one participant set heads 
nodding around the room when she warned, ‘Don’t take away from scientists 
that love of what they do.’
As many participants were aware, the Department of Health and Ageing runs 
a nationwide series of workshops for the purpose of instructing life scientists 
and laboratory managers on the requirements for complying with the SSBAs 
scheme. However, these workshops are not an opportunity to suggest changes 
to the rules or challenge the scheme as a whole. As disinterested academics, 
we were determined through our seminars to facilitate such an opportunity, 
and participants readily gave voice to a wide array of opinions. These ranged 
from outright opposition to the SSBAs scheme on the grounds that it inhibited 
research through to concerns that the scheme was entirely necessary but not 
strict enough. Declining to express personal views for or against specific modes 
of security oversight, we suggested that interactive seminars such as ours could 
be a valuable, empowering and bottom-up means of increasing the security 
consciousness of life scientists and students. Arguably, this complements rather 
than conflicts with the top-down regulatory scheme imposed by the National 
Health Security Act 2007.
Further to the issue of security-oriented oversight, the law does not (and 
perhaps could not) offer guidance for life scientists making decisions about lines 
of research (Question 1) and communicating research results (Question 2). These 
are best regarded as ethical rather than legal issues and, as one Canberra seminar 
participant commented, ‘often it is better to think about moral obligations than 
regulations’. One mechanism of ethics-based oversight, professionally binding 
but falling short of actual law, is a code of conduct. The final part of the seminar, 
drawing all its themes together with possible solutions in mind, invited 
participants to consider sample principles for a code. We used the example 
of the 2008 document A Code of Conduct on Biosecurity commissioned by the 
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences at the request of the Dutch 
Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. Because a code of conduct can only 
be useful if it reflects scientific practice, scientists as well as representatives 
of government and business were from the outset involved in developing this 
document.23 Seminar participants were first shown the Code’s ‘basic principles’, 
drawing the link back to the international ban on biological weapons:
23 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 2008, A code of conduct on biosecurity: Report by the 




The aim of this code of conduct is to prevent life-sciences research or its 
application from directly or indirectly contributing to the development, 
production or stockpiling of biological weapons, as described in the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), or to any other 
misuse of biological agents and toxins.
We then displayed the suggested elements of the Code with respect to ‘research 
and publication policy’ and ‘accountability and oversight’, in each case asking 
participants to tell us what they liked or disliked:
Research and publication policy
• Screen for possible dual-use aspects during the application and assessment 
procedure and during the execution of research projects.
• Weigh the anticipated results against the risks of the research if possible 
dual-use aspects are identified.
• Reduce the risk that the publication of the results of potential dual-use life-
sciences research in scientific publications will unintentionally contribute to 
misuse of that knowledge.
Accountability and oversight
• Report any finding or suspicion of misuse of dual-use technology directly to 
the competent persons or commissions.
• Take whistleblowers seriously and ensure that they do not suffer any adverse 
effects from their actions.
The ensuing discussion invariably centred on what the application of such 
general principles would look like in practice. Seminar participants would 
typically pick out one or more of the above words and ask a question along 
the lines of ‘What does that really mean?’ What did it mean, for example, to 
‘screen’ research? How and by whom are ‘possible dual-use aspects’ to be 
‘identified’? What about results that are not ‘anticipated’? What does it mean 
to ‘unintentionally contribute’ to misuse of knowledge? What are good grounds 
for ‘suspicion’ of misuse of technology? What is the difference between a 
‘whistleblower’ and a troublemaker? What constitutes taking something 
‘seriously’? Such questions, drilling down to the fine detail of how scientists’ 
day-to-day working lives might be affected by a code of conduct, generated 
excellent and sometimes heated discussions among the seminar participants. 
Our role as facilitators, we reminded them, was not to answer their questions 
but to get an informed conversation started on possible solutions to the dual-
use dilemma in the life sciences. At the end of each seminar, after thanking the 
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participants for their contributions and providing our contact details, it was 
pleasing to hear conversation continuing in the corridors as people headed back 
to their places of work.
General Reflections
It was not the purpose of these seminars for the facilitators to advance a moral 
position on particular lines of research and publication decisions or to advocate 
any specific form of oversight to manage the dual-use dilemma. Rather, these 
were opportunities for loosely structured discussions moderated by impartial, 
non-government experts. Only rarely did a participant ask us directly for an 
answer to a question we posed, and such a request was always met with a 
deliberate and conspicuous sidestep. We were candid about not being able to 
agree among ourselves, and we admitted that the seminars themselves were an 
occasion to rethink our opinions, but beyond that we insisted on keeping a low 
profile. Each of us had come to this awareness-raising project with different 
intellectual backgrounds (virology, bioethics and political science), and it was 
sometimes difficult to reconcile our individual views on the kind of content to 
cover and the best process to follow. In preparing for and debriefing after each 
seminar, we saw the series evolve and improve. As facilitators, we reflected on 
what we judged to be mistakes in our own and each other’s approach and sought 
to build on those aspects of previous seminars that seemed to work well.
At all times, however, we needed to be flexible and alert enough to facilitate 
conversation among seminar participants rather than try too hard to shape it. 
We needed to be careful, for example, not to be seen to be prefacing questions 
or pre-empting answers. Lest we appear to be pushing an agenda, we tried to ask 
open questions (for example, ‘What is your moral position, if any, on X?’) rather 
than leading ones (for example, ‘Do you think X is immoral?’). Our language 
had to be as neutral as possible, abstract rather than personal, to maintain focus 
on the participants’ own views (for example, ‘One argument against that might 
be…’, ‘Another perspective you might come across is…’, ‘Can anyone think of 
a possible counterargument?’). In addition to being impartial, we needed to 
be inclusive. A consistent feature of all four seminars was that the more senior 
scientists in the room tended to speak first, at greater length, and contributed 
statements rather than questions. Most of their contributions were well informed 
and constructive, but we were sensitive also to the importance of ensuring that 
the more junior scientists and students had an opportunity to voice opinions 
as future research leaders. The aim overall was to draw people into articulating 
their reasoning on how they would navigate a dual-use dilemma, and to flush 
out the assumptions underlying particular points of view. Our facilitative tasks 
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were to attend carefully to what was being said at the time, recall similar or 
countervailing points raised earlier, anticipate what might be raised next, and 
keep the conversation moving swiftly enough to cover all our themes.
The experience of designing and running the seminars was both challenging 
and rewarding, and it was unlike any other academic activity the facilitators 
had engaged in before. It was a privilege to discuss the dual-use dilemma 
with some of the most talented life scientists in Australia, and we made some 
useful professional contacts over the course of 2009. In Canberra, Melbourne, 
Sydney and Brisbane, we were greatly encouraged seeing seminar participants 
taking the time and effort to talk seriously about a vexing and intriguing issue. 
We were made to feel very welcome at every institution we visited, and each 
seminar proved a valuable learning experience for us too. Although limited 
in scope, our pilot seminar series seemed to confirm what anecdotal evidence 
had led us to suspect: that in Australia there is very little familiarity overall 
with policy issues surrounding the dual-use dilemma in the life sciences. The 
remedy we proposed, as simply and tactfully as we could, was to get people 
talking. However distasteful the topic of biological weapons might seem, it is 
nevertheless an increasingly important one for Australian life scientists and 
their colleagues around the world. We sought to raise awareness of the dual-
use dilemma in a manner sensitive to but not beholden to the interests and 
concerns of life scientists. Scientific opinions are not the only ones that count; 
potentially all members of a given community have a stake in this issue. On 
the other hand, life scientists are historically not closely acquainted with the 
language and institutions of national security. As such, seminars such as ours 
might serve as a source of empowerment as well as information. By becoming 
more familiar with political and policymaking processes, life scientists might 
be able to suggest better ways of managing the security risks inherent in some 
research while minimising scientific opportunity costs.
In Australia and beyond, with the health and security stakes so high, there needs 
to be further exploration of education and awareness-raising as a long-term 
means of preventing the destructive use of science. Accordingly, the National 
Centre for Biosecurity is drafting a proposal that the Australian Government fund 
a nationwide Seminar Programme to raise awareness of the dual-use dilemma 
among Australian life scientists and students. The Programme would consist 
of 24 seminars (six in 2011, eight in 2012, and 10 in 2013) and three annual 
training days for seminar facilitators. The seminars would initially resemble 
those conducted in the 2009 pilot scheme, and updates and improvements 
would be made over the succeeding three years. Such an initiative would firstly 
support Australia’s national security and public-health objectives. By raising 
awareness of biological-weapons risks in a manner sensitive to the interests of 
scientists, the seminars would facilitate conditions in which biological attacks 
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are less likely to emanate from the Australian life-sciences community. Secondly, 
the Programme would support foreign-policy objectives by strengthening 
the fulfilment of Australia’s international obligations under the 1972 BTWC. 
Specifically, Article IV obliges member states to take ‘any necessary measures’ to 
give effect to the Convention’s prohibitions. Lastly, the initiative could provide 
members of the Australian life-sciences community with a respectable forum to 
articulate their interests and concerns regarding the dual-use dilemma.
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Chapter 8: Bringing Biosecurity-
related Concepts into the Curriculum: 
A US View
NANCY.CONNELL.AND.BRENDAN.MCCLUSKEY
The decades flanking the September/October 2001 terrorist incidents in the US 
(1990–2010) have seen a dramatic increase in concern with and attention to 
biological weapons (BW). The discovery of an extensive offensive BW programme 
in the former Soviet Union, the unsuccessful attempts of Aum Shinrikyo and US 
domestic terrorists to acquire, produce and disseminate ‘weaponised’ biological 
agents, and the anthrax attacks through the US Postal Service are among the 
events that have contributed to increased awareness of a possible biological 
threat.
While assessments of the actual threat remain controversial, the perceived threat 
already has led to extensive changes in the conduct and regulation of scientific 
activity in the US. In the past decade, concern with biological weapons and 
biodefence has been accompanied by massive increases in funding directed 
towards civilian biodefence: over $50 billion between 2001 and 2009.1
An enormous amount of federal effort and capacity is now directed towards 
select-agent research, in particular, and infectious-disease research in general.
Accompanying this push in infectious-disease research are requirements for 
compliance with increased regulatory activity at federal, state and institutional 
levels.2 The changes include enhanced personnel and site-security oversight, 
consideration of delaying publication of relevant results, and greater regulation 
and management of experimental research. Thus far, systems of control 
have focused largely on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, by regulating 
manipulation of and access to highly infectious organisms. The impetus for this 
has come largely from federal agencies.
1 Franco, C. 2009, ‘Billions for biodefense: federal agency biodefense funding, FY2009–FY2010’, Biosecurity 
and Bioterrorism, vol. 7, September, pp. 291–309.
2 Jaax, J. 2005, ‘Administrative issues related to infectious-disease research in the age of bioterrorism’, 
Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources Journal, vol. 46, pp. 8–14.
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Also, a series of recent experiments in infectious-disease research (discussed in 
other chapters in this volume) have brought the concept of ‘dual use’ to the fore. 
For decades, the term ‘dual use’ was applied to the civilian/military duality. This 
concept has continued to evolve. Today the concern is that most technologies 
developed for legitimate purposes are intrinsically capable of being exploited for 
nefarious ones. It is not difficult to appreciate this potential in contemporary life 
sciences. There have been a number of pivotal technical advances in biomedical 
research over the past two decades. For example, the introduction of polymerase 
chain reaction in 1983 permitted the measurement of gene expression with 
previously unimaginable precision; the application has continued to develop 
novel applications. Current imaging techniques allow precise mapping of 
metabolic and signalling pathways, in real time and in whole animals, including 
humans. Nanotechnology and microfluidics have created more-effective 
delivery methods of drugs, hormones, and bioregulators. Increased information 
relating to physiology, behaviour and disease paves the way to new methods 
of controlling biological responses in medicine and improving human life. Yet, 
it can be argued that each of these advances is accompanied by the potential 
for malfeasance. In relation to dual-use concerns, the Fink and Lemon/Relman 
Reports3 argued that the scientific community must increase its involvement in 
the development of policy. The creation of the National Security and Biosafety 
Board (NSABB) has been a useful exercise in focusing the attention of leaders in 
academic and commercial research on this topic.
Interest in dual use continues to grow. In 2009, the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the National Academies of Science 
(NAS) jointly published a report titled A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on 
Dual-use Research in the Life Sciences.4 The results of the study suggested that 
the majority of life-sciences researchers in the US supported the concept of 
oversight models that rely on self-governance and responsible conduct, but 
that clarification of a number of issues is required. This included matters such 
as defining the scope of research and experiments of concern, establishing 
appropriate training mechanisms, and identifying ways that scientists can 
contribute to the prevention of misuse of scientific knowledge. These same 
issues were revisited in a series of recent workshops held by the AAAS to 
examine existing programmes in dual-use education and in biodefence policy 
training.5 From these studies, it became clear that most academic institutions 
3 National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 2006, Globalization, biosecurity and the 
future of the life sciences, Washington, DC: NRC.
4 National Research Council/American Association for the Advancement of Science 2009, A Survey of 
Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research 
Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC: NRC/AAAS.
5 American Association for the Advancement of Science 2009, Building the Biodefense Policy Workforce, 
Washington, DC: AAAS; American Association for the Advancement of Science 2008, Professional and 
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provide few resources for or demonstrate little interest in dual-use education. 
Further, educational materials are lacking, as are methods and analysis of their 
efficacy. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) released 
its Strategic Plan for Outreach and Education on Dual-use Research Issues in 
2008.6 A joint letter7 to the NSABB from the AAAS, the American Association of 
Medical Colleges (AAMC), the Association of American Universities (AAU), the 
Council on Government Relations (COGR), the Federation of American Societies 
for Experimental Biology (FASEB) and the Association of Public and Land-
grant Universities (NASILGC) outlines these groups’ apprehension with the 
mechanism of review, the determination of whether specific dual-use research 
would be categorised as being ‘of concern’, and the lack of clarity concerning 
liability issues that might lead to a dampening of scientific enterprise.
Dando8 and others have called for the creation of a ‘culture of responsibility’. 
This chapter will discuss approaches to this challenge in the current US 
academic environment. The idea of instilling a culture of social responsibility 
among scientists with respect to security issues is underpinned by the question 
of disclosure mechanisms, anonymity, and whistleblower protection. These 
are not novel topics, and are included in current standard biomedical-ethics 
curricula. However, disclosure of unusual or inappropriate activity takes on 
additional significance when the behaviour might be tied to national security.
Thus, in the last decade the US has witnessed the introduction of a number 
of new concepts to the life sciences. The process of doing science has been 
permeated by security and safety regulations that in turn have stimulated 
interest in the ethical and even moral issues related to the misuse of life-sciences 
research. Studies are accumulating to evaluate whether practising scientists 
are aware of these ideas, either by exposure or on their own, and which 
educational institutions have introduced these concepts into ethical-training 
programmes. Other chapters in this volume detail these studies in different 
parts of the world. Here, we discuss the challenge of introducing biosecurity 
Graduate-Level Programs on Dual Use Research and Biosecurity for Scientists Working in the Biological Sciences, 
Washington, DC: NRC/AAAS.
6 NSABB 2007, Proposed framework for the oversight of dual-use life sciences research: Strategies for minimising 
the potential misuse of research information, Bethesda, MD: NSABB; NSABB 2008, Strategic plan for outreach 
and education on dual-use research issues, Bethesda, MD: NSABB.
7 Joint letter, 18 July 2008, to NSABB from the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS), The American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), The Association of American Universities 
(AAU), The Council of Governmental Relations (COGR), The Federation of American Societies for Experimental 
Biology (FASEB) and The National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC, 
now the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APLU)), available: www.aau.edu/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9740 [viewed 15 Mar 2010].
8 Atlas, R. and Dando, M. 2006, ‘The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: Perspectives, conundrums, and 
global solutions’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, vol. 4, September, pp. 1–11; Revill, J. and Dando, M. 2008, 
‘Life scientists and the need for a culture of responsibility: After education…what?’, Science and Public Policy, 
vol. 35, February, pp. 29–36.
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and dual-use matters within the context of existing programmatic frameworks 
in a typical US academic biomedical-research institution. Over the past 15 
years we have developed a number of avenues for introducing the concept of 
dual-use research to the university community at our institution. The first is 
through the federally mandated ‘Responsible Conduct of Research’ education of 
National Institute of Health (NIH)-sponsored trainees. The second route is via 
the Institutional Biosafety Committee, originally mandated by the NIH in the 
1970s to review experiments involving recombinant DNA and since expanded 
to include infectious agents. The third avenue is the laboratory safety training 
mandated by the Occupational Safety and Health Association (OSHA) for all 
laboratory workers. The fourth route is through a robust biodefence ‘certificate’ 
academic curriculum, open to all students at the university regardless of 
programme (PhD, MS, MD, nursing, and so on). We propose a fifth approach 
using an institutionally based ‘train-the-trainer’ system of intercalating dual-
use awareness into individual academic departments through periodic seminars 
and discussion groups. We discuss the strengths and limitations of each of these 
approaches in terms of topics, efficacy and audience.
Route One: Responsible Conduct of Research
An examination of the history of incorporation of ethical issues into the 
US curriculum will enrich this exploration of mechanisms for introducing 
biosecurity and dual use into the academic biomedical curriculum. Formalised 
ethics training was introduced just over two decades ago in the US federally 
supported scientific enterprise. The impetus was a series of fraud/misconduct 
cases at four research institutions in 1980 that were widely publicised, leading 
to widespread calls for a concerted effort to include ethics training within the 
medical school curriculum, originating from both lay and medical groups. The 
first congressional hearing uncovering additional cases took place that same 
year, in the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science 
and Technology Committee.
In 1985, Congress passed the Health Research Extension Act, which required 
that Health and Human Services (HHS) awardee institutions establish ‘an 
administrative process to review reports of scientific fraud’ and ‘report to the 
Secretary any investigation of alleged scientific fraud which appears substantial’. 
The Final Rule, Responsibilities of Awardee and Applicant Institutions for 
Dealing With and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, was published in 
the Federal Register in 1989 and codified as 42 CFR Part 50, Subpart A. The 
Office of Research Integrity (ORI) was established in its current iteration — 
that is, independent of the funding agencies — in 1992. The Commission on 
Research Integrity published a report titled Integrity and Misconduct in Research 
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in November 1995.9 It contained 33 recommendations, among which was the 
requirement of funded institutions to establish educational programmes on the 
responsible conduct of research (RCR).
The term ‘misconduct’ has evolved from its original definition of ‘fraud, 
fabrication and plagiarism’ to include ‘other serious deviations from commonly 
accepted practices’.10 In 1999, policy was developed requiring all extramural 
research institutions to provide training in RCR to all staff who have ‘direct 
and substantive involvement in proposing, performing, reviewing, or reporting 
research, or who receive research training, support by Public Health System 
(PHS) funds or who otherwise work on PHS-supported research projects even if 
the individual did not receive PHS support’. Eight topics are required in addition 
to misconduct (fraud, fabrication and plagiarism): data acquisition, sharing and 
management; conflict of interest; animal protection; human-subject protection; 
publication and authorship; mentor–trainee responsibilities; peer review; and 
collaborative science. Scientific research is conducted in a constantly changing 
environment and RCR training has undergone gradual shifts in focus. Regulatory 
changes, electronic publishing, and data sharing have compelled adjustments or 
additions to the topics. The policy was suspended in February 2001 pending 
review and, interestingly, a ruling on whether the document should have 
been issued as a ruling remains suspended. Whistleblower protection was 
also reviewed, although the final rule has been pending since January 2001. 
However, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 protects federal employees, 
individual institutions and corporations have their own protection policies 
implemented at state and institutional levels.
It would appear from this brief review of the history of RCR training and 
guidance in the NIH that this programme would be an excellent framework 
for the introduction of dual-use concepts to life scientists. Indeed, the Office 
of Intramural Research at the NIH has already explored new case studies and 
scenarios (‘Science and Social Responsibility — Dual Use Research 2009’ 11) 
for inclusion in RCR training within the NIH’s own intramural programme, 
which requires annual ethics training for all regular NIH employees — not only 
trainees.
Whether the RCR mechanism will provide adequate training of dual-use issues 
remains an important question. Recent studies of standard RCR training methods 
9 Rhoades, L. J. 2004, New Institutional Research Misconduct Activity: 1992–2001. Office of Research Integrity, 
available: ori.dhhs.gov/education/products/rcr_misconduct.shtml [viewed 15 Mar 2010].
10 American Association for the Advancement of Science and the US Office of Research Integrity 2000, The 
Role and Activities of Scientific Societies in Promoting Research Integrity. A Report of a Conference, available: 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/report.pdf.
11 NIH Committee on the Conduct of Science 2009, Science and Social Responsibility — Dual Use Research 
2009, available: www1.od.nih.gov/oir/sourcebook/ResEthicsCases/2009cases.pdf [viewed 15 Mar 2010].
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have pointed to wide variation in both approaches and efficacy. Antes et al.,12 
who concluded that effectiveness was ‘modest’, carried out a meta-analysis of 
ethics instruction in the sciences. They noted that success was tied to course 
structure (case-based illustration and discussion was more effective than lecture) 
and context (instruction separated from standard curricula rather than included 
within existing courses). Others13 argue that all trainees in our universities 
should be expected to understand basic principles of academic integrity and, 
further, to gain expertise in ethical issues in their individual fields. The study 
of Heitman et al.14 observed a disheartening lack of knowledge among trainees 
upon entering graduate school, irrespective of previous research experience, 
ethics training, or country of origin; the authors suggest RCR training might be 
modified to adjust to gaps in knowledge and experience. Finally, a troublesome 
study by Anderson et al. examined early- and mid-career NIH-funded scientists 
who had received NIH-mandated RCR training.15 Not only had many of 
the respondents little to no recollection of that teaching, but the study also 
found under some conditions a positive correlation between research-integrity 
training and behaviour that was inconsistent with that teaching. Critics of the 
entire RCR training enterprise claim that scientists as educated adults already 
have a moral framework within which the core concepts of RCR are adequately 
contained. These and many other studies suggest that our academic institutions 
should consider alternative educational methods for effective ethics training; 
and dual-use awareness should be included in the discussions.
In a December 2009 editorial titled Bringing a ‘Culture of Responsibility’ to Life 
Scientists,16 Malcolm Dando pointed out that many researchers consider RCR 
training adequate for developing a culture of responsibility. Dando further 
observed that neither the ORI nor professional societies with similar agendas, 
such as the NAS or the Royal Society, had yet incorporated dual-use issues in any 
formal way. Washington’s recent ‘National Strategy for Countering Biological 
Threats’17 contains as its second objective the ‘reinforce[ment of] norms of safe 
12 Antes, A., Wang, X., Mumford, M. D., Brown, R. P., Connelly, S. and Devenport, L. D. 2010, ‘Evaluating 
the effects that existing instruction on responsible conduct of research has on ethical decision making’, 
Academic Medicine, vol. 85, March, pp. 519–26.
13 Bulger, R. E. and Heitman, E. 2007, ‘Expanding responsible conduct of research instruction across the 
university’, Academic Medicine, vol. 82, September, pp. 876–8.
14 Heitman, E., Olsen, C. H., Anedtidou, L. and Bulger, R. E. 2007, ‘New graduate students’ baseline 
knowledge of the responsible conduct of research’, Academic Medicine, vol. 82, September, pp. 838–45.
15 Anderson, M. S., Horn, A., Risbey, K. R., Ronning, E. A., De Vries, R. and Martinson, B. C. 2007, ‘What 
do mentoring and training in the responsible conduct of research have to do with scientists’ misbehavior? 
Findings from a national survey of NIH-funded scientists’, Academic Medicine, vol. 82, September, pp. 853–
60.
16 Dando, M. 2009, ‘Bringing a “culture of responsibility” to life scientists’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
18 December, available: http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-dando/bringing-
culture-of-responsibility-to-life-scientists [viewed 15 March 2010].
17 National Security Council 2009, National strategy for countering biological threats, available: http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-releases-national-strategy-countering-biological-threats 
[viewed 15 March 2010.
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and responsible conduct’ by developing appropriate training programmes and 
materials. Dando mused whether these strategies will be implemented in time 
for the Seventh Review Conference of the BWTC in 2011.
Integration.into.Ethics.and.Responsibility.Training:.A.
Case.Study
What follows is a description of the gradual incorporation of biosecurity and 
dual-use issues into the RCR curriculum of the University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) that began in 1994 at the Newark branch 
of the Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences (GSBS). The GSBS in Newark 
presents its RCR course for PhD students at the end of their second year, just as 
they finish the didactic segment of their training and enter the laboratory full 
time. The course is team-taught and the lecturers represent various departments 
and regulatory cores of the institution. The teaching style is a mix of lecture and 
interactive case-study discussion. In 1994, a single lecture, titled ‘Biological and 
Toxin Weapons’, was introduced into this course and focused on the history of 
biological and toxin weapons use, the nature of the agents and the difficulties 
in working with them, the past offensive programmes of the US, UK, Japan 
and USSR, weapons-testing programmes, and the history and development of 
the BTWC. Discussion topics included the verification protocol that was under 
development and the responsibility of scientists to recognise and support the 
BTWC. Students were urged to think about problems in detection of production 
or weaponisation methodology and learned about the pledge, circulated by the 
US Council for Responsible Genetics in 1989, that scientists not participate 
knowingly ‘in research and teaching that will further the development of 
chemical and biological agents’. Although dual-use issues were not yet a primary 
focal point of the BTWC Review Conferences, codes and the dual-use dilemma 
were already part of the discussion in many scientific circles.
There were two subsequent changes in the focus of UMDNJ’s lecture as the 
years went by. One was in 1999 when the institution established a biodefence-
research programme, forming the UMDNJ Center for BioDefense, accompanied 
by construction of a new Biosafety Level Three laboratory for the study of 
infectious respiratory micro-organisms, including select agents. The RCR lecture 
in bioweapons expanded at this point to include the topics of biosafety and 
biosecurity, natural versus man-made outbreaks of disease, and so on. The 
Center for BioDefense had a strong Emergency Response training component that 
further expanded the scope of the lecture. The BTWC and the responsibility of 
scientists in maintaining awareness of a possible biological arms race, including 
the UN inspection teams, remained the cornerstone of the lecture. The second 
major change in structure of the RCR lecture was in Spring 2002, four months 
after the anthrax attacks. At this juncture, the lecture began to include yearly 
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updates in the anthrax mailing case, biological terrorism, and so on. In fact, a 
group of graduate students approached the Center for BioDefense asking for 
full-length courses in both basic science and policy. In response to this request, 
a certificate programme in biodefence was developed (discussed below).
UMDNJ is a large institution, with three branches of the graduate programme 
in different parts of the state of New Jersey. Inquiries directed at the Center 
for BioDefense from other segments of the GSBS suggested that students across 
the university would benefit from knowledge of such things as select-agent 
research, and biosafety and biosecurity regulations. Therefore, approximately 
75 students per year are taken through a two-hour lecture and interactive 
discussion of the history of biological weapons, arms control, codes of conduct 
and the dual-use dilemma.
Nevertheless, using the RCR to introduce biosecurity and dual use-issues has 
a number of limitations. For example, only graduate students take this course. 
How would Principal Investigators (PIs) be included in the programme? The 
NIH and a very small number of universities have included PIs in their training 
programmes, but this is rare.21 The RCR requirement for trainees was initiated 
in 1995, and assuming these first students left college soon after, they should 
now be at assistant- or associate-professor level, or the equivalent in industrial 
settings. These researchers have been surveyed regarding the effectiveness of 
RCR training, as discussed above.18
There are other groups of scientists who play significant roles in the scientific 
enterprise who are often not included in RCR training. The first comprises those 
in post-doctoral training: recently, the National Postdoctoral Association has 
introduced materials for RCR training on its website19 and the NIH now requires 
RCR training for recipients of its ‘K-series’ of awards, for which post-docs and 
junior faculty are eligible. The second group are the research technical staff: it 
is possible that these groups can be reached through laboratory safety training, 
described below.
18 Anderson et al. 2007, op. cit.; Antes et al. 2010, op. cit.
19 National Postdoctoral Association 2009, Tailoring RCR programs for postdocs, available: http://www.
nationalpostdoc.org/publications/rcr/112-pda-toolkit-tailor-to-postdocs [viewed 15 March 2010].
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Route Two: The Institutional Biosafety 
Committee
A second introductory route of biosecurity and dual use into the curriculum 
is through the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC). IBCs were established 
in the 1970s in response to alarm and concern in the scientific community 
over the potential dangers of the then novel recombinant DNA technology. 
The NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules20 
have been continually updated and are now under the charge of the Office of 
Biotechnology Activities. The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) 
members are responsible for oversight of these activities by interpreting the 
NIH Guidelines (latest version, September 2009). Appendix G is the section 
that deals with physical containment and biosafety. In June 2009, a ‘Tool for 
the Self-Assessment of the Institutional Biosafety Committee and Programme 
of Oversight of Recombinant DNA Research’21 was released, which allows 
individual IBCs to evaluate their effectiveness and compliance with federal 
regulations. The IBC reviews and approves all research involving ‘non-exempt’ 
recombinant DNA, pathogenic micro-organisms and/or potentially infectious 
materials requiring work at Biological Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) or above. Research 
protocols are prepared by principal investigators and submitted for appraisal 
before the work is begun: the major review focus is the safety of workers 
carrying out the experiments and the community, both within and outside the 
institution.
As the purview of the IBCs has expanded from recombinant DNA to include 
pathogen research, these committees have been identified as a control point 
for oversight of research with dual-use potential. The Fink Report advocated 
expanding the responsibilities of IBCs to include biosecurity and dual-use 
concerns.22 However, this suggestion has been met with criticism: in the NAS 
report Science and Security is a Post-9/11 World,23 David Relman is quoted as 
saying, ‘Today’s IBC’s can’t do biosecurity because the members have not been 
adequately informed about how you think [about] biosecurity, how you think 
about the potential misuse of science’.24 While Relman’s point is well made, the 
20 Office of Biotechnology Activities 2002, NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA 
Molecules, available: oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_guidelines_oba.html [viewed 15 March 2010].
21 Office of Biotechnology Activity 2009, Tool for the Self-Assessment of the Institutional Biosafety Committee 
and Program of Oversight of Recombinant DNA Research, available: oba.od.nih.gov/rdna_ibc/ibc.html [viewed 
15 March 2010].
22 National Research Council 2004, Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism, Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press.
23 National Research Council 2007, Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional 
Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
24 Relman, D. 2006, Remarks made at the Committee on a New Government–University Partnership for 
Science and Security Western Regional Meeting at Stanford University, 27 September, available: www7.
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past few years have seen a wealth of information and scholarly articles addressing 
these issues. Several training modules have been developed for online use and 
IBC members might be required to undergo these training modules. Much of 
this dual-use material was analysed at a series of workshops held by AAAS25 
and reviewed by the NSABB26. For example, online modules are sponsored by 
the following organisations:
• Duke University (SERCEB) at: www.sercebtraining.duhs.duke.edu/
• Federation of American Sciences at: www.fas.org/biosecurity/education/
dualuse/index.html
• NIH Office of Research Integrity at: www1.od.nih.gov/oir/sourcebook/
ResEthicsCases/2009cases.pdf
• The Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at: www.
politicsandthelifesciences.org/Biosecurity_course_folder/base.html.
Other contributors to this volume have also outlined additional resources.
Integration.into.the.Institutional.Biosafety.
Committees:.A.Case.Study
The IBC at UMDNJ in Newark has taken specific steps to begin introducing 
dual use into its agenda. Members of the IBC have all taken the online dual-
use-awareness modules developed by Duke University (SERCEB) and they 
now evaluate submitted protocols for dual-use potential in their discussions. 
The Newark IBC is currently considering appropriate language to incorporate 
questions regarding dual use into the IBC protocol application itself, thereby 
involving the PI directly. The Department of Environmental and Occupational 
Health and Safety Services has published the first of a series of articles in its 
monthly newsletter on dual-use experimentation. This newsletter is widely 
distributed across the entire campus. The goal is to introduce these ideas across 
the university community, reaching PIs, trainees and staff in all fields, regardless 
of whether they work with recombinant DNA or pathogenic organisms.
As with integrating dual-use education into the RCR component of life-sciences 
instruction, there are drawbacks to the approach of solely relying on the IBC as 
a vehicle for dual-use education. In addition to the possible lack of expertise 
and experience discussed above, not all research with potential dual-use 
application is captured by the IBC as it is currently configured. It focuses on 
experiments using recombinant DNA and/or highly infectious agents. Research 
nationalacademies.org/stl/202006.pdf [viewed 15 March 2010].
25 American Association for the Advancement of Science 2009, Building the Biodefense Policy Workforce, 
Washington, DC: AAAS.
26 NSABB 2008, op. cit.
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not involving these activities will not be captured. Most, but not all, life-
sciences research uses molecular biology and cloning, but protocols from fields 
using technologies identified as dual use in nature, such as neural imaging or 
nanotechnology — projects that do not use rDNA — will not be reviewed. Other 
regulatory committees in biomedical research are those that oversee laboratory-
animal welfare and human-subjects protection: these institutional committees 
might be engaged to evaluate proposals for dual-use potential.
These limitations argue for a broader approach, one that includes all kinds of 
research and targets executives, administrators, PIs, technical staff and trainees. 
Laboratory Safety Training is a requirement for all laboratory workers, and 
provides a third level of introduction to dual-use issues.
Route Three: Laboratory Safety Training
A third route of entry is through the Laboratory Safety Training required for all 
laboratory workers: PIs, post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, technicians 
and other staff. The OSHA has identified within its array of standards for 
general industry those with specific application to laboratories.27 Topics include 
chemical safety/‘right-to-know’,28 hazardous-waste and regulated medical-
waste handling, fire safety, personal protective equipment, and emergency 
procedures. The training at UMDNJ lasts two hours and is given at the time of 
hire, followed by a short refresher course every other year thereafter. Laboratory 
biosafety and biosecurity are topics usually covered and dual use might be 
incorporated. However, we have found the brevity of such an introduction to 
a complex issue like dual-use research is inadequate to the task of successfully 
increasing awareness. Indeed, even the current methodology used for training 
and education in the responsible conduct of research — including the concept 
of dual use — have come under increased scrutiny and criticism, as discussed 
above.
Route Four: The Biodefense Certificate 
Programme
Faculty of the Center for BioDefense developed a certificate programme in 
biodefence for its PhD, MD and MS students. The programme comprises five 
27 United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration 1970, Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, available: http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/laboratories/standards.html.




compulsory courses and one elective. Of those required are two fundamental 
biomedical science (specified by the student’s degree programme) and 
three biodefence-specific courses. The first of the latter is a weapons-survey 
course: biological and toxin agents are reviewed with respect to virulence, 
pathogenesis, route of infection/intoxication, treatment, history and potential 
use. The second focuses on the molecular biology of select agents (bacteria and 
viruses) and focuses on key papers, both classic and in current literature. The 
students read and analyse the science and policy implications of studies such 
as the three iconic papers describing (1) the mousepox IL-4 virus,29 (2) the 1981 
flu reconstruction,30 and (3) the botulinum contamination of the milk supply.31 
The third is a seminar on contemporary topics, in which students are asked to 
prepare and discuss current issues in biodefence research, policy and history, 
including ethics, the responsibility of scientists as citizens, and so on. These 
courses contain extensive sections on dual-use analysis of contemporary topics 
in biodefence research. The primary question here is whether this thorough 
examination of the issues would be impractical for all researchers, either during 
or after PhD/MS awards. In the current climate of steadily increasing regulatory 
and compliance requirements, the answer would likely be ‘yes’.
Route Five and the Challenges Ahead
In the current climate made competitive by limited funding, and in the absence 
of a federal mandate, we find concerns among many of the faculty over the 
possible introduction of dual-use awareness training, consistent with points 
made by the joint letter to the NSABB from a coalition of scientific societies 
discussed previously.32 Many researchers feel they have little time to spend 
on anything other than the overwhelming demands of staying competitive in 
contemporary research. A common complaint is that there are many regulatory 
and compliance requirements in place that encumber the effective progress of 
science; adding another layer of regulation will be met with dismay by many 
scientists. Others are troubled by what they consider insufficient guidance on 
both the definition of ‘dual use’ and the consequences of a positive identification. 
Exactly what is dual-use research, and, if one’s work is determined to be of dual-
use ‘concern’, what then? There are fears that there is not enough expertise to 
29 Jackson, R. J., Ramsay, A. J., Christensen, C. D., Beaton, S., Hull, D. F. and Ramshaw, I. A. ‘Expression 
of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant ectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and 
overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox’, Journal of Virology, vol. 75, pp. 1205–10.
30 Perrone, L. A. S. and Tumpey, T. A. 2007, ‘Reconstruction of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus: how 
revealing the molecular secrets of the virus responsible for the worst pandemic in recorded history can guide 
our response to future influenza pandemics’, Infectious Disorders Drug Targets, vol. 7, pp. 294–302.
31 Wein, L. M. and Liu, Y. 2005, ‘Analyzing a bioterror attack on the food supply: the case of botulinum 
toxin in milk’, Proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences, vol. 201, pp. 9737–8.
32 Joint letter, 18 July 2008 (see note 7).
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anticipate the possible dangers of certain experiments; some think the Australia 
group should have been able to predict that the IL-4 recombinant ectromelia 
virus would have a lethal phenotype.33
There is a logical connection between dual-use awareness and the generation 
of a ‘pledge’ or ‘code of conduct’.34 Although this is outside the scope of the 
present discussion, we have found that many scientists who think about the 
dual-use dilemma and an associated code of conduct inevitably arrive at the 
issue of whistleblowing and whistleblower protection. Might the development 
of a ‘Culture or Responsibility’ lead to a culture of accusation and suspicion? 
A related issue that arises frequently is that of liability: if an entity recognises 
an experiment or line of inquiry as being of dual-use potential, what is the 
responsibility of the funding agency or institution sponsoring the research in 
the event that the information or reagent does lead to a biocrime, a terrorist 
incident or even a catastrophic event? Indeed, these critical questions were 
raised in response to the NSABB’s 2008 Strategic Plan.35
Despite these concerns, we have detected a gradual thaw in attitudes toward 
dual use over the past decade. The RCR course discussion of dual-use 
experiments of concern has been received eagerly across the university’s several 
campuses. The IBC of UMDNJ in Newark is thinking energetically about ways 
to incorporate dual-use issues into our review. Some of our colleagues are finally 
willing to include dual-use questions embedded within larger exam questions 
in immunology and infectious-disease courses. The University’s Department of 
Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Services — an arm of the 
administrative branch — has embraced the issue and recognised the importance 
of disseminating information and resources. Our next step will be to recruit 
interested faculty in each department and begin to introduce seminars on dual 
use as regular yearly or twice-yearly events. We will focus on faculty who are 
already committed to teaching and mentoring. Our feeling is that discussions 
can be introduced at many different levels across the institution, creating a ‘web 
of instruction’. Gradually, an appreciation of the complexity of the dual-use 
dilemma will become part of the scientific idiom.
33 Muellbacher, A. and Lobigs, M. 2001, ‘Creation of killer poxvirus could have been predicted’, Journal of 
Virology, vol. 75, pp. 8353–55.
34 Atlas and Dando 2006, op. cit.
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Chapter 9: Implementing and 
Measuring the Efficacy of Biosecurity 
and Dual-use Education
.JAMES.REVILL.AND.GIULIO.MANCINI
Teaching security-related issues to science students is increasingly salient in 
the international security discourse, yet despite the calls for greater education, 
research conducted by the authors and others contributing to this volume (as 
in the chapters by Friedman and Minehata and Shinomiya) demonstrates that 
the calls for, and interest in, biosecurity education have too infrequently been 
converted to commensurate activity at the level of the practising life scientist. 
Indeed, it remains clear from previous chapters that there are currently limits 
to the extent of biosecurity education and the process of promulgation and 
implementation of education has been slow, something stymied by practical, 
ethical and philosophical considerations which need to be addressed in 
the process of moving from aspirational declarations by states and other 
organisations to concrete action (see the chapter by Johnson).
The purpose of this chapter is to posit some partial responses to the questions 
posed in the introduction, specifically questions related to the ‘Who, What and 
How’ of education. These will be based on the authors’ experiences derived 
from a joint project between the Landau Network Centro Volta (LNCV) and 
Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC) on sustainable biosecurity and 
dual-use education. This project represents one experimental applied approach 
to the implementation and promulgation of a specific element of biosecurity 
education that focuses on the ‘wider ethical/arms-control issues’ mentioned 
earlier by Rappert. In this regard, biosecurity in the context of this chapter 
relates less to the notion of laboratory biosecurity. Rather, is much more closely 
linked to concerns over the limited awareness amongst scientist both of the 
existence of measures intended to prevent and prohibit the malign exploitation 
of the life sciences, and how benignly intended research could be misapplied.
This chapter firstly provides a brief elaboration of the phases of activity 
in the LNCV-BDRC project, beginning with a gap analysis of university 
curricula in Europe and proceeding with the construction of a collaborative 
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Biosecurity Education Network. Secondly, the chapter outlines the process of 
implementation testing using tailored material that was presented primarily 
to life-science students under the supervision of network members working 
within a number of departments in European universities. Thirdly, this 
chapter provides information on some of the lessons learned over the course 
of implementation tests, before underlining the vital importance of other 
complementary intervention points which could be addressed in the process of 
moving from aspirational statement of interest to concrete activity.
Biosecurity Education Survey
The joint LNCV-BDRC project was implemented with the intent of firstly 
developing an understanding of the extent of, and attitudes to, education 
on wider ethical/arms-control and dual-use issues within life-science degree 
courses. Also underlying this objective was an aim to identify means and methods 
through which biosecurity education could be more effectively promulgated 
across the life-science community in Europe. In this sense, the LNCV–BDRC 
project was initiated with a focus on university students. Whilst recognising 
that other targets could be considered for inclusion, engaging students was 
deemed particularly important because the development of advanced biological 
weapons is likely to require some degree of sophisticated scientific capability. 
This logically points advocates of education towards a primary target group 
consisting of individuals trained in the life sciences to at least undergraduate 
level. Moreover, engagement with this sector could be particularly beneficial in 
the long term in feeding into a sustainable culture of responsibility built by the 
next generation of life scientists.
In the first phase of the LNCV–BDRC project, the aim was to produce a gap 
analysis which assessed the extent of, and attitudes to, biosecurity-related 
content in universities across Europe using a sample of 142 degree courses 
(undergraduate and master’s level) at 57 universities in 29 countries. 1 This phase 
involved an assessment of the existence and extent of biosecurity-related content 
through the development of sample and search terms and the implementation of 
an investigation into available content (including online programmes of study 
and syllabi); but also the identification of key individuals within departments 
with whom we subsequently confirmed the provisional results and elicited an 
understanding of attitudes through follow-up correspondence.
1 The Member States of the European Union but also Norway and Switzerland. The sample was selected on the 
basis of a balance between international ranking and geographical representation, see Mancini, G. and Revill, J. 
2008, ‘Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: Biosecurity Education for the Next Generation of Life Scientists’, Working 




Figure 11: Overview of results from investigation into the biosecurity 
contents of European life-science and biotechnology courses
This investigation was not intended to produce statistically significant results 
and suffered a number of problems in determining content with certainty, 
particularly vis-à-vis ‘references’ to concepts related to biosecurity. Indeed, 
what constitutes a ‘reference’ ranged from one or more dedicated lectures, to 
a reference during a lecture. Nevertheless, the process provided an illustrative 
snapshot of the situation in Europe with regards to biosecurity and related 
components. We found a total of 37 (26 per cent) life-science and biotechnology 
degree courses from our sample where there was clear evidence of a reference to 
biosecurity; 22 (15 per cent) courses mentioned biological weapons, the BTWC 
or other arms-control agreements; in 29 (20 per cent) courses there was clear 
reference to the dual-use issue and finally, in 31 (22 per cent) courses there was 
a reference to codes of conduct, practice or ethics.
In terms of generating an understanding of attitudes to biosecurity education, 
responses to questions regarding whether biosecurity was perceived as 
important largely fell into three categories, with the majority falling in the first 
two. In the first category were a number of examples where curricula clearly 
didn’t offer a specific module in their syllabi, or respondents felt the topic was 
irrelevant. Thus, for example, it was suggested ‘we do not teach anything to do 
with the BTWC. I’m not sure if teaching such material on the BTWC would be 
helpful to our students unless they went into the field’. In the second category 
were those that felt the topics were relevant but were constrained by practical 
factors. Therefore, for example, one participant noted ‘the main reason [for not 
having a specific biosecurity module] being the limited time we have to expose 
our students to science & society issues’. Finally, there were those that were 
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clearly interested in the inclusion of this material as a topic of discussion; for 
example, one participant stated, ‘I will take profit of your enquiry and integrate 
these issues in the introductory course starting with this year’.
In addition to the collection of data to determine the extent of biosecurity 
education in Europe, the process was useful in constructing the collaborative 
network through the identification of, and engagement with, individuals 
from various disciplines that were interested in advancing education on these 
subjects. This process was to some extent confirmed through two workshops 
held in Como in 2008 and 2009 titled ‘Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: An 
Educational Module for Life-science Students’ and ‘Biosecurity, Biosafety and 
Dual-use Risks. Trends, Challenges and Innovative Solutions’, respectively, 
which brought together life-science educators and security experts to discuss 
these topics. The process of conducting a gap analysis had a clear secondary 
value in building a biosecurity education network and providing a means 
through which the target audience could be reached and their attention and 
active engagement secured.
Building a Biosecurity Education Network
Indeed, the development of an informal collaborative network of professional 
actors interested in biosecurity or dual-use education has proved a useful 
model through which the process of framing and implementing education can 
be advanced taking into consideration input from a range of actors. As such, 
this remains one possible practical response to the question posed by Rappert 
on how audiences and practising scientists can be reached. Camarinha-Matos 
and Afsarmanesh have defined a collaborative network as being ‘constituted 
by a variety of entities (for example, organisations and people) that are largely 
autonomous, geographically distributed, and heterogeneous in terms of their 
operating environment, culture, social capital, and goals. Nevertheless, these 
entities collaborate to better achieve common or compatible goals.’ 2
Such a model is certainly consistent with the collaborative network established 
in the LNCV–BDRC project, which consists of a number of independent academic 
departments and research organisations covering a range of disciplines (life 
sciences, biotechnology, bioethics, law, political science, security studies and 
international relations) in various countries in Europe (including Sweden, Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal and Germany), and which have in a 
variety of ways provided input from different perspectives that cumulatively 
contributed to the advancement of the network and progress in the objectives.
2 Camarinha-Matos, L. M. and Afsarmanesh, H. 2004, ‘Collaborative networks: a new scientific discipline’, 




In this regard, the collaborative network can be seen as facilitating both the process 
of building bridges between different communities and academic disciplines 
and enhancing the quality of material and the implementation of lectures. 
Contributions to the legal aspect of biosecurity education have been made, for 
example, through engagement with the Institute for International Legal Studies 
at the National Research Council (ISGI-CNR) in Italy and the Department of 
Penal Law at the University of Granada in Spain. Cooperation with legal experts 
was particularly fruitful and led to the distillation of domestic legal references 
developed by a number of countries into accessible material more readily usable 
by science students and lecturers. More ethically and philosophically orientated 
consideration has also been advanced through engagement with the Department 
of Philosophy at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. Discussions 
with scientists and life-science lecturers within the network, such as those in 
the National Council of Biologists of Italian Universities, have been particularly 
useful for enhancing the quality and implementation of material. Firstly, they 
have provided feedback and advice on the optimisation of both teaching 
material and the delivery of lecturers to specific audiences; and, secondly, they 
have advised us on how implementation challenges can best be overcome.
Implementation Tests
Using nodes within the network developed through the survey and the 
Educational Module Resource elaborated upon by Whitby and Dando in another 
chapter in this volume, the LNCV–BDRC project has begun the process of testing 
material in several universities across Europe. This process was facilitated by 
contacts in the network who agreed to promote lectures or seminars organised 
by local professors, using agreed elements of material (summarised below in 
Table 3), as the basis for implementation tests tailored to their local contexts.
In some cases, implementation tests were conducted independently by life-
science educators who developed their own lectures from material developed 
for the EMR and translated this into the local language where necessary. This 
suggests that in some cases the implementation of this approach to biosecurity 
education may merely require directing individuals to structured and accessible 
educational materials that can be used as a solid base for lectures which 
necessarily move beyond a scientific focus into broader social, economic and 
ethical territory. In other cases, network members began a process of engagement 
with the authors in which components of lecture courses were negotiated. In yet 
other cases, LNCV–BDRC project officers conducted lectures that were agreed 




Table 3: Summary of material in the EMR































The Web of Prevention
•.Building.an.Effective.Web.of.
Prevention
In all cases there was not sufficient time to cover every component part of the 
EMR (which is intended as a comprehensive resource), nor was it necessarily 
important for undergraduate students in different scientific disciplines of 
relevance to learn all the information outlined in Table 3. However, it was 
important to ensure that the key elements were covered. In some cases this 
required a degree of discussion and content negotiation with network members 
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where implementation tests were taking place. This was particularly important 
for engagement with individuals with scientific backgrounds who were more 
interested in focusing on examples of dual-use research.
This issue is significant in relation to the question posed in the introduction as 
to how to secure audience attention and active engagement. Three key areas are 
noteworthy in this regard. Firstly, it is apparent that an extensive section on 
the history of offensive biological weapons was perceived as unwelcome and 
unnecessary. Such a response is understandable in courses focused on science. 
However, the presentation of specific case studies can provide a stimulating 
discussion, but also an overview of the history of offensive biological-weapons 
programmes, which remains important in dispelling the myths amongst some 
in the scientific community that biological weapons have either not been used 
in warfare, or have been the preserve of other, ‘bad’ scientists. Secondly, some 
commentators were reluctant to include significant discussion on either arms-
control measures or legislation on the grounds that this may be irrelevant, 
boring, or incomprehensible to science students. Whilst recognising such 
concerns, it is contended that a basic understanding of the legal and regulatory 
measures affecting scientists remains an essential component of biosecurity 
education because they can have a direct effect on their future activities.
Finally, in addition to the shortening of material to comply with the requirements 
of lecturers, it is apparent there is a need to include material which explicitly 
acknowledges the positive aspects of science, in order to both avoid the project 
being seen as in any way ‘anti-scientific’ and to avoid ‘scaring’ students away 
from science. On this basis, in more recent implementation tests we have been 
very clear that any security concerns need to be kept in perspective and the vast 
array of positive benefits of science in responding to societal challenges in the 
sphere of, inter alia, health, energy, food security and economic development 
are acknowledged at the beginning of the lectures. Indeed, for many in the 
scientific community, this is an essential component to avoid dissuading or 
deterring individuals away from the life sciences and prevent the appearance of 
being somehow anti-scientific.
Implementation Test Results
As part of the implementation test process we also attempted to evaluate the 
success of our activities. In the short term, there are a number of means of 
measuring the success of a lecture in raising awareness. These include pre- and 
post-lecture surveys (which could simply be done through raising hands), 
examination questions and seminar discussion-group demonstrations of 
understanding. In this project we opted to primarily use post-lecture surveys. 
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Using this approach it has been possible to determine the success of an 
individual lecture and, indeed, the results from implementation tests conducted 
with network members. These appear positive, with a significant percentage of 
participants indicating that they thought their knowledge of biosecurity and 
other related topics had been improved, as illustrated in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Responses to post-lecture questionnaire
It was also apparent that a significant majority of participants felt the lectures 
were both interesting and important, with 99 per cent appreciating the seminars 
and agreeing that raising awareness of biosecurity-related issues should be 
promoted among students, something evident in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Responses to post-lecture questionnaire II
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Such support for the promotion of biosecurity education is important to feed 
into a second test of success, that of sustainability. Sustainability is important in 
meeting the objective of building a culture of awareness which passes material 
on to subsequent generations and there are a number of metrics that can be 
used individually or in combination to test sustainability effectively. Examples 
include the following:
• post-lecture discussions with staff and students
• follow-up questionnaires
• requests for information on subsequent activity
• monitoring of website providing educational material related to biosecurity 
to determine the frequency and geographic location of downloaded material.
Based on these criteria, we can claim a degree of success in that network 
contacts in several cases have intimated that, given the interest raised and the 
available reference materials, they intend to both recommend and replicate 
lectures in future academic years. Accordingly, it has been possible to determine 
success in the immediate impact of generating interest and the potential future 
sustainability of lectures.
Measuring Prevention
However, in the longer term determining the success of preventing scientists 
(regardless of a terrorist or state affiliation) from contributing to the 
development of biological weapons is much more difficult. Also, although there 
may be measures that can be used to assess the long-term impact of biosecurity 
education, greater consideration is required into how to develop metrics that 
are sufficiently robust to demonstrate success or failure, yet simple enough to 
be useful to the policy community. Indeed, it is not enough to simply count the 
number of students taught. The National Academies of Science have suggested 
that experience with other Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities in the 
US indicated ‘hard “scorecard” metrics, often very quantitative in nature, are 
not always going to be adequate measures of a programme’s success’. 3 This is 
certain to be the case in relation to biosecurity and dual-use education, where 
demonstrating the effect in the long term to some extent requires proving a 
negative without confusing causations.





Based on the authors’ experience with biosecurity and dual-use education, 
a number of key practical lessons have emerged. These are not necessarily 
applicable to other regions and future activities are likely to need tailoring to 
the specific location. Nonetheless, they may prove useful in facilitating future 
activities.
One of the principle lessons learned over the course of building the network and 
conducting implementation tests is the need to carefully frame both engagement 
and presentation of material. The perception of biosecurity education as 
irrelevant or less relevant amongst many (not all) in the scientific community, 
necessitates that the rationale for including it needs to be clearly and objectively 
articulated. This applies both at university level, where it is essential to ensure 
science and scientist are not presented as part of the problem but part of the 
solution, but also to any activity related to other intervention points that could 
be conducted. Indeed, the need to frame the issue carefully is likely to be even 
more acute in relation to national academies and authors.
In practical terms, discussion with lecturers and course coordinators in the 
European context indicates there is only limited space within the degree course 
syllabi. Thus, space for extensive historical material and detailed information 
on conventions and regulations is likely to be difficult to integrate within the 
often-small window of opportunity that exists to engage life-science students. 
As one survey respondent suggested, ‘all knowledge is useful. It is a matter 
of priorities and of limited number of credits/programme [space available]’. 
Accordingly, if the objective is to reach a broader audience using the bottom-up 
approach outlined above, compromise will often be necessary.
Objectivity is also very important to students of disciplines such as biology that 
are founded on positivist logic. Thus it is often advantageous to avoid subjective 
approaches or, more significantly, ‘preaching’ to life-science students. This is 
particularly acute in relation to more ethically orientated issues such as the 
morality of using disease in warfare and our experience concurs with the 
sentiments of Rappert expressed in Chapter 1 that ‘resistance can be intense 
when some try to tell others what they should think’. Finally, there is no one-
size-fits-all approach to achieving biosecurity education through a bottom-up 
approach. A degree of flexibility in the presentation of materials and content 
is also likely to be important in the future and the model used in the European 
context is unlikely to be directly applicable to other contexts.
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Addressing Other Intervention Points
Although much of the current attention to education is focused on university-
level education, this is not the only possible implementation point through 
which biosecurity education can be progressed and it would be remiss not 
to address the range of others. In their chapter, Whitby and Dando discuss 
the role of funders of scientific research in encouraging consideration of the 
so called dual-use issue. If education is considered an important element of 
what has been termed the ‘web of prevention’, 4there are a number of further 
intervention points that can and should be addressed which would be mutually 
reinforcing, examples of which are evident in Figure 14. Indeed, based on a case 
study produced by Revill, it suggests that if calls for biosecurity education are 
converted into effective action there are a number of additional intervention 
points which are particularly important to engage. These include academies 
of science, authors of scientific textbooks, the biotechnology industry, and 
possibly schools. 5 Each one of these points is addressed in turn in the following 
sections.
Figure 14: The role of education, and sub activities related to education, 
within the web of prevention
4 Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds), A Web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the future 
governance of research, London: Earthscan: 51–65, available: http://people.exeter.ac.uk/br201/Research/
Publications/Chapter%203.pdf [viewed 1 November 2009].
5 Revill, J. 2009, ‘Biosecurity and bioethics education: A case study of the UK context’, Research Report for the 





Academies of science and ‘champions’ 6 within the scientific community certainly 
represent key means of promulgating biosecurity education internally within 
the community of life scientists, a process that is likely to be considerably more 
influential than attempts by individuals exogenous to this community. Already 
there are examples of how individual champions can generate awareness around 
certain issues, as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated of Joseph 
Rotblat, ‘Mr Rotblat went from working on the nuclear bomb to founding the 
Pugwash conference, and continued for the rest of his days to champion the 
principle of scientists taking responsibility for their inventions’. 7 However, in 
the current climate it seems the life sciences lack such champions and although 
some national academies of science have demonstrated interest in the area there 
is insufficient attention placed on this issue to trigger significant activity.
Scientific.Literature.and.Authors
It is also apparent, certainly in the UK, that much (not all) of life-science 
literature tends to omit discussions on biosecurity. This is understandable 
given the relatively new nature of these terms in the framework of international 
security discussions, and the perceived irrelevance of the topic to science and 
scientist. Similarly, although there is often material on biological weapons, this 
is within the context of agent characteristics and from a scientific perspective 
that is devoid of material on the illegality of the use of biology as a weapon. This 
is also logical given the target audience and the intended purpose of life-science 
textbooks. Nonetheless, a modest extension could serve to engender further 
debate on prohibitions and regulations that could raise awareness. There are 
grounds for optimism in this regard and discussion with textbook authors 
revealed that some might be willing to include a reference to these issues in 
future volumes. Certainly, Professor Robert Bauman, author of Microbiology 
with Disease Taxonomy has stated in discussion with Revill that he plans on 
‘expanding the content of the section on biological weapons to indicate the 
illegality of these weapons’, believing it ‘wise to enhance greater understanding 
of this important issue’.
6 Certainly the idea of ‘champions’ was voiced at the National Academies of Science [US] meeting on 
‘Education on Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences’, held on 16–18 November 2009, Warsaw, Poland.
7 Annan, K. 2005, ‘Annan regrets death of Nobel Peace Laureate and disarmament advocate Joseph Rotblat’, 





The role of industry in education could also prove a valuable intervention point 
for biosecurity education. Like academies of science, the biotechnology industry 
is likely to have greater sway upon science students than are social scientists or 
policymakers who, in some cases, are already perceived as overly burdening and 
constraining scientific research. Moreover, such a process could present benefits 
and opportunities for corporations to demonstrate a commitment to social and 
ethical responsibility.
Conclusions: One Approach to the 
Implementation of Education
In his introduction to this volume, Rappert posited a number of questions that 
need to be considered in the process of moving biosecurity education from an 
aspiration to a concrete activity. One such question was: How can audiences of 
practising scientists or other practitioners be reached and how can their attention 
and active engagement be secured? Although it would be inappropriate to claim 
ownership of any definitive response, it is apparent that the process undertaken 
through the LNCV–BDRC study provides a useful overview of the extent of 
education, but also an understanding of the attitudes of life-science educators 
and a collection of contacts necessary to construct a collaborative network. This 
can have practical value as a vehicle to conduct implementation tests and convey 
ownership of the process of biosecurity education to life scientists. Although 
the efficacy of this approach in the context of other cultures remains contestable 
and further research and adaptation may be required to tailor education to the 
local context, in Europe and other Western academic environments this network 
process is one constructive bottom-up model through which an audience can be 
reached and their attention and active engagement secured. Indeed, the network 
has proved useful in conducting implementation tests in academic departments 
around Europe and learning to tailor the material and delivery of the EMR.
It has further demonstrated there is no one-size-fits-all approach to education 
even within the framework of European universities; and although a core 
module resource is a useful basis for implementation, the context needs to be 
taken into account. Indeed, based on lessons learned over the course of this 
project, it is essential to recognise the various priorities of different communities 
of practice and ensure that material is delivered objectively in a manner that 
avoids preaching and balances the potentially harmful effects of life-science 
research with the vast array of positive benefits generated by scientific research. 
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This is likely to be a greater challenge in cases where the model was applied 
more broadly within other contexts, particularly those where scientific research 
assumes a much higher priority than security of scientific research.
Finally, the implementation of biosecurity at university level is only one element 
of a number of measures that could be taken to build a ‘culture of responsibility’. 
Other intervention points, such as academies of science and ‘champions’, the 
biotechnology industry, and scientific authors, all have a significant role to 
play advancing biosecurity education. As many of the questions relating to the 
‘who, what and how of education’ will ultimately be answered by the scientific 
community, significant input and engagement with these other intervention 
points will be essential in the long term.
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The 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) added to the ban 
on the use of biological weapons embodied in the 1925 Geneva Protocol by what 
was termed the ‘General Purpose Criterion’ of Article 1. This stated that: 1
Each  State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes...
Thus, peaceful uses of the modern life sciences are fully protected, but there 
is an all-encompassing prohibition of non-peaceful development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents or 
toxins (and toxins here are understood to cover all mid-spectrum agents such as 
bioregulators).
As early as the Second Five-Yearly Review Conference of the BTWC in 1986, 
the ‘States Parties’ 2 recognised the importance of the awareness and education 
of life scientists in regard to the Convention. In the Final Declaration of 
1 For the text of the Convention, see: www.opbw.org.
2 The term ‘States Parties’ refers to the membership of the Convention. The Biological Weapons Convention 




the Conference, States Parties 3 noted, in relation to Article IV on national 
implementation measures, that: 4 ‘The Conference notes the importance of 
...inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.’
Similar statements were subsequently agreed at following Review Conferences. 
However, during the 1990s, when concerns about Biological Warfare (BW) 
returned, the attention of diplomats was centred on the problem of how confidence 
in compliance with the Convention might be improved and there was very little 
involvement of the civil life-science community. 5 After the failure of these 
efforts, when states decided to discuss and promote common understandings 
on more tractable issues, Australia reported in a 2005 Intercessional Meeting on 
Codes of Conduct that: 6
1. Amongst the Australian scientific community, there is a low level of 
awareness of the risk of the misuse of the biological sciences to assist 
in the development of biological or chemical weapons. Many scientists 
working in ‘dual-use’ areas simply do not consider the possibility that 
their work could inadvertently assist in a biological or chemical weapons 
programme...
At the same meeting we reported work carried out with the editor of this 
volume, Brian Rappert, in which we had interactive seminar discussions with 
life scientists at 15 UK universities. Analysis of the tape recordings of these 
seminars led us to conclude that: ‘There is little evidence from our seminars that 
participants: a. regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as a substantial threat; b. 
considered that developments in life-sciences research contributed to biothreats; 
c. were aware of the current debates and concerns about dual-use research; or d. 
were familiar with the BTWC.’ 7
In the next year we reported to the Sixth Review Conference on further 
seminars in several other countries. In regard to the UK seminars we concluded 
that: ‘The results from the remainder of the seminars were consistent with all 
3 States Parties refers to States that have both signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. (BTWC). The BTWC currently has 163 States Parties and 13 signatories. There are 19 states which 
have neither signed nor ratified the Convention.
4 Again, for the text of the Final Declaration, see: www.opbw.org.
5 Dando, M. R. 1994, Biological warfare in the 21st century: Biotechnology and the proliferation of biological 
weapons, London: Brasseys; Dando, M. R. 2002, Preventing biological warfare: The failure of American 
leadership, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
6 Australia 2005, Raising Awareness: Approaches and Opportunities for Outreach, BWC/MSP/2005? MX/
WP.29, available: www.opbw.org.
7 Dando, M. R. and Rappert, B. 2005, Codes of Conduct for the Life Sciences: Some Insights from UK Academia, 
Briefing Paper no. 16 (2nd series), University of Bradford, May, available: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc.
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of these points [enumerated above]. A particular surprise was that so few of the 
participants (less that 10 per cent in most groups) had heard of the mousepox 
experiment that has figured largely in security literature.’ 8
There were, of course, some differences in the interactions that we reported 
in the seminars in the Netherlands, Finland, the US and South Africa but we 
stated that ‘[D]espite such differences between the seminars held in the different 
countries, the degree of similarity between the responses in the seminars was 
much more pronounced’. Our subsequent experience of carrying out seminars 
in 16 different countries with a few thousand life scientists in over 110 different 
departments has consolidated these findings. 9 Indeed, we used the seminars 
more as an awareness-raising mechanism rather than as a means of investigative 
research into the attitudes of life scientists.
The Education Gap
These findings demand some serious explanation. Many physicists are clearly 
aware of the dangers of the misuse of their science and have played important 
roles, for example, in the Pugwash movement. In the 1980s and 1990s, chemists 
were also influential in helping to bring negotiations of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) to a successful conclusion, and the International Union of 
Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) has contributed major reviews of relevant 
science and technology to the first two Review Conferences of the CWC. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to ask why practising life scientists are so 
unaware of the BTWC and the problem of dual use despite increasing attention 
being given to these issues, for example, by national science academies.
One possible explanation is that life scientists are uninformed of biosecurity 
issues because they do not feature in their university education. In order to 
investigate this possibility, in cooperation with the Italian Landau Network 
Centro-Volta, we carried out an internet survey of a sample of courses in the 
EU. As detailed further in the chapter by Mancini and Revill, the results were 
quite startling: ‘This research suggested that only three out of 57 Universities 
identified currently offered some form of specific biosecurity module and in all 
cases this was optional for students.’ 10 On the other hand, the survey noted:
8 Rappert, B., Chevrier, M. I. and Dando, M. R. 2006, In-depth Implementation of the BTWC: Education and 
Outreach, Review Conference Paper no. 18, University of Bradford, available: www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc.
9 Rappert, B. 2007, Biotechnology, security and the search for limits: an inquiry into research and methods, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave; Rappert, B. 2009, Experimental secrets: International security, codes, and the future of 
research, University Press of America.
10 Mancini, G. and Revill, J. 2008, Fostering the biosecurity norm: Biosecurity education for the next generation 




There is evidence of a considerable number of bioethics modules 
and nearly half of the degree programmes surveyed evidenced some 
form of bioethically-focused module. In terms of biosafety modules...
roughly one-fifth of life-science degrees in the sample contain a specific 
dedicated biosafety module although several of these specific modules 
were optional.
So we found a reasonable number of biosafety modules, a large, and we suspect, 
increasing number of bioethics modules, and virtually no biosecurity modules.
We attempted to investigate in more detail by looking for any kind of reference 
to biosecurity issues in the course material. Again the picture was bleak:
Exactly what constitutes a reference varies; however, based on the 
quantitative data from the investigation, we found a total of 37 life-
science degree courses out of our sample of 142 where there was clear 
evidence of a reference to biosecurity. Only a minority of the degree 
courses in the study — a total of 22 out of 142 — made a reference to 
the BTWC, BW and/or arms control, and a similar number, 29 degree 
courses, exhibited some reference to the dual-use issue.
When we carried out a similar survey in Japan, and as can be seen from the 
analysis presented by Minehata and Shinomiya, we found a similar picture. Of 
197 life-science degree courses in 62 universities we found only three specific 
biosecurity modules. 11
In Japan we took the investigation a stage further by sending out a questionnaire 
to lecturers asking why biosecurity and dual use was not being taught. Clearly 
some lecturers did not see these subjects as relevant to their courses, but others 
certainly did. Where people thought the topics relevant but did not teach them, 
the reasons cited were a lack of expertise and access to necessary resources, and 
a lack of space on a very crowded timetable in the modern life sciences.
Correcting the Deficiency
Correcting this deficiency in education- and awareness-levels of life scientists 
will be a massive task that will require action by a range of constituencies 
involved in life-science education including, inter alia, governments, bodies 
11 Minehata, M. and Shinomiya, N. 2009, Dual-use education in life science degree courses at universities in 




responsible for the administration of standards in higher education, funders of 
life-science education, civil society groups and non-governmental organisations 
involved in the production of educational material, and teachers and trainers. 12
As is evidenced by the convergence of ethics and medicine in the area of 
biomedical ethics, 13 the consideration of moral dilemmas is not new in life-
science research. However, current concern about dual use 14— where 
science findings can be used for malign as well as benign purposes — arises 
from a new range of security threats. These include the changing nature of 
warfare, the possibility of new forms of mass-casualty terrorism, a discernable 
commitment by States Parties to the BTWC to address these threats through 
seeking to improve awareness and education amongst life scientists, reviews 
of scientific oversight regarding dual-use research performed by national 
scientific academies 15 (particularly in the US), and a genomic and biotechnology 
revolution in life science with the rapid and worldwide spread of advanced 
science and technology. Thus concerns about dual use are being discussed in 
the context of a distinctly new phenomenon — namely, a convergence between 
security concerns and the practice of life scientists in what might be termed a 
novel biosecurity problem.
The term ‘biosecurity’ has been used in different ways in different contexts. 
We should, therefore, be very clear about usage of the term here. In our view 
the threat spectrum ranges from natural disease through to inadvertently 
caused disease. We deal with natural disease by public-health measures and 
inadvertently caused disease is restricted by ‘biosafety’ — good laboratory 
practice. The concept of laboratory biosecurity has also arisen to ensure that 
dangerous materials are kept secure from those with malign intent. We see 
laboratory biosecurity as part of biosecurity, but for us the term has a much wider 
meaning related to the concept of a web of preventative policies centred on the 
prohibition of the misuse of the life sciences embodied in the General Purpose 
Criterion of the BTWC. Thus biosecurity is the objective of the whole range of 
policies, such as export controls, biodefence and national implementation of the 
Convention, that minimise the possibility that the life sciences will be misused 
for hostile purposes. Within that range of policies there is, in our opinion, a role 
for practising life scientists in being aware that the materials, technologies and 
knowledge they produce may be misused and for contributing their expertise 
to the development and maintenance of preventative policies.
12 Dando, M. R. 2009, Dual-use Education for Life Scientists, Disarmament Forum, vol. 1, pp. 41–4.
13 Jonsen, A. R. 1998, The birth of bioethics, 1st edition, USA: Oxford University Press.
14 Atlas, R. and Dando, M. 2006, ‘The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: Perspectives, conundrums, and 
global solutions’, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 4, pp. 276–86.
15 The US National Academy of Sciences’ (Fink Committee) classification of seven classes of experiment 
sought to illustrate the types of endeavour that would require careful review by informed experts.
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In order to begin building capacity in biosecurity education, a new range of 
creative and innovative interventions are required. As set out in the following 
argument, it is seen that biosecurity education can be easily accommodated by 
current standards in higher education in the UK. In the US, recommendations 
for the adoption by federally funded institutions of biosecurity education have 
already been set out.
Scope for Biosecurity Education in the UK and 
US
Whilst ethical consideration of the implications of dual-use science and 
technology is conspicuously absent from the vast majority of curricula in 
UK higher education, in the US, and indeed worldwide, it is apparent that a 
codified response through the development of new guidelines and policies that 
reflect biosecurity concerns will not necessarily be required within UK higher 
education. In order to satisfy its statutory obligation to ensure that publicly 
funded teaching provision is of a high standard, the UK’s Higher Education 
Funding Council (HEFCE) 16 contracts the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) 17 
to ‘devise and implement quality- assurance methods’ and is responsible for 
the conduct of audit and review of teaching quality in both higher and further 
education. Although not a national curriculum that sets standards in UK higher 
and further education, the Subject Benchmark Statements produced by the 
Quality Assurance Agency 18 require the inclusion of an ethical dimension in all 
undergraduate bioscience programmes. These are largely aspirational; however, 
they ‘set out expectations about standards of degrees in a range of subject areas. 
They describe what gives a discipline its coherence and identity, and define 
what can be expected of a graduate in terms of the abilities and skills needed to 
develop understanding or competence in the subject.’ 19
The 2002 QAA bioscience benchmark statements made a number of references 
to ‘ethical’ aspects of this subject-area, including the following requirements:
Students should expect to be confronted by some of the scientific, 
moral and ethical questions raised by their study discipline, to consider 
viewpoints other than their own, and to engage in critical assessment 
and intellectual argument. 20
16 http://www.hefce.ac.uk/Learning/qual/qaa.asp.
17 http://www.qaa.ac.uk/academicinfrastructure/benchmark/default.asp.







Recognising the moral and ethical issues of investigations and 
appreciating the need for ethical standards and professional codes of 
conduct. 21
All students should: Have some understanding of ethical issues and the 
impact on society of advances in the biosciences. 22
Good students should: Be able to construct reasoned arguments to 
support their position on the ethical and social impact of advances in 
the biosciences. 23
Honours Degree Subject Benchmark Statements were re-stated by QAA again in 
2007, where the Subject Benchmark Statement for Biosciences again reiterated 
the importance of the inclusion of an ethical dimension in undergraduate 
programmes. Whilst ethics teaching forms an important component in many 
bioscience courses and courses address a range of ethically related issues, ethics 
in bioscience or bioethics education could easily be extended to accommodate 
and incorporate the ethical concerns of biosecurity education. Institutional 
audits of teaching-quality assessment by the QAA strengthen incentives to 
extend teaching in ethics into the area of biosecurity.
Further to this, a report 24 published in December 2008 by the US National 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) sets out a Strategic Plan for Outreach 
and Education on Dual-Use Research Issues. As specified in a related contribution 
to this book, this strategy envisages the implementation of a series of 
recommendations on ‘the development of programmes for outreach, education, 
and training on dual-use research issues for all scientists and laboratory workers 
at federally funded institutions in the US’.
Funders of Science
Increasingly, recipients of research funding must be willing to comply 
with requirements set out by funders of science that are intended to ensure 
bioscience-research activities are in full compliance with guidance on ethics. 





24 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 2008, Strategic plan for outreach and education on dual 
use research issues, December, Washington, DC.
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As outlined in its position statement 25 on Research Ethics, the UK Biotechnology 
and Bioscience Research Council (BBSRC) states that it has:
a responsibility to ensure that its funds are used ethically and 
responsibly. Potential applicants should consider whether their work is 
likely to give rise to societal concerns about the purpose of the research, 
or includes any social or ethical issues regarding its conduct or potential 
outcomes (for example, relevance to development of biological weapons; 
products and processes that might be used in social discrimination), or 
other aspects of potential public concern.
As stated in its Terms and Conditions 26 for Research Council Grants, according 
to the Research Councils UK (RCUK), recipients of its funding are responsible 
for ensuring that:
…ethical issues relating to the research project are identified and 
brought to the attention of the relevant approval or regulatory body. 
Approval to undertake the research must be granted before any work 
requiring approval begins. Ethical issues should be interpreted broadly 
and may encompass, among other things, relevant codes of practice, the 
involvement of human participants, tissue or data in research, the use of 
animals, research that may result in damage to the environment and the 
use of sensitive economic, social or personal data.
The UK Medical Research Council (MRC) 27 sets out detailed guidance on ethics 
that addresses a broad range of areas including ‘clinical research governance’, 
‘global bioethics’ and ‘good research practice’. Additionally, the MRC Position 
Statement on Bioterrorism and Biomedical Research recognises the ‘dual-use 
nature of life science and the importance in funding research of due consideration 
of ethical dilemmas presented by research’.
Adopting a similar approach, the Wellcome Trust specifies the importance of 
appropriate processes existing at institutional, national and international levels 
for the review and oversight of dual-use research. In its Position Statement 
on Bioterrorism and Biomedical Research, the Wellcome Trust 28 cites the US 
National Academy of Sciences’ (Fink Committee) classification of seven classes 
of experiment to illustrate the types of endeavour that would require careful 
review by informed experts. The experiments this committee specified are those 
that would:







• confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents
• enhance the virulence of a pathogen, or render a non-pathogen virulent
• increase transmissibility of a pathogen
• alter the host range of a pathogen
• enable the evasion of diagnostic and detection modalities
• enable the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin.
Improved grant-application procedures, more stringent reporting requirements 
and management, and oversight of the grants by funders will help ensure that 
grantees live up to stipulated ethical obligations and efficient and effective 
implementation of such requirements will facilitate the development of best 
practice in the financing of life-science research. Given the low levels of 
awareness amongst life scientists of biosecurity issues it is not surprising that 
progress has been slow in the implementation of measures such as effective 
training programmes to address the issue. However, it can be expected that 
these measures will be implemented in coming years: the question is, how 
quickly and how well?
Civil Society Groups and Non-Governmental 
Organisations
In the meantime, there does seem a potential role for civil society in providing 
models of what might be done to close the gap most effectively in the shortest 
timeframe. This is what we have been attempting to do over the last few years 
in developing a Dual-use Biosecurity Education Module Resource (EMR). The 
NSABB report ‘Strategic Plan for Outreach and Education on Dual Use Research 
Issues’ 29 mentioned previously considers what needs to be done in some detail. 
In its view, developing a strategic plan requires: ‘First and foremost, the target 
audience must be identified and assessed as to their level of understanding 
of the issues since this will guide educational strategies…[Then]...messages 
should be tailored to specific target-audiences. Key points must be identified 
and specifically crafted.’ And because there are so many different possible 
methods of communication, ‘it is important to select those methods that will 
most effectively reach the intended audiences’.
Therefore, when we applied a similar method of analysis to our work, it was clear 
that our intended target audience — university-level lecturers and students 
— did not have a high level of awareness of biosecurity and dual-use issues. 
Furthermore, given the prevalence of the use of the internet in universities it 
29 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 2008, op. cit.
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was clear that providing information on the web was by far the most efficient 
and effective way forward. However, given the pressure on the timetable we 
thought it unwise to design a one-size-fits-all educational module and decided 
to design an EMR that could be used by different lecturers to fit relevant parts 
into their own courses.
Our thinking was also much influenced by the developing consensus about 
education of life scientists that developed at the 2008 BTWC Intercessional 
Meetings. The final report of these meetings states: 30
26. States Parties recognised the importance of ensuring that those 
working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under 
the Convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines, have a 
clear understanding of the content, purpose and foreseeable...security 
consequences of their activities, and are encouraged to take an active 
role in addressing the threats posed by potential misuse of biological 
agents and toxins as weapons, including bioterrorism.
This paragraph of the report then continues, significantly: ‘States Parties 
noted that formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses, including 
possible mandatory components, in relevant scientific and engineering training 
programmes and continuing professional education could assist in raising 
awareness and in implementing the Convention.’
In the paragraph that followed, States Parties set out what they agreed would be 
of value in such programmes:
(i) Explaining the risks associated with the potential misuse of the 
biological sciences and biotechnology
(ii) Covering the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on those using 
the biological sciences
(iii) Providing guidance on the types of activities which could be 
contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national laws and 
regulations and international law
(iv) Being supported by accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer 
programmes, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual 
materials
30 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Protection and 
stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction (2008) Report of the 
meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2008/5, United Nations, Geneva, 10 December.
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(v) Addressing leading scientists and those with responsibility for 
oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications at a 
senior level, as well as future generations of scientists, with the aim of 
building a culture of responsibility
(vi) Being integrated into existing efforts at the international, regional 
and national levels.
Our idea for the EMR was to capture as many of these ideas as possible based 
on the concept of having a web of integrated preventative policies that together 
would persuade everyone thinking of breaking the prohibition that the costs 
would far outweigh the benefits. 31 However, in work with colleagues at Japan’s 
National Defence Medical College on designing and testing the EMR (under 
British Council Funding) it became clear that we needed to start the lecture 
series with material that could be readily grasped by life scientists.
Thus the EMR consists of 21 lectures, each with 20 PowerPoint slides and notes 
for the lecturer, and direct links to the references used via the web. Each lecture 
also has some suggested essay questions and the EMR has an introduction to all 
the material for lecturers and a small number of Briefing Papers cover material 
that would be less familiar to life scientists. Several lectures are also duplicated, 
with material in the second set being more scientifically orientated.
Therefore, our EMR is designed in five parts as follows:
Outline of the EMR
A. Introduction and Overview
Lecture 1
B. The Threat of Biological Warfare and Biological Terrorism and the 
International Prohibition Regime
Lectures 2–10
C. The Dual-Use Dilemma and the Responsibilities of Scientists
Lectures 11–18
D. National Implementation of the BTWC
Lectures 19–20
E. Building an Effective Web of Prevention
31 Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. 2007, A Web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the governance 




Thus the first lecture gives a brief overview of the whole of the module resource 
in order to orientate the user.
The second section takes up the story of the misuse of modern biology after the 
discovery of the causes of infectious diseases in the late nineteenth century by 
scientists such as Pasteur and Koch. This history is largely unknown amongst 
life scientists and forms a basis for consideration of the possible misuse of 
future advances. In this section we have also introduced modern accounts of 
the traditional agents such as anthrax, smallpox and botulinum toxins to better 
engage scientists’ interest.
The lectures in Section B are set out as follows:
Section B of the EMR
2. BW from Antiquity to World War I
3. BW from WWI to WWII
4. BW during the Cold War
5. The impact of BW Agents
6. Assimilation of BW in State Programmes
7. International Legal Agreements
8. Strengthening the BTWC 1980–2008
9. The 2003–2005 Intercessional Process
10. The 2007–2010 Intercessional Process
Section B ends by briefly reviewing how the international community has 
attempted to deal with the threat of the proliferation of biological weapons 
through the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1975 BTWC and the 1997 CWC (given 
that there is an overlap between the BTWC and CWC in the area of mid-spectrum 
agents such as toxins and bioregulators).
It can be seen that these lectures begin with a consideration of the history of 
biological warfare and end with the BTWC recent annual meetings in which 
scientists have become increasingly involved — at least at the level of national 
academies and industrial leaders. This then sets the basis for the third section 
of our module.
The lectures in Section C are set out as follows:
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Section C of the EMR
11. Bioethics methodology
12. Obligations derived from the BTWC
13. The growth of dual-use bioethics
14. Dual-use: The Fink Report
15. Dual-Use: Examples
16. The Lemon-Relman Report
17. Weapons targeted at the nervous system
18. Regulation of life sciences
Although present evidence strongly suggests there is little biosecurity or dual-
use content in university life-science modules dealing with bioethics, it is our 
belief this is probably the best place to focus on these issues. Life scientists are 
becoming familiar with the ethical problems that new research brings up, and 
the teaching of bioethics is growing in universities. Our view is that biosecurity 
and dual-use issues are best presented to life scientists in the context of the moral 
and ethical implications of research (see item (ii) in the 2008 report of the BTWC 
meeting on education above). 32 Therefore, this section of the module starts 
with a review of standard bioethical analyses that students are likely to have 
encountered before, introducing the growing literature on dual-use bioethics. 
The section then leads to a consideration of the key US National Academics 
Reports (Fink and Lemon-Relman) that began the closer examination of the 
dual-use problem from within the scientific community. Some lectures examine 
classic dual-use experiments such as the mousepox experiment in lecture 15 and 
the contention by Lemon-Relman that the dual-use problem is far wider than 
just research in microbiology, as illustrated in lecture 17 regarding concerns 
over the misuse of advances in neuroscience. The section ends with a lecture 
that reviews the various papers that have recently discussed regulation of the 
security implications of the life sciences.
The final two sections of the EMR continue this theme of national and 
international regulation and are set out as follows:
Section D of the EMR
19. International regulation of biotechnology
32 Revill, J. 2009, Biosecurity and bioethics education: A case study of the UK context, Wellcome trust Dual-Use 
Bioethics Group, University of Bradford, available: www.dual-usebioetics.net.
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20. National implementing legislation
Section E of the EMR
21. The web of prevention
Looking back at the list of specific suggestions agreed by State Parties to the 
BTWC in 2008, we would argue that we have covered most. Lectures cover the 
risks of misuse, the moral and ethical obligations of life scientists, give guidance 
on the types of activities which could be contrary to the aims of the Convention, 
and provide accessible teaching materials. Therefore, what else needs to be 
done?
Increasing Efficiency through Networks
One way to build on the work described here is to carry out more surveys 
of education provision in the university sector in different countries. These 
surveys, particularly if carefully followed up by questionnaire, telephone and 
email, inevitably provide a list of life-science lecturers who are interested in 
bringing issues of biosecurity and the dual-use dilemma into their courses. By 
assisting the development of country and regional networks on the basis of 
these contacts it should be possible to generate a much faster development and 
uptake of material suitable for different countries and regions. Such an approach 
would also fit with the States Parties agreement on the value of education efforts 
being integrated into existing international, regional and national activities.
As shown in a recent report from the US National Academies on ‘Ethics Education 
and Scientific and Engineering Research: What’s Been Learned? What Should 
Be Done?’ dual-use bioethics developments will fit within a broader effort to 
develop ethics education.33
What is also clear is that these wider developments, whilst showing some 
advances in understanding how to proceed best in engaging students, have 
not yet found an adequate means of evaluating the impact of teaching on later 
ethical behaviour. The report points out that:
Attempts to evaluate and improve ethics education for scientific and 
engineering research and practice are just beginning. However, they 
do show that even though immediate results of some programmes are 
33 National Academies 2009, Ethics Education and Scientific and Engineering Research: What’s Been Learned? 
What Should Be Done? Summary of a workshop, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
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positive, circumstances and pressures can overwhelm graduate students, 
postdoctoral fellows, and junior-faculty and researchers and undermine 
results.
In the longer term, attention to evaluation of the impact of dual-use bioethics 
education will be central to supporting the prohibition embodied in the BTWC.
More immediately, a further chance of improving efficiency will arise at the 
2011 Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC because just after the specific 
suggestions on education (and codes of conduct) discussed above, paragraph 
31 suggested that: ‘State Parties are encouraged to inform the Seventh Review 
Conference of, inter alia, any actions, measures or other steps they may have 
taken on the basis of the discussions…in order to facilitate…decisions on 
further action.’
Therefore, if networks of life scientists concerned with implementing dual-
use bioethics education can be established in different countries and regions, 
and if they carefully evaluate their efforts, the results could be applied rapidly 
elsewhere to help quickly close the education gap.
What Should Be Done Now?
Even if all of what has been discussed in this chapter were achieved it would still 
leave a great deal needing to be done. One specific point in the 2008 agreement 
amongst States Parties to the BTWC seems particularly important to us: train-
the-trainer programmes, being an important capacity-building initiative in 
developing a worldwide culture of responsibility amongst life scientists. In 
regard to this objective, we believe rapid progress can be made through the use 
of modern technology.
Train-the-Trainer
In order to facilitate efficient and effective engagement across a range of life-
science constituencies worldwide we developed an expert-level online distance-
learning train-the-trainer programme in dual-use bioethics (biosecurity) 
education. The original iteration of this module consisted of two key elements: 
1. the EMR described above, together with 20 expert-level scenarios that 
introduce users to examples of the complex bioethical dilemmas that have 
confronted life-science research; and 2. a range of innovative electronic online 
distance-learning technologies that facilitate outreach on a worldwide basis.
The aim of the module was to introduce educators to the concepts in bioethics 
and biosecurity education by developing awareness and understanding of a 
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range of dual-use ethical issues arising from the impact of science and technology 
on society. The module provided the opportunity to develop knowledge 
of approaches that give a defence for ethical decisions or recommendations 
regarding dual-use technologies. Educators were guided through the lecture 
series by a trainer. Participants were introduced to scenarios where the results 
of well-intentioned scientific research can be used for both good and harmful 
purposes which have given, or may in future give, rise to what is now widely 
known as the ‘dual-use dilemma’, providing the opportunity to analyse in depth 
the ethical dilemmas these scenarios raise. Central to this is the importance and 
role of ethics in informing the debate. The programme was intended to have an 
applied, practical dimension in that its aim was to enable and facilitate more 
bioethical research into dual-use issues, and help develop policies and practices 
that might prevent the misuse of knowledge generated through biomedical 
research.
The methodological approach relating to the delivery and implementation of 
this module was developed with UK academic standards in mind, so that the 
module would furnish participants with knowledge and understanding to 
review and appraise ethical theories and methods relevant to dual-use bioethics 
and recognise and discuss ways in which the application of ethics methodologies 
resolves or leaves unresolved questions relating to dual-use issues. In relation 
to subject-specific skills, the module would facilitate educators’ organisation 
and synthesis of ideas and questions relevant to assessing ethical dilemmas in 
specific dual-use issues affecting humans, animals and plants generally, and 
across a select range of life-science sub-disciplines of relevance including human 
biology, zoonotic diseases, phytopthology, biotechnology, DNA synthesis, 
drug control, genomics, genetic engineering and genetic modification, 
immunology, nanotechnology, neuroscience, scientific freedom, synthetic 
biology, whistleblowing, and processes relating to ethical review. As to personal 
transferable skills, educators would be able to evaluate and integrate data from 
a variety of sources and express ideas clearly, both verbally and in writing; and 
communicate effectively in an online environment using a range of media.
Technologies
The module was designed to facilitate participation in lectures, seminars, 
and discussion groups that would all take place online. A novel approach to 
online distance learning was adopted. This utilised online distance-learning 
technologies that facilitate the delivery, viewing of, and participation in 
lectures by real-time video transmission. With this approach participants can 
see a live video transmission of the teacher, and the teacher can guide the 
participants through respective online sessions with the support of a range of 
online teaching technologies and visual aids. Together with the lecture, these 
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can be broadcast simultaneously, including PowerPoint presentations, word-
processing files, graphical images, as well as audio and video. Participants with 
video cameras can be invited by the teacher to join live online ‘face-to-face’ 
discussion and the latter can be viewed online by all members. Those with the 
capability to transmit audio can raise a (virtual) hand, be invited by the teacher 
to join live online discussion, and can communicate this way with all of those 
taking part, regardless of geographical location. Participants without video and 
audio capability can follow the class online and communicate with the teacher 
by typing questions via their keyboard. The classes can be recorded and viewed 
online subsequently.
Working in a fully supported online-learning community, members are able to 
communicate and interact with peers, developing their practice through sustained 
reflection and involvement in a range of activities and scenarios. Participants are 
encouraged to bring their own ideas and experiences to the course, sharing 
these with peers to contextualise their knowledge and understanding in ways 
that will help them, as life-science professionals, to meet the ethical challenges 
thrown up by dual use. As well as participation in a vibrant academic (social-
network) web-group where interaction on coursework-related topics between 
tutors, moderators and students takes places, members undertake independent 
reading and research. Participants benefit from a supportive and interactive 
online web-based learning community and work both independently to produce 
a coursework assignment, as well as in online groups to produce a significant 
group-work course assignment.
Conclusion: Recommendations for the BTWC
As has been made clear, a major effort will be required to raise awareness levels 
amongst life scientists and develop a culture of responsibility around the dual-
use implications of research. Whilst concerns raised by high-level reviews of 
scientific oversight of dual-use research are becoming assimilated into the terms 
and conditions associated with the funding of life-science research, this is a 
long-term initiative and will necessarily involve a broad range of constituencies. 
As set out by Mathews and Webb, 34 two practical suggestions would assist in 
sustaining interest in this area. The first is that States Parties could report to the 
Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC in 2011 on progress on implementation 
and capacity building in dual-use/biosecurity education. The second is that 
34 Mathews, R. J. and Webb, J. M. 2009, ‘Awareness-raising, Education and Codes of Conduct within the 
Framework of the BWC’, Chapter 9, BWPP Biological Weapons Reader, McLaughlin, K. and Nixdorff, K. (eds).
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the confidence-building mechanism (CBM) could be extended by appending 
progress reports on implementation and capacity building in education for life 
scientists to annual CBM reports.
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Chapter 11: Teaching Ethics to 
Science Students: Challenges and a 
Strategy
.JANE.JOHNSON
To be an effective scientist in the twenty-first century requires not only a 
specialised scientific knowledge but an appreciation of the ethical dimension of 
science. Scientists need to be able to recognise ethical dilemmas and formulate 
coherent responses to them. But scientists are not philosophers or ethicists, and 
their ethics education, therefore, needs to be different from that frequently 
offered as part of mainstream ethics courses, particularly those on moral 
theory. This chapter will argue that dual-use dilemmas and role-play involving 
real scientific case studies are an ideal vehicle for effectively engaging future 
scientists in ethics education, and helping furnish the necessary skills for their 
professional development.
The Role of Ethics Education for Scientists
Two questions which ought to precede any properly informed discussion of 
how to teach ethics to scientists are ‘Why should we teach this group ethics?’ 
and ‘What do we hope to achieve from their ethical education?’ Ethics teachers 
who are novices in the area might well be driven to ask these questions in 
despair as they confront resistance to their efforts on the part of both students 
and their colleagues in the science faculty. Nonetheless, how we respond to 
these questions is a serious matter and crucial to determining the shape of ethics 
courses.
A recent workshop on ethics education in science and engineering began 
by asking participants why they thought ethics education was important. 
Respondents talked about famous cases of research misconduct (presumably 
hoping they could be prevented in the future by ethics education) and how 
public trust in the integrity of science and research may be undermined by 
problematic practices. It was also noted that some students only appreciated 
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the value of their ethics education in retrospect, after practising their discipline 
and being forced to confront real-life ethical issues. Interestingly, there was 
also a suggestion that talented students with high ideals might be lost if ethics 
education were ignored.1 Whilst all these factors can play a role in motivating 
ethics education for scientists, the central problem which surely underpins 
them all is that ethical issues constantly arise in science, and scientists need 
to learn how to deal with them. As researchers investigating ethics education 
in the life sciences have noted, the ‘more influential science becomes, the more 
ethical issues become associated with scientific practice directly, and scientists 
are increasingly required to participate in the value questions born from new 
knowledge and new technologies’.2
There are a number of ways in which the practice of science generates 
ethical issues. Regarding the methods adopted in research (for instance, 
we can ask ‘Should we run placebo-controlled drug trials, or use animals in 
experimentation?’) these include how knowledge is applied (for example, how 
do we respond to knowledge of aerosolisation being used to make more effective 
bioweapons?), as well as the very questions which drive scientific research in 
the first place (for example, should we do research into human reproductive 
cloning, or weapons of mass destruction?). In fact, the ethically charged nature 
of science is well exposed by the dual-use dilemma, since dual-use scenarios 
demonstrate that even the well-intentioned pursuit of scientific research can 
generate difficulties. Although a scientist may be pursuing admirable goals such 
as understanding how a particular disease spreads with a view to containing 
future outbreaks, this does not preclude this same research being used for 
harmful ends such as deploying the disease as a biological weapon.
Since WWII at least there has been a growing awareness that the ethical challenges 
generated by science need to be addressed. To this end various strategies have 
been tried, including codes of conduct and ethics such as the World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Helsinki and the International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects; regulations and laws like 
those prohibiting research on human reproductive cloning in Australia; and 
boards or committees in universities, hospitals and other institutions charged 
with assessing whether proposed scientific research is ethical.
Though motivated by laudable goals, these measures are limited and for a 
variety of reasons fall short of what is required to address the ethical challenges 
generated by science. For instance, one issue with respect to some codes of 
conduct and ethics is that although they may supply aspirations and even 
1 Hollander, R. (ed.) and Arenberg, R. A. (co-ed.) 2009, Ethics education and scientific and engineering 
research: What’s been learned? What should be done?, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, p. 6.
2 Clarkeburn, H., Downie, J. R. and Matthew, B. 2002, ‘Impact of an ethics programme in a life sciences 
curriculum’, Teaching in Higher Education, vol. 7(1), pp. 65–79.
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appropriate rules for behaviour, individuals may not possess the practical know-
how or skills to apply them.3 Thus, even the most well-conceived, well-written 
and comprehensive codes may not foster ethical conduct if the individuals to 
whom they are meant to apply do not understand how to follow them, or have 
not been involved in the process of developing them.4 When it comes to laws 
and regulations, these are frequently backward-looking and thereby may be ill-
equipped to cope adequately with new situations being generated by science. 
In the case of ethics committees, their purview is limited. They are generally 
constrained to monitoring human and nonhuman animal experimentation 
rather than research in fields like physics, chemistry and engineering, and 
are charged with determining whether experiments that have already been 
conceived and developed comply with an institution’s policies. Finally, none of 
these measures genuinely address the institutional and cultural factors that may 
impede ethical conduct in science.5 Therefore, it seems that if we as a society 
take ethics in science seriously, we do our future scientists a disservice if we 
do not adequately prepare them for the ethical challenges they will face, since 
we cannot depend solely on outside parties and existing mechanisms to ensure 
‘good’ science.6
In accepting that scientists need ethics education, a further question arises: 
What form should this ethics education take?7 I suggest below that based on 
the particular needs of science students and the learning outcomes that should 
be set for them, teaching activities should include role-play involving real cases 
or plausible hypothetical ones, with an emphasis on those situations with dual-
use implications. In isolation these activities cannot meet all the needs of this 
cohort of students. However, as will become apparent through this chapter, 
they can make a significant contribution to this end, particularly if deployed 
in conjunction with other strategies, such as those aimed at improving student 
literacy.
3 In the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant famously drew attention to an important distinction between 
knowing a rule and knowing how to apply it. A134/B174. For instance a judge might have a good knowledge 
of the law but yet not know what law a particular case falls under, or a physician might be familiar with the 
descriptions of a disease but be unsure of the correct diagnosis when presented with a diseased patient.
4 For a good discussion of codes of conduct with respect to biological weapons, see Rappert, B. 2007, 
‘Codes of conduct and biological weapons: An in-process assessment’ Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science, vol. 5(2), pp. 145–54.
5 For a discussion of these factors, see Martin, B. 1992, ‘Scientific fraud and the power structure of science’, 
Prometheus, vol. 10(1), pp. 83–98; Hollander and Arenberg 2009, op. cit.
6 Good is being used here in the ethical sense, though it also has connotations related to validity, and there 
is frequently a connection between ethically and epistemologically good science, though not the space here 
to expand on this link.
7 The discussion here focuses especially on ethics education for undergraduate students, though some of the 
points made might be incorporated into training for practising scientists.
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The Needs of Science Students
Many undergraduate science students experience particular difficulties when 
they undertake study in philosophical courses, even when these courses cater 
to their presumed interest in science (for instance, in classes on science and 
ethics or the philosophy of science). These difficulties are of concern not only 
because they limit student enjoyment of the subject studied, but also because 
evidence suggests students who have a negative orientation toward a subject 
will experience poor learning outcomes;8 that is, they do not achieve what 
they ought to from their studies. Therefore, if the attainment of the generic 
and course-specific learning outcomes set for an ethics class is valued, these 
difficulties represent genuine concerns that need to be addressed.
Analysing the relatively limited literature regarding teaching philosophy to 
science students reveals that at the broadest level student difficulties stem 
from a difference in the culture and norms of the humanities and sciences. 
This manifests itself in science students frequently not having the requisite 
skills in writing, reading, and so on, to perform well in philosophy subjects 
generally (of which ethics forms a part); in their not knowing, understanding 
or being comfortable with the culture and expectations of philosophy; and in 
their possibly having a hostile orientation towards a discipline which they may 
perceive as either challenging or inferior to their chosen career path in science. 
These three specific issues demand special attention when teaching ethics to 
science students.
In expanding on the skills deficit experienced by science students, I want to 
begin by joining Geoffrey Cantor in observing that it is not simply the case 
that the difficulties encountered by many science students studying philosophy 
align with what he describes as the ‘crude stereotype’ that construes them 
as ‘illiterate and culturally inept’.9 Nor does the skills deficit result from a 
failure of intelligence or moral fibre; rather, it is frequently a product of the 
inexperience of students in certain types of activity, or occasionally a failure 
to value these activities. Sometimes it may also be the case that students have 
chosen a degree in science because they feel they lack natural competency in 
the skill set demanded by the humanities.10
The most widely discussed skills deficit canvassed in the higher-education 
teaching and learning literature in this area centres on essay writing. Essays 
are effectively an alien genre for many science students since they are generally 
8 Murtonen, M. 2005, ‘University students’ research orientations: Do negative attitudes exist toward 
quantitative methods?’, Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, vol. 49(3), pp. 263–80.
9 Cantor, G. 2001, ‘Teaching philosophy and HPS to science students’, PRS-LTSN Journal, vol. 1(1), pp. 
14–24, p. 15.
10 Cantor, for instance, makes this suggestion. Ibid., p. 20.
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not required within the natural sciences and mathematics, though they may 
form part of the assessment in biology classes and in the so-called soft sciences 
such as psychology. According to Cantor, given that essay writing is not 
emphasised in science education, the ‘prospect of essay writing may evoke fear 
and uncertainty since many science students will have no conception of what is 
involved or how to begin the process of essay writing’.11 Problems divide into 
two main categories — those to do with an inability to engage in the analysis 
and thinking demanded by an essay, and those related to written expression. 
Into the first group fall the difficulties encountered by students with the very 
notion of developing and defending their own original point of view; with 
appreciating how to engage critically with the literature (including knowing 
how to analyse key concepts in written form); and with knowing what would 
constitute an appropriate answer to the question asked. The latter can manifest 
in students being unsure whether or not their essay even represents a legitimate 
response to the question.12 Frequently such students submit papers that simply 
and unreflectively restate course content and border on plagiarism, since sources 
for the various arguments and concepts are not cited.13 The second category 
involves the more general struggle of science students to write clearly and 
fluently. Such students also have problems knowing how to use the first person 
and active voice in essay writing, most likely as a result of being discouraged 
from doing so in scientific writing.14
If science students do not already possess or develop essay-writing skills they 
are unlikely to flourish in philosophy subjects which require them as part of 
their assessment. This means that not only will they achieve a poor grade in 
such subjects but they will fall down in their studies at a deeper level too. 
Sellars, for instance, makes the argument that essays are not merely arbitrarily 
associated with philosophy, ‘they reflect the very nature of philosophy itself’.15 
If students cannot write an essay, they cannot ‘do philosophy’, they are not 
properly engaged in critical thinking, analysis and evaluation, and may be 
unable to construct an argument. On this view, philosophy teaching must 
incorporate the writing skills crucial to achieving critical analysis — the very 
stuff of philosophy. Lecturers and tutors should not regard their students as 
incompetent if they do not already possess writing skills, and the teaching and 
learning of writing should not be considered a merely remedial and distracting 
11 Ibid.
12 Gooday, G. ‘The Challenges of teaching history and philosophy of science, technology & medicine to 
“science” students’, available: http://prs.heacademy.ac.uk/view.html/prsdocuments/66
13 Ibid. As Gooday notes, to many science students it would seem irrelevant or arrogant to attribute 
authorship to facts and theories in science.
14 Ibid. 
15 This is Crome and Garfield’s way of expressing Sellar’s point in Crome, K. and Garfield, M. 2004, ‘Text-
based teaching and learning in philosophy’, Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious 
Studies, vol. 3(2), pp. 114–30, p. 124.
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activity the teacher is forced to engage in by virtue of student inadequacy.16 As 
Sellars notes, it should be regarded ‘an essential part of any training designed 
to teach students how to argue clearly and effectively. If our aim is to teach 
students how to think then we must accept that it will also be our task to teach 
them how to write’.17
Another feature of literacy increasingly acknowledged as deficient amongst 
the broader student population in universities is that of critical reading.18 In 
the case of science students, problems may be compounded since many do not 
enjoy reading, are slow readers and they struggle to know how to evaluate a 
text.19 In spite of this deficit, it appears little research has been undertaken 
into how to remedy this situation.20 Yet, as with essay writing, an inability to 
read effectively is a significant impediment to studying philosophy, not just 
because it means students are unlikely to score well in their subjects, but also 
because critical reading is just part of what it is to do philosophy — to reflect 
on and analyse arguments and ideas. Thus, Kelton describes it as a ‘gateway 
intellectual activity’;21 that is, an essential tool to getting started in one’s 
philosophical studies. Crome and Garfield go further when they claim ‘there 
is an intimate and unique bond between an appropriately engaged or active 
reading of a philosophical text and the act of doing philosophy itself’.22 As with 
essay writing, these authors maintain that developing a student’s reading skills 
should not be seen as a remedial activity, but part of the broader ‘aim of all 
philosophy teaching, getting students to do philosophy’.23
There are two further skills that are important but often appear lacking amongst 
science students (again due mainly to lack of exposure and experience); 
namely, verbal ability and note-taking proficiency. Science students may not 
be comfortable expressing themselves in a public oral forum, and in lectures 
and tutorials they may struggle to know what is important and worth taking 
down, since they are accustomed to being provided with handouts or having 
key formulae clearly identified for them.24
16 There is a strange belief that teachers (including myself) sometimes have that students ought to already 
possess at least some of the skills and knowledge that we are charged with teaching them in a course. It is 
salutary to remind ourselves that our role as teachers is to teach, not complain when our students lack such 
knowledge.
17 Sellars, J. 2002, ‘Some reflections on recent philosophy teaching scholarship’, PRS-LTSN Journal, vol. 
2(1), pp. 110–27, pp. 126–7.
18 Crome and Garfield 2004, op. cit. p. 115.
19 Ibid., pp. 119–20.
20 Ibid., p. 117.
21 Kelton, S. 1997, On assessing philosophical literacy, available: http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/c7/0d.pdf [viewed December 2009] p. 4.
22 Crome and Garfield 2004, op. cit. p. 122.
23 Ibid., p. 123.
24 Gooday, op. cit.
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An inability to appreciate and embody in practice the different norms that govern 
the pedagogy of the humanities, as opposed to the sciences, contributes to the 
struggle with skills competency experienced by science students, particularly 
in essay writing. Gooday describes the problem well when he comments that 
‘[w]hen learners enter into an unfamiliar field of knowledge, their entry is 
never just a simply undirectional process of picking up knowledge…novices 
need to secure the appropriate practices, strategies and expectations to be able 
to articulate and use such knowledge in accordance with the values of their 
specialist field’.25 In the case of the sciences and humanities, the differences 
present a ‘clash of cultures’ in Gooday’s view, which leaves science students 
unclear and confused over what is expected of them when studying philosophy. 
They may feel unsure of the rules of the game, do not necessarily understand 
what their teachers are seeking, and may find the tactics they have deployed 
to effect in their science subjects do not translate to success in philosophy. 
Again, as Gooday comments, ‘[f]rom the point of view of science students, 
the scholarly values of HPS [History and Philosophy of Science] teaching can 
seem bafflingly vague, gratuitously subjective and self-indulgent, whilst the 
pedagogical practices employed seem to lack a proper emphasis on “getting the 
right answer”’.26
This last point is significant and reflects a strong difference between the 
humanities and sciences cultures. From their mainstream courses, science 
students are reinforced in the belief (prevalent in broader society too) that there 
is just one truth of matter and it is the business of science to discover it. In this 
context the teacher and text are often regarded as authorities, and it is expected 
that there are definitive right and wrong answers to questions.27 Therefore, 
to a science student the operation of an ethics class is highly puzzling. There 
is no one correct answer to ethical dilemmas so that neither textbooks nor 
lecturers are authoritative. Discussions are open-ended and can seemingly be 
mired in subjectivity and opinion. To succeed in the sciences students need to 
demonstrate they know and understand the dominant prevailing theory in a 
field, while in the humanities interpretative work is required and the ability to 
understand and critically evaluate a diversity of views including one’s own. The 
ability to construct an original line of argument is also rewarded.
Related to the differences in culture and norms of the sciences and humanities 
(and again with the potential to hamper student learning) is the inadequate 
conception some science students hold of what the discipline of ethics is about. 
25 Gooday, G. 2002, ‘How do different student constituencies (not) learn the history and philosophy of their 
subject?’ PRS-LTSN Journal, vol. 1(2), pp. 141–55, p. 147.
26 Gooday, op. cit.
27 Most philosophy of science since the influential work of Thomas Kuhn challenges the idea that science 
itself is actually like this. Nonetheless, these kinds of assumptions still appear prevalent in the teaching of 
science in higher education.
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For instance, they may regard ethics as constituted by externally imposed rules 
and regulations; they may conflate ethics and law; or believe the discipline of 
research ethics exhausts the ethical issues raised by science, so that effective 
ethics committees may be all that is required to ensure ethical practice in science.
The final impediment to the learning of science students considered here is 
related to the hostility toward the entire discipline of philosophy (including 
ethics) found amongst many such students, their teachers28 and scientific 
practitioners more broadly. Unfortunately, within this group, C. P. Snow’s famous 
‘Two Cultures’ thesis still appears widely accepted, namely that science and 
the humanities represent two quite separate cultures that lack even a common 
language to mediate between them. According to this division of the intellectual 
landscape, the sciences are superior to the humanities, with the latter often 
construed as irrelevant or just common sense. As former science ‘insiders’ who 
have gone on to work in philosophy, both Cantor and Gooday acknowledge the 
veracity of this perception. As Cantor describes it: ‘When at school I shared 
with many of my peers the (utterly depressing) view that science students are 
innately superior to those taking humanities subjects, and that the sciences hold 
the key to the future.’29 He goes on to discuss the self-selecting and mutually 
reinforcing nature of the community of science students who ‘often perceive 
themselves as having chosen science and thereby positively rejected humanities 
subjects’.30 They may regard the humanities in general as ‘a doddle’31 and 
philosophy, more specifically, as comprising waffle and navel gazing.32
If science students assume intellectual superiority over humanities students, 
any difficulties they experience with a philosophy class due, for instance, to 
the skills deficit described earlier will surely be particularly disturbing. They 
may well wonder how it is that armed with their natural academic ability they 
do not automatically prosper in their philosophical studies. Therefore, it seems 
probable that they will ascribe these difficulties to some fault with the teacher 
or the subject itself, further fuelling their frustration and antipathy toward the 
humanities.
Even if they do not have an overtly hostile orientation to philosophy, the study of 
applied ethics can be confronting for any student. As Joan Callahan comments, 
‘[p]ractical ethics courses press students to become clear about their own biases 
28 Part of the issue for this group may also be that they do not believe time in the curriculum should be 
devoted to a subject which is not strictly speaking science, or that such an ethical education is not needed 
because it is irrelevant or just common sense.
29 Cantor 2001, op. cit. pp. 15–6.
30 Ibid., p. 17.
31 Ibid., p. 18.
32 These observations are drawn from my own experience. I find such perceptions of philosophy particularly 
intriguing as they seem to me to be the antithesis of what philosophy is actually about; namely, rigorous 
argument well supported by evidence.
Chapter.11:.Teaching.Ethics.to.Science.Students
205
and to examine the reliability of their own ways of making moral decisions, 
and this, unavoidably, makes students feel vulnerable’.33 Ethical positions are 
often deeply held, dependent on cultural and religious background, and may go 
unchallenged in daily life, so that formulating coherent reasons and justifications 
for beliefs may be difficult and intimidating for students. Many science students 
may also perceive philosophy of science and ethics as a direct threat to the 
discipline they have committed themselves to as students and potential future 
professionals. Unaccustomed by their scientific studies to engage in reflection 
on the philosophical basis for science and how it can be justified, or the ways 
in which it might legitimately be curtailed by the ethical concerns of society 
more broadly, they can interpret any such debate as a challenge to their 
personal integrity. The perception that the very existence of some philosophical 
disciplines represents an attack on the scientific enterprise and on individuals 
as participants in this enterprise is surprisingly widespread and continues into 
professional life. Frequently, scientists and those in medicine view discussion of 
ethics in these contexts as an unwarranted attack on their good intentions, calling 
into question their motives in a discipline they perceive to be dedicated to the 
public good. A philosopher’s call to justify an ethical stance can be construed 
as unjust slander against one’s person, partly because philosophers and ethicists 
are sometimes seen as outsiders who have no legitimate status or expertise with 
which to criticise the authority and status of science and scientists.
Whilst I think scientists, doctors and others may well be overreacting when 
they feel personally threatened and intimidated by philosophers, at the same 
time there is a sense in which education is and should be transformative — a 
catalyst to change. To reflect seriously and critically on one’s world view may 
well be disconcerting and unsettling. A further unfortunate side-effect of such a 
transformation may be underperformance in science subjects, where the kind of 
scepticism and critical reflection encouraged in ethics and philosophy of science 
classes may undermine achievement in straight science subjects.34
Thus it seems from this critical examination of the literature that the challenge 
for teaching (and learning) ethics to science students is to investigate approaches 
which could build their skills, minimise experiences which may be threatening, 
while supporting the learning outcomes of philosophical ethics.
Although the difficulties experienced by science students are acknowledged in 
the literature and by teachers in the area, few systematic and well-researched 
solutions to such difficulties are proffered. Nigel Taylor makes this point when 
posing questions about possible principles to guide the teaching of philosophy 
33 Callahan, J. 1998, ‘From the “applied” to the practical: teaching ethics for use’, in Kasachkoff, T. (ed.), 
In the Socratic tradition essays on teaching philosophy, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 
57–69, p. 65.
34 Gooday, op. cit.
Education.and.Ethics.in.the.Life.Sciences
206
to non-philosophy students and the means of assessing good practice in 
this area: ‘I shall not be drawing on any substantial body of literature about 
this topic, still less on an established body of “theory”, for there isn’t any.’35 
Therefore, he resorts to the same strategy as other authors confronting this 
problem; namely, he relies on critical reflection into his own experience, or self-
reflection in tandem with the reflective experience of colleagues. The paucity 
of research in this area is not unique to the teaching and learning of non-
philosophy students, but is part of a more general deficit in the philosophical 
literature. Sellars bemoans the proliferation of narrative, personal, experiential 
accounts of teaching philosophy, and hopes for more theoretical reflection in 
the future.36 Part of the rationale behind this paper is to move beyond these 
kind of attempts, to systematically reflect on and re-conceptualise the problems, 
and address them by appealing to the broader literature in higher-education 
teaching and learning.
Setting the Ethical Agenda
Having established that science students need ethics education (bearing in mind 
they are also a group with special needs when studying humanities), what goals 
should be set for their ethical education? In other words, what learning outcomes 
— skills, knowledge, and so on, should students take away from ethics classes?
The ‘virtue/skill dichotomy’ represents a fundamental divide in approaches 
to ethics education of medical students that is also relevant in this context.37 
Those who emphasise the virtue approach claim that ethical instruction should 
teach virtue, students should exit classes as better people, and courses should 
transform them into citizens of good character. In a tradition originating with 
the ancient Greeks, the underpinning rationale is simple — that good people 
make good decisions.38 Conversely, those who lobby for a skills focus argue that 
the emphasis in ethics education should be on fostering skills and resources 
required to engage in solving ethical problems. Whilst the virtue position 
embodies a noble and laudable goal that may follow from ethics education, I 
agree with Eckles et al. that it must surely lie beyond the primary business 
35 Taylor, N. 2003, ‘Teaching philosophy to non-philosophy students: The example of architecture and 
town planning’, Discourse: Learning and Teaching in Philosophical and Religious Studies, vol. 3(1), pp. 41–52, 
p. 41.
36 Sellars 2002, op. cit.
37 The literature on teaching medical students ethics is more developed than that for science students.
38 Justin Oakley has argued for the virtue approach to be adopted in teaching science students, citing the 
experience with medical students to support his case. Oakley, J. 2009, ‘Teaching scientists the value of virtue’, 
Australasian Science, vol. 30(2), p. 39.
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of ethics teachers.39 Such a learning outcome would also present significant 
challenges for assessment. How could a teacher determine whether or not 
students had attained this learning outcome? What possible measure could be 
used to decide if they were of good character? Therefore, given the problems 
inherent in the virtue approach it seems more plausible to accept the slightly 
less lofty, skill-based goal for ethics education of science students. Thus, at the 
broadest level, the aim should be to teach students the skills that will equip 
them to practise science ethically. To achieve this aspiration I would argue that 
there are two groups of learning outcomes that should be set — those to do with 
understanding the nature and terrain of ethics, and others related to how to do 
ethics or applied philosophy more generally.
Students need to develop an appreciation of some of the key features of ethics 
in order to operate ethically in science. In the first instance, they need to 
acquire what I call their ‘ethical radar’; that is, a sensitivity that allows them to 
recognise moral issues, as well as situations where values are in conflict. Such 
an understanding may appear common sense and such conflicts might seem 
obvious, but this, in my experience, is not necessarily the case. For instance, some 
students in medical sciences consistently conflate ethical and clinical choices, 
and assume they are making purely medical decisions based on scientific factors 
when their conclusions are being driven by their own personal values (for 
example, what constitutes a good quality of life). Similarly, it may be difficult 
for a student in the life sciences to see that there is any ethical issue generated 
by research into a deadly virus because they may implicitly value scientific 
knowledge, research and progress over issues such as threats to public health 
and security. Thus, they might be unconcerned by research into transmission 
of the Ebola virus, for instance, seeing the science as neutral or focusing on the 
good ends such research might produce, rather than its potential to lead to a 
disease outbreak or biological attack.
Related to developing sensitivity to the presence of ethical issues is the goal of 
learning to appreciate the complex and contested nature of the ethical landscape. 
Students need to understand that there are genuine and well-grounded points of 
difference between people on such issues, but that although complete consensus 
on the nature and resolution of a concern may be rare, this does not undermine 
the value of discussion and argument, nor does it mean that ethical relativism 
must follow.
39 Eckles, R. E., Meslin, E. M., Gaffney, M. and Helft, P. R. 2005, ‘Medical ethics education: Where are we? 
Where should we be going? A Review’, Academic Medicine, vol. 80(12), pp. 1143–52.
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To complement this appreciation of the nature of ethics, students should acquire 
a particular set of skills regarding criticism, analysis and argument. Although 
discussing philosophical pedagogy more broadly, the aims Sellars sets down 
apply equally well in practical ethics. He writes:
If one defines philosophy as a critical analysis of one’s existing opinions 
and the attempt to replace those opinions with rationally ground beliefs, 
then teaching philosophy should involve teaching the skills necessary 
to accomplish this. A successful philosophical education, then, will be 
one at the end of which one’s students are able to call into question 
their own unexamined presuppositions and to think rationally for 
themselves.40
Students need to be able to interrogate and critique ethical views expressed in the 
literature, in the media and by their colleagues, as well as systematically reflect 
on their own views. Students should be able to argue and formulate coherent, 
reflective and well-justified responses to ethical situations, both verbally and in 
written form. Therefore, it is insufficient to accept the UK Quality Assurance 
Agency for Higher Education’s claim that in the biosciences we should expect 
all students to develop ‘some understanding of ethical issues and the impact on 
society of advances in the biosciences’, but that only good students should ‘be 
able to construct reasoned arguments to support their position on the ethical and 
social impact of advances in the biosciences’.41 Good students will presumably 
produce better arguments than poorer students, but to have no expectation that 
poorer students will develop any skills in argument is to set the bar too low. If 
students do not obtain competency in such a fundamental learning outcome, 
they should not pass the course in which they are enrolled.
Further learning outcomes have been suggested in the literature, including that 
ethics education should canvass the ‘development of competencies in analysing 
how social and technical factors interact’.42 I would argue, however, that this 
is beyond the purview of philosophical ethics and that traditional teachers 
of ethics would likely lack the relevant expertise to do justice to such a goal, 
though if such outcomes are regarded desirable by some institutions, then 
teachers should be sourced and course goals amended.
40 Sellars 2002, op. cit., p. 126.
41 As reported in Willmott, C. J. R., Bond, A. N., Bryant, J. A., Maw, S. J., Sears, H. J. and Wilson, J. M. 
2004, ‘Teaching ethics to bioscience students — A Survey of undergraduate provision’, BEE-j, vol. 3.




Pedagogy is important. There are better and worse ways to teach particular 
subjects and disciplines. One factor demonstrated to benefit student learning in 
all areas of higher education is the constructive alignment of learning activities 
(that is, the activities in which students engage during their studies) with 
outcomes and assessment.43 In essence, constructive alignment ensures that 
what is done in the classroom supports what students ought to learn. It involves 
determining appropriate learning outcomes, having students perform tasks and 
activities that develop these outcomes (often particular skills or abilities), and 
rewarding successful achievement of goals by awarding marks. For instance, 
if the goal is to teach medical professionals how to give injections, rather than 
delivering lectures on how to do this and assessing their skills by a written 
paper, students should practise this skill (initially in some form of simulated 
environment) and teachers should assess  by valuing it relative to other learning 
outcomes by assigning a particular grade. Such a strategy might sound self-
evident; however, for various reasons including historical and pragmatic ones, 
such an obvious strategy may not always be adopted. For instance, Kelton 
discusses how he used multiple-choice exams with computer grading, partly 
as a way of coping with the enormous volume of marking generated by large 
class sizes. However, eventually he came to regard such tests as ineffective in 
assessing whether students had achieved learning outcomes.44 Courses and entire 
disciplines might also have certain assessment strategies historically linked to 
them that may not align with or be the best way of ensuring the attainment of 
learning outcomes.
Now I want to put the case for why role-play (focusing especially on dual-use 
dilemmas) can help meet some of the important learning outcomes identified for 
science students in ethics. First a couple of the key terms need to be defined. 
By ‘role-play’ I mean a structured exercise in which participants are assigned 
roles and some form of scenario in which to play out these roles.45 For the 
purposes here, a dual-use dilemma is a situation that arises when one and the 
same technology, scientific research project or outcome of a scientific research 
project is such that it can be used as a basis to provide means to significantly 
43 Biggs, J. 1996, ‘Enhancing teaching through constructive alignment’, Higher Education, vol. 32, pp. 
1–18; Biggs, J. 1999, Teaching for Quality Learning at University, Buckingham, UK: SRHE & Open University 
Press; Prosser, M. and Trigwell, K. 1999, Understanding learning and teaching: the experience in higher 
education, Buckingham, UK: SRHE & Open University Press; Ramsden, P. 2003, Learning to Teach in Higher 
Education, 2nd edition, London: Routledge.
44 Kelton 1997, op. cit.
45 For a good example of a dual-use role-play, see Rappert, B. ‘The Life sciences, biosecurity and dual use 




harm others as well as perform another purpose that is not harmful. A dilemma 
arises in such a case, as there are reasons both for and against developing the 
technology or conducting the research.46
Evidence suggests that role-play with dual-use cases is a highly effective 
teaching activity to support the learning outcomes outlined earlier. In the 
first instance, role-play can help students develop their ethical radar, enabling 
them to become aware of the issues generated in scenarios.47 Such scenarios can 
also foster an appreciation of the complex and contested nature of practical 
ethics generally. In applied ethics, opinions can differ over what values are at 
stake, and what the morally correct response should be. Since role-play can 
force students to adopt and defend positions they may not actually hold, and 
engage with other similarly positioned individuals, they learn to appreciate 
that there can be multiple legitimate positions to any ethical debate.48 Students 
have reported that role-play may be superior to other teaching and learning 
strategies when it comes to developing a sense of the ethical terrain. They noted 
that in role-play they could ‘[c]reate a discussion…[which] makes you transport 
yourself to the role and situation…[and] [s]ee it from “different shoes”’ and ‘It 
makes people think, adopt different points of view, and therefore, get a broader 
understanding of an issue.’49
To assist psychology students in learning about the complexity of research ethics 
and demonstrate that there are multiple perspectives that should be considered 
in the evaluation of studies, Rosnow developed a role-play exercise.50 Strohmetz 
and Skleder later evaluated the effectiveness of this role-play in achieving the 
stated learning outcomes, validating Rosnow’s work.51 Other authors have also 
supported the value of role-play. Chesler and Fox, for instance, ‘suggest that 
students can achieve insights into themselves, others, and motivations for 
actions which “can aid students in clarifying their own values and in effectively 
46 Definition adapted from unpublished research by Dr. John Forge, University of Sydney.
47 For instance, Illingworth argues role-play can ‘enrich students’ perceptions of morally significant 
situations’, Illingworth, S. 2004, Approaches to ethics in higher education: Teaching ethics across the curriculum 
University of Leeds: Philosophical and Religious Studies Subject Centre, p. 52; Brummel, B. J., Gunsalus, C. 
K., Kristich, K. L. and Loui, M. C. 2008, ‘Development of role-play scenarios for teaching responsible conduct 
of research’, available: http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/loui/wwn/RCRRolePlays.pdf [viewed December 2009], p. 1.
48 Brummel et al., Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 6.
50 Rosnov, R. L. 1990, ‘Teaching research ethics through role-play and discussion’, Teaching of Psychology, 
vol. 17(3), pp. 179–81, p. 179.
51 Strohmetz, D. B. and Skleder, A. A. 1992, ‘The Use of role-play in teaching research ethics: A validation 
study’ Teaching of Psychology, vol. 19(2), pp. 106–8, p. 108.
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directing or changing their own behaviour”’.52 Similarly, Doron comments 
that role-play ‘exposes the students to attitudes or viewpoints that they might 
otherwise not have been conscious of’.53
In addition to helping develop their ethical radar, role-play can assist students 
to pick up analytic, critical and argumentative skills. Primarily through their 
deployment in simulated settings, students learn the skills required to navigate 
real ethical situations. The task they embark on in role-play is not abstract and 
theoretical but highly immediate and practical. By being forced to understand, 
interrogate and attack one’s opponents and defend a position in the cut and 
thrust of debate, a whole raft of skills may be developed.
Significantly, the use of role-play can also be an effective means of dealing with 
some of the special needs of science students in the ethics classroom. Engagement 
in role-play can break down the hostility toward ethics sometimes encountered, 
by providing an enjoyable and stimulating environment for learning. Brummel, 
for instance, reports on the high level of student satisfaction associated with this 
form of learning activity,54 and Doron comments that role-play ‘facilitates deeper 
individual involvement with, and interest in, the case’ being examined.55 As 
the higher-education literature has shown, this is significant, because positive 
learning experiences can translate into better learning outcomes.
The potentially threatening nature of ethical discourse for science students can 
also be ameliorated by role-play since, as Brown notes, such scenarios ‘have the 
advantages of creating low-risk conditions for expression of extreme opinions 
by students’.56 He goes on: ‘The freedom afforded by playing a stranger, and 
attributing extreme positions to that individual, allows the players tremendous 
scope of exploration into the nuances and conflicts inherent in any complex 
situation, without exposing the players’ own beliefs.’57 However, Brummel 
notes there can also be unfavourable responses to role-play, with students 
potentially feeling awkward or not seriously engaging with the exercise.58 In 
his research, such shortcomings did not outweigh perceived advantages on the 
part of students generally and, in my view, could potentially be handled by 
sensitivity on the part of the teacher to the needs of students who are not as 
socially competent or skilled as their colleagues.59
52 Quoted in Brown, K. M. 1994, ‘Using role play to integrate ethics into the business curriculum a financial 
management example’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 13(2), pp. 105–10, p. 105.
53 Doron, I. 2007, ‘Court of ethics: Teaching ethics and ageing by means of role-playing’, Educational 
Gerontology, vol. 33(9), pp. 737–58, p. 742.
54 Brummel et al. 2008, op. cit., pp. 2 and 4.
55 Doron 2007, op. cit., p. 742.
56 Brown 1994, op. cit., p. 105.
57 Ibid., p. 106.
58 Brummel et al. 2008, op. cit., p.6.
59 Illingworth gives some excellent and practical suggestions for teaching ethics generally which are 
particularly relevant in this context. She focuses specifically on creating a safe environment, ensuring mutual 
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Role-play also enables students to be immersed in an environment where the 
potentially alien norms of the humanities operate and can be implicitly fostered. 
A very different notion of the teacher prevails in such scenarios. For instance, 
the manner in which role-plays function mean they ‘avoid…preaching by the 
authority figure’.60 Doron supports such a view, claiming that in role-play the 
teacher ‘is not the omniscient expert who possess the correct answer and whose 
place in the classroom is laid down by a hierarchy of superiority that is based 
on the disparity between the teachers’ and their students’ knowledge and 
experience’.61 According to Brown, another advantage of such exercises is that 
‘[b]y its nature, a role-play has no ultimate solution contained within it, and so 
emphasises the indeterminate elements of decisions’.62 There is no single correct 
answer that is possessed by authorities, either teachers or texts.
Dual-use cases add to the effectiveness of role-play by helping provide the 
realistic and practical context science students crave. As recent research with 
ethics teachers in science has shown, ‘[w]hen it comes to the aspects of ethics 
respondents believe students find most interesting or engaging, the most 
prominent theme is that of real world cases, or ethics in social contexts’.63 Not 
only do real dual-use scenarios provide a realistic setting for ethical discussion, 
they also have at their heart a significant conflict, which as Brown has argued, 
is essential for the success of role-plays.64 Dual-use situations have an inherent 
tension between values — the desire for scientific knowledge and progress, and 
the potential for such knowledge to generate harm. Finally, dual-use scenarios 
demonstrate vividly to science students that even if they are well-intentioned 
scientists and moral people more generally, their research can still create 
significant ethical concerns. In the heat of role-play they learn that they need 
to deal with these ethical concerns if they are to be effective scientists in the 
twenty-first century.
Conclusion
Though it may represent a challenging exercise, science students need to be 
taught ethics. They need to be empowered with the skills to conduct their 
professional lives in the face of the moral challenges they will confront. Role-
plays based on dual-use dilemmas can motivate engagement with ethics, be a 
respect and protecting confidentiality. Illingworth 2004, op. cit., pp. 82–90.
60 Brown 1994, op. cit., p. 105.
61 Doron 2007, op. cit., p. 743.
62 Brown 1994, op. cit., p. 106.
63 van Leeuwen, B., Lamberts, R., Newitt, P. and Errington, S. 2007, ‘Ethics, issues and consequences: 
conceptual challenges in science education’, in UniServe Science Teaching and Learning Research Proceedings, 
available: http://science.uniserve.edu.au/pubs/procs/2007/23.pdf [viewed December 2009] pp. 112–9, p. 117.
64 Brown 1994, op. cit., p. 106.
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catalyst to developing critical, analytic, argumentative and verbal skills, and do 
so in an enjoyable and non-threatening way, conducive to getting the best from 
current students and future scientists.

215
Conclusion: Lessons for Moving Ahead
BRIAN.RAPPERT.AND.LOUISE.BEZUIDENHOUT
If we are to avoid the life sciences becoming the death sciences — as has 
happened in so many fields of knowledge — then concerted thought and action 
is required. Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences has attended to one aspect 
of the ‘web’1 of measures necessary to avert this prospect. The need for greater 
education and awareness about the security–science link was one of the reasons 
motivating this volume. Its contributions have supported this starting impetus 
and elaborated the contours. The authors have examined a variety of emerging 
efforts to attend to the possibility that the life sciences might aid in the spread of 
disease; most of which addressed issues far beyond sturdy locks on laboratory 
doors. An aim has been to share experiences, models and resources with readers.
Experiences: Selgelid, Sture, Johnson, and Barr and Zhang have asked how 
ethics — and particularly ethics training — has been and could be brought to 
bear on dealing with so-called dual-use concerns. Each of these contributors, 
as well as others, have cautioned against thinking that the destructive use of 
science could be addressed by simply requiring budding researchers-to-be to 
sit in general ethics modules during their university degrees. Whether because 
of the hidden curricula that often frustrate teaching leading to principled 
outcomes, the skewed past priorities of bioethics, the need for ongoing and 
workplace-relevant instruction, or the resistance given to formal ethical 
instruction, many of the authors have detailed the vital importance of measured 
and context-sensitive interventions. As argued by Barr and Zhang in particular, 
despite the international character of much of the life sciences, the national 
structures in place for research and bioethics are of major significance. Not only 
do research cultures differ, but the pressures on the individual scientist can also 
vary dramatically between countries and research communities. It is therefore 
of marked importance that dual-use education not only address the ethical 
background of scientists, but also the social and cultural context in which 
they are operating. In developing countries, for example, considerations such 
1 See Rappert, B. and McLeish, C. (eds) 2007, A Web of prevention: Biological weapons, life sciences and the 
governance of research, London: Earthscan.
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as limited resources, governmental and social expectations, as well as cultural 
norms may affect the way in which ethical education is internalised and applied 
(see below).
Models: The chapters — particularly those in Part 2 — outlined a range 
of possible rationales, strategies and methods for bringing in educational 
measures. The inter-related chapters of Minehata and Shinomiya and Mancini 
and Revill showed how a process of ‘survey-contact-network-assist-resurvey’ 
provided a basis for building national understanding and interest. Enemark 
described a series of regional workshops in Australia conducted by members of 
the National Centre for Biosecurity. Drawing on past experiences elsewhere, the 
Centre members were able to complement renewed concern about the control 
of sensitive agents and devise an agenda for required future activities. Because 
of their long-term engagement with biosecurity-related issues, Connell and 
McCluskey suggested a number of routes for introducing attention to the misuse 
of science into a university setting: ‘Responsible Conduct of Research’ training, 
institutional biosafety committees, laboratory-safety training, a biodefence 
certificate, and an institutionally based ‘train-the-trainer’ system. As they argue 
at the end of their chapter, the strengths, limitations and prospects for each of 
these approaches needs to be seen against the consuming time demands placed 
on those associated with the life sciences. At the level of national governments, 
Garraux gave a work-in-progress account of the implementation of an awareness-
raising project in Switzerland; one that suggests how those inside and outside 
of government can work together in mutually beneficial ways. His lessons 
outline paths for sustaining long-term outreach to both academic circles and 
first responders. Finally, Friedman detailed the most ‘top-down’ example of 
an education development given in this book. The Israeli case illustrates how 
science and security organisations can work together to establish a national 
structure for advancing education. Despite focusing on particular initiatives 
associated with their own work, each of the authors suggested that a multi-level 
approach is needed to address biosecurity education.
Resources: The Education Module Resource (EMR) described by Dando and 
Whitby presents easily accessible, electronic-support material that can be used 
to raise awareness. By avoiding the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, this resource is 
available for lecturers to fit into existing programmes (as further discussed by 
Revill and Mancini). Dando and Whitby also forwarded an expert-level distance-
learning programme that makes use of innovative electronic online technologies 
that facilitate outreach on a worldwide basis. In her essay on teaching ethics 
to science students, Johnson not only highlighted the importance of pedagogy 
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and dedicated teaching of ethics for science students, but also gave an outline 
of innovative methods such as role-playing which make ethics more accessible 
to students.2
So in summary, Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences has indicated possible 
guiding philosophies, strategies, enabling mechanisms, techniques and materials. 
But just as the contributors have detailed the importance of context-sensitive 
tuition, it needs to be recognised that the achievements documented in this 
volume cannot be reproduced elsewhere by a simple mechanical duplication. 
The arguments offered are given in the spirit of providing a springboard for 
creative thinking and action. Their relevance should be interpreted in different 
ways across varied situations, a point taken up shortly.
The need for active questioning of the significance of lessons from this volume 
(and elsewhere) is underscored by a point made by Dando and Whitby: while 
it is possible to demonstrate how some forms of education and ethics training 
help further specific teaching objectives, there is little in the way of agreed 
standards for evaluating the significance of ethics teaching on future behaviour.3 
Moreover, as Connell and McCluskey note, studies that have been done of major 
ethics-related training requirements — such as those associated with the US 
National Institute of Health’s (NIH) Responsible Conduct of Research initiative 
— indicate only modest accomplishments in relation to the criteria used to 
measure them. Therefore, caution is prudent in thinking about what works and 
what can work.
Arguably, these points also allude to a fundamental question that has reappeared 
throughout this book; that being: ‘What must be done and by whom?’ As 
included in the Introduction, what counts as appropriate education in areas 
such as biosecurity is often contested because what is considered suitable by 
the way of education in general is often debated. In her chapter, for example, 
Johnson wrote of the basic divide between virtues and skill ethics, as well as 
the complications of philosophers teaching science students. More generally, 
notions about proper education are inextricably bound with the exercise 
of authority and expertise. As such, various types of education are not just 
different ways of achieving the same goal, but themselves are tied to alternative 
answers to the aforementioned question.
The scope for contention is all the greater in relation to matters central to 
Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences. As with other aspects of security, just 
2 As considered as well in Rappert, B., Chevrier, M. and Dando, M. 2006, In-depth implementation of the 
BTWC: Education and outreach, Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 18, available: http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc/ [viewed 1 April 2010];  and see: http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/BiosecuritySeminar/
Education/index.htm.
3 Derived from a reading of National Academies 2009, Ethics education and scientific and engineering research: 
What’s been learned? What should be done? Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
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what ‘biosecurity’ should mean and how it can be achieved are matters on 
which individuals differ. Security, for whom and from what, are only some of 
the topics leading to division. Today, much of the government-level interest in 
biological weapons relates to sub-state terrorist groups. While some of those in 
this volume expressed concern in this regard, others did not. Indeed, many of 
the senior contributors have been working on bioweapon issues long before the 
recent upturn in attention to them. Much of the scepticism about the terrorist 
threat derives from doubts about the ease of inflicting mass casualties through 
disease. Attention is directed instead towards maintaining the resilience of the 
existing stigma and prohibition against the deliberate spread of disease into 
the future — whatever that future brings by the way of new technological 
possibilities and security environments.
Here, as elsewhere in matters of public policy, the ‘process of formulating 
the problem and of conceiving a solution (or re-solution) are identical, since 
every specification of the problem is a specification of the direction in which a 
treatment is considered’.4 In this regard, it is worth noting that discussions to 
date about what needs to be done to prevent the destructive application of the 
life sciences have overwhelmingly been couched within traditional national-
security frameworks. Such contexts have stressed the importance of limiting 
access to materials, agents, findings, equipment, and techniques.5 However, 
it could be argued instead that the question at hand should be one of how 
modern overall science can be entrusted to improve societal wellbeing and 
security — rather than control them, the focus would be with making science 
relevant to societal needs. Tackling this would require addressing how social 
trust is engendered in science and its institutions. That, in turn, is not a matter 
for technical or policy experts only. Rather, it requires a much more inclusive 
societal discussion.
While contributors in this volume have written about the need for ethicists, 
social scientists, and government officials to re-think their commitments and 
practices, the majority of attention has been directed towards those associated 
with the life sciences. In turn, within this diverse group, ‘scientists’ have been 
at the centre of the discussion about education. That has been justified largely 
on the basis of the current lack of professional attention to the hostile use of the 
life sciences, the need for practitioners to become involved if sensible responses 
are to be devised, and the potential contribution to maintaining the current 
prohibition. However, clearly the concerns that motivated Education and Ethics 
in the Life Sciences are not matters for scientists alone.
4 Rittel, H. and Webber, M. 1973, ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, pp. 
155–69.
5 For further elaboration of the limits of current framing of biosecurity, see McLeish, C. 2007, ‘Reflecting on 
the Problem of Dual Use’, in Rappert and McLeish (eds), op. cit.; Vogel, K. 2008, ‘Framing biosecurity’, Science 
and Public Policy, vol. 35(1), pp. 45–54.
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Therefore, it follows from the previous three paragraphs that standards for 
assessing the significance of teaching can be an issue on which people disagree. 
Even if relative accord were reached on what has been taken as a central aim in 
this book — namely, preventing the hostile use of the life sciences — measuring 
the contribution of any education effort to this goal would be problematic. 
Although it is possible to use certain metrics for evaluating education (such 
as improved knowledge and understanding of individuals, and the satisfaction 
of participants with training), these are very much secondary, proxy measures 
in relation to this objective. Such points along with others from this chapter 
suggest the need for vigilance regarding what counts as effective learning.6
So, while proposing models and resources for further efforts to extend education, 
in doing so the contributions to this volume have underscored many areas for 
work that remain. In closing, it is possible to suggest three of these.
1. Widening Engagement: In their study on bioethics education in China, Barr 
and Zhang mentioned what they called a ‘software’ problem, meaning that 
while the facility design met with the required guidelines, the human element 
of biosecurity had been neglected. When considering extending engagement 
with issues of education, it is important to recognise the scenarios in which 
more attention has been spent on developing the facility security than training 
the staff within it. This is a particularly pertinent situation for resource-limited 
countries needing to maximise funding results. Including such countries in 
science-security debates requires sensitivity towards the potential pressures of 
limited physical and human resources as well as different social priorities.7
While US and European academia heavily influence life-science research around 
the world, it is important that each country examines its own ethical tradition 
and how it is unique. Education cannot be merely a case of pushing foreign 
solutions onto life scientists, but should be sensitive to their pressures and 
beliefs. Scientists, science students and others related to the life sciences do not 
present a homogenous group of ethical and cultural affiliations, a fact which 
should be reflected in online repositories. While lack of previous engagement is 
an international challenge, it has the potential to be rendered more acute by a 
lack of culturally appropriate teaching methods and content. Further discussion 
on innovative teaching methods and contextually appropriate case studies will 
no doubt strengthen and support pedagogy in developing countries.
In need of further acknowledgement is the recognition that differing access to 
resources such as the internet (for online learning and discussion groups) may 
6 For a consideration of this theme, see Argyris, C. 2003, ‘A life full of learning’, Organizational Studies, vol. 
24(7), pp. 1178–92.




affect the ease with which initiatives are accessed and utilised. It is important that 
international education projects consider the possible limitations of their choice 
of technology for certain nations. As developing countries are more likely to rely 
on the efforts of champions than their developed counterparts, the significance 
of support and training for invested teachers cannot be overemphasised.
Dando and Whitby also suggest the development of national and regional 
networks that may allow much faster development and uptake of material suitable 
for different countries and regions. This has the potential to become a very 
powerful resource, as local networks would allow issues to be discussed against 
a more similar ethical background. It would also facilitate the development and 
sharing of educational resources that may reflect topical issues and context-
appropriate examples. Networking and collaborative partnerships have been 
strongly encouraged, for example, to develop science and technological 
innovation in sub-Saharan Africa, and it is possible that the support and 
exploitation of existing and future research networks could be a valuable tool 
for expanding the debate.
The process by which policy is developed in individual countries differs, as do 
the range of people involved. Furthermore, the level of public participation in 
policy development varies greatly between nations. Nonetheless, there is an 
international trend towards developing plans on biosecurity in which scientific 
communities could play a major role. As mentioned by Christian Enemark 
in his chapter, ‘by becoming more familiar with political and policymaking 
processes, life scientists might be able to suggest better ways of managing the 
security risks inherent in some research while minimising scientific opportunity 
costs’. This is of vital importance to countries with emerging science-research 
communities. Additionally, with a growing number of collaborations between 
developing and developed countries it is becoming increasingly important that 
scientists from the former have a voice not only in their national debates, but 
also in international research communities. This is necessary in order to have 
their particular situations recognised and considered.
2. Ethics as a Non-issue: As suggested in the Introduction, one the curiosities 
of the contemporary discussion about the security dimensions of the life 
sciences is that while it is often said that any knowledge might be used for 
destructive ends, in practice it has been extremely rare that benignly intended 
civilian research has been identified as posing concerns.8 Arguably this speaks 
to the conceptually confused manner in which the said ‘dual-use’ potential of 
8 Rappert, B. 2008, ‘The risks, benefits, and threats of biotechnology’, Science and Public Policy, February, 
vol. 35(1), pp. 37–44.
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knowledge is conceived. The chapters in Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences 
have indicated the lack of previous engagement with security-related issues 
among practitioners across varied national contexts.
This overall situation raises practical and conceptual questions regarding how 
the security potential of science are and could be assessed. Moving into the 
future, it would seem highly prudent to better understand how, for whom, 
between whom, and under what circumstances the implications of research 
become matters of concern. One way forward along these lines would be to 
examine why practitioners have not identified the potential for destructive 
application of research.9 In other words, what institutional structures, 
professional preoccupations, or other factors, have rendered concerns about the 
damaging use of the life science ‘non-issues’ for so many? Such an approach 
would presumably inform discussions about what kind of education would be 
relevant to practitioners.
3. International Leadership: Practically, it is clear that nascent efforts could 
be strengthened through international co-ordination and leadership. What is 
needed is a forum for building high-level agreement about what should be done 
and sharing experiences.
As a key cornerstone of the prohibition and stigmatisation of biological weapons, 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) could help fulfil such 
roles in the future. As noted in this volume, education has been identified as 
an important topic between governments party to the treaty in recent years. 
Indeed, as Dando and Whitby document, explicit international recognition of 
the significance of the awareness and education of life scientists runs back to 
the Second BTWC Review Conference in 1986. However, as they also suggest, 
this recognition in itself has not been sufficient to deliver adequate concrete 
measures. Therefore, what is needed is a plan for concerted action. That plan 
could include mutual targets, deadlines, and milestones; the establishment 
of international and/or regional co-ordinators; a programme of international 
workshops; and agreed bilateral and multilateral assistance.
Perhaps what is needed most for the future is a collective vision among states, 
intergovernmental organisations and members of civilian society. As part of an 
address to the Meeting of Experts of the BTWC in 2008, one of the authors 
(Rappert) proposed such elements for a shared vision, including agreeing:
…all those graduating from higher education in fields associated with 
the life sciences should be familiar with the international prohibition 
against biological weapons;
9 Eliasoph, N. 1998, Avoiding politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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…all those undertaking professional research careers should have 
received effective training or instruction related to preventing the 
misuse of their research;
…each government should commit itself to initiating a dialogue with 
their respective national science academies (or other relevant bodies) 
about how the present low level of awareness can be swiftly corrected. 
Regardless of whether or not these elements are proper, current discussions and 
efforts would do well to organise themselves around such positive shared goals 
that are subject to joint questioning.
As outlined in the Introduction, if handled properly, concerted attention and 
action to education in the BTWC could help ensure that conventions remain 
meaningful and robust moving ahead. The 2011 BTWC Review Conference 
provides an opportunity to formulate and arrange such a plan; one that should 
not be lost. The formation of such a shared agenda between governments could 
open a new chapter of reflection on how to ensure the prohibition of biological 
weapons.
